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Show 46 TIIE FEDERAL CONVEPTION. It docs not appear that in any of these cases the re· formed system was to be otherwise sanctioned than by the legislative authority of the States ; nor whr1 her, nor how far a chan o·e was to be made in the structure · of the de- ' 0 po ·itory of federal powers. 'rhe Act of Virginia, providing for the Convention at Philadelphia, was snccecoed by appointments from the other States, as their legislatu res were assembled, the appoinlmenls being selections from the mo ·t experienced and high-standing citizens. Rholle Island was the only exception to a com pli ~wce wilh the recommendation from Annapolis, well known to have been swayed by an oLdurate adherence to an advantnge, which her position gave her, of taxing her nci O'hbors thron crh the it· consumption of imported suppli es-an advantage which it was fore cen would be taken from ller by u revi."al of the Articles of Confederation. As the public mind lutd been ripened for a sulntary reform of the political system, in the interval between the proposal and the meeting of the Commis ioners ut .Annapolis, the interval between this last event and the meeting of Deputies at Philadelphia, had con ti nuecl to develop more and more the necessity an<l the extent of a systematic provi ion for the preservation and governn1ent of the Union. A.mong the ripening incident s, was the insurrection of Shays, in Massachusetts, against her government, which was with difficulty suppressed, notwithstanding the influence on the insurgents of an apprehended iutcrposition of the federal troops. A.t the elate of the Convention, the aspect al)d retrospect of the political condition of the United States could not but fill the public mind with a gloom, which was relieved only by a hope that so select a body would devise an adequate remedy for the existing and prospective evils so im· pressively demanding it. THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 47 It was seen that the public debt, rendered so sacred by the cause in which it had been incurred, remained without any provision for its payment. The r eiterated and elaborate effo rts of Congress, to procure from the States a more adequate power to rai c the means of payment, had failed. 'rhc effect of the ordinary requi sitions of Congress bad only displayed the in efficiency of the authority making them ; none of the States having duly complied with them, some huvi11g failed altogether, or nearly so, while in one in stance, that of New J crsey, a compliance was expressly refused ; nor was more yielded to the expostulations of members of Congress, deputed to her legislature, than a mere repeal ?f the law, without a compliance. The want of authority m Congress to regulate commerce had produced in forci()"'n • . b ~~tw.ns, particularly Great Britain, a monopolizing policy, InJnnous to the trade of the United States, and destructive to their navigation; the imbeci li ty, and an ticipated dissolution of the Confederacy, extingni hing all apprehensions of a countervailing policy on the part of the United States. The same want of a general power over commerce, led to an exercise of the power, separately, by the States, which not only proved abortive, bnt engendered rival, conflicting, an~ angry re~nlations. Be ide the vain attempts to supply the1r respective treasuries by imposts, which turned their commerce into the neighboring ports, and to coerce a relaxation of the British monopoly of the West India navigation, which was attempted by Virginia, the States having ~orts for foreign commerce, taxed and irritated the adjoinlng .Stat~s t.r~ding through them-as New York, Pennsylvama, VIrg111w., and South Carolina. Some of the States as Connecticut, taxed imports from .others, as from ~1n , a~ chusetts, which complained in a letter to the Executive of :it·~inia, and. doubile s to those of other States. In sun-ry Instances, as of New York, New J ersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, the navigation laws treated tlle citizens of |