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Show 462 DARWINISM CHAP. manifestations of intelligence, amounting in some cases to distinct acts of reasoning, in many animals, are adduced as exhibiting in a much less degree the intelligence. and reason of man. Instances of curiosity, imitation, attentwn, wonder, and memory are given; while ex~mples are ~lso addu?e~ which may be interpreted as pro:mg t~at ammals exhibit kindness to their fellows, or mamfest p~Ide, contempt, and shame. Some are said to have the rudiments of la~guage, because they utter several different sounds, e~ch of wh1eh has a definite meaning to their fellows or to thCir young ; others the rudiments of arithmetic, because they seem to count and remember up to three, four, or even ~ve. A s~nse of beauty is imputed to them on a.ccoun~ of t~Cir own bn~ht colours or the use of coloured obJects m their nests; while dogs, cats, and horses are said to have imagination, because th~y appear to be disturbed by dreams. Even some distant approach to the rudiments of religion is said to be found in the deep love and complete submission of a dog to .his. master.1 • TurninO' from animals to man, It IS shown that m the lowest sav~ges many of these faculties ar~ very l~ttle ad':anced from the condition in which they appear m the higher ammals; while others, although fairly well exhibited, are yet great~y inferior to the point of development they ha:ve r.eached m civilised races. In particular, the moral sense IS said to have been developed from the social instincts of savages, and to depend mainly on the enduring disc~mfort produced by ~n y action which excites the general disapproval of the tnbe. Thus, every act of an individual. which . is b~lieved to . be contrary to the interests of the. tribe, excites. Its unvarymg disapprobation and is held to be Immoral; :Vh1le every ~ct, 0!1 the other hand which is, as a rule, beneficial to the tnbe, Is warmly and c~nstantly approved, and is thus considered to be right or moral. From the mental strugg~e, when an .acL that would benefit self is injurious to the tnbe, there ~n cs conscience · and thus the social instincts are the foundation of the moral ~ense and of the fundamental principles of morality. 2 The question of the origin and nature of the mor~l sense and of conscience is far too vast and complex to be discussed 1 For a full discussion of all these points, see Descent of Man, chap. iii. t Descent of Man, chap. iv. XV DARWINISM APPLIED TO MAN 463 here, and a reference to it has been introduced only to complete the sketch of Mr. Darwin's view of the continuity and gradual development of all human faculties from the lmver animals up to savages, and from savage up to civilised man. The point to which I wish specially to call attention i , that to prove continuity and the progressive development of the intellectual and moral faculties from animals to man, is not the same as proving that these faculties have been developed by natural selection; and this last is what Mr. Darwin has hardly attempted, although to support his theory it was ab olutely es.·ential to prove it. Because man's physical structure has been developed from an animal form by natural selection, it does not necessarily follow that his mental nature, even though developed pari passu with it, has been developed by the same causes only. To illustrate by a physical analogy. Upheaval and depression of land, combined with sub-aerial denudation by wind and frost, rain and rivers, and marine denudation on coastlines, were long thought to account for all the modelling of the earth's surface not directly due to volcanic action ; and in the early editions of Lyell's Principles of Geology these are the sole causes appealed to. But when the action of glaciers was studied and the recent occurrence of a glacial epoch demonstrated as a fact, many phenomena-such as moraines and other gravel deposits, boulder clay, erratic boulders, grooved and rounded rocks, and Alpine lake basins-were seen to be due to this altogether distinct cause. There was no breach of continuity, no sudden catastrophe; the cold period came on and passed away in the most gradual manner, and its effects often passed insensibly into those produced by denudation or upheaval; yet none the less a new agency appeared at a definite time, and new effects were produced which, though continuous with preceding effects, were not due to the same causes. It is not, therefore, to be assumed, without proof or against independent evidence, that the later stages of an apparently continuous development are necessarily due to the same causes only as the earlier stages. . Applying this argument to the case of man's intellectual and moral nature, I propose to show that certain definite portions of it could not have been developed by variation :md natural selection alone, and that, therefore, some other influence, law, or agency is |