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Show HINCKLEY JOURNAL OF POLITICS SPRING 2001 The Sanctions Dilemma: Saddam vs. the UN By Amy DeFrank Sanctions against Iraq are a contentious subject both within the United States government and within the United Nations. This paper examines the effectiveness of the United Nations' enforcement mechanism, the multinational Maritime Interception Force (MIF), as well as the humanitarian and economic effects of the sanctions upon Iraq. An analysis of the risks and benefits of ending the sanctions concludes that due to the limited effectiveness of the MIF, the sanctions in their current form are not worth the resources or the political capital required to maintain them. INTRODUCTION The controversy over the employment of economic sanctions as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy did not begin, nor will it end, with the sanctions regime currently in place against Iraq. The sanctions were first instituted on August 6, 1990, with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 661. This resolution imposed a broad range of economic sanctions on Iraq in response to its invasion of Kuwait in hopes of compelling Iraq to withdraw from the country (United Nations Security Council 2000). These measures have been modified numerous times by the UN in the intervening decade, yet they remain as an ongoing attempt to contain Iraq and force it to conform to international will and standards. When these sanctions were first imposed, it was with the backing of a large majority in the international community. However, in recent years, that once broadly based coalition of states has begun to crumble, often pitting the U.S. and the United Kingdom against other Security Council member nations on the issue of sanctions. Even within the U.S., an increasing number are speaking out against Iraqi sanctions and calling for them to be lifted, particularly due to the poor humanitarian situation in that country. An entire book would be required to examine the sanctions regime in its totality. Therefore, this paper focuses only upon selected aspects, beginning with a component of the enforcement side of the regime - the multinational Maritime Interception Force (MIF). It examines and evaluates the operations of the MIF, and offers conclusions about the sanctions policy. Amy DeFrank earned a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Political Science, a certificate in International Relations, and minors in History and French from the University of Utah. She will be pursuing an M.A. in Security Policy Studies at George Washington University. THE OPERATIONS AND FAILINGS OF THE MIF The MIF derives its authority from UN Security Council Resolution 665, passed on August 25, 1990 (United Nations Security Council 2000). As a maritime force in the Persian Gulf charged with the enforcement of sanctions against Iraq, the MIF intercepts and boards vessels in international waters suspected of carrying contraband, particularly illegally exported Iraqi oil. Though the U.S. by far has always played the largest role in the MIF, it was originally conceived as a force comprised of assets from a significant number of nations. However, the U.S. currently provides an overwhelming majority of the forces used for these operations, with the UK being the only other consistent contributor (U.S. House Committee 2000). Recently, the U.S. Department of State has become increasingly engaged in an effort to encourage old and new MIF partner countries to participate more actively by contributing ships and personnel to help enforce the sanctions. However, as present support for the sanctions regime in general is relatively low, this has been somewhat of an uphill struggle. At this time, the majority of the vessels comprising the MIF are diverted from the U.S. carrier group stationed in the Gulf. In all, the U.S. maintains a presence of approximately thirty vessels in the area, which are called upon to perform a wide variety of duties (U.S. House Committee 2000). Since its inception in 1990, the MIF has queried more than 28,000 vessels, boarded over 12,000, and diverted over 700 for carrying illegal cargo (Department of State 2000b). Despite these seemingly impressive numbers, the MIF only intercepts a small fraction of the smugglers operating in the Gulf. State Department personnel involved in the process believe the MIF intercepts only five to ten percent of the smugglers moving through the Gulf. In fact, it has been estimated that oil smuggling topped over 100,000 barrels per day in January 2000. Subsequent rises in oil prices provide incentives to continue, and indeed increase smuggling activities (Department of State 2000b). 27 |