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Show 438 ON THE ll'YIMEDIATE CAUSES (CH. VII. n1ent, where the chances are so d.readfully against our attaining the object of our search. It is not perhaps e~sy to say to what extent the abolition of the law of primogeniture and entails would divide the landed property of this country. If the po\ver oftestatnentary bequest were left untouched, it is possible that past habits might still keep many estates together for a ti1ne; but the probabilities are, that by degrees a considerable subdivision of land would take place ; and if there were fevv estates of above a thousand a year, the n1ercantile classes would either be induced to moderate their exertions in the acquisition of wealth, from the absence of the n1otive of competition with the landlords, as I stated above; or, if the merchants and manufacturers were still to acquire great wealth, excited either by a competition with each other or by political an1bition, they would be the only persons who could possess great influence in the state ; and the government of the country would fall almost "'~holly into their hands. In neither case, probably, could our prestnt constitution be maintained. In the first, ,vhere the property of individuals would be so inconsiderable, and so equal, the tendencies \\rou1d be either to de1nocracy or military despotism, with the chances greatly in favour of the latter. And in the second case, whatever might be the form of governn1ent, the n1erchants and manufacturers would have the greatest influence in its councils; and it is justly ob· served by Adam Smith, that the interests of these SEC. VII.] OF THE PROGRESS OF WEALTH. 439 classes do not always prepare them to give the most salutary advice. Although therefore it be true that a better distribution of landed property n1ight exist than that which actually prevails in this country at present; and although it be also true, that to make it better, the distribution should be more equal; yet it may by no means be wise to abolish the law of pritnogeniture, which \Vould be likely to lead to a subdivision of land greater probably than would be favourable even to the wealth of the country; and greater certainly than would be consistent 'vith those higher interests, which relate to the protection of a people equally from the tyranny of despotic rulers, and the fury of a despotic n1ob. But, \vhatever conduct the \visdon1 and policy of a legislature n1ay dictate respecting the laws of succession, the principle will still be true, that the division of landed property is on~ of the great means of the distribution of wealth, which tends to keep up and increase its exchangeable value, and to encourage further production; and that the distribution so occasioned will, as it extends, continue to produce a n1ore favourable effect on \vealth, till it meets its antagonist principle, and begins to interfere with the power of production. This will take place sooner or later, according to circum- . stances, depending chiefly upon the activity of foreign and dotnestic commerce, and the mass of effective demanders besides the landlords. If the demand be great, independently of the land, a FP'4 |
