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Show SACRIFICING DEMOCRACY IN THE NAME OF PROSPERITY: THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN POLITICS AND ECONOMICS IN SINGAPOREAN DEVELOPMENT Nick Barker tions that, taken together, distinguish modern representative democracy from all other political systems, whether non-democratic regimes or earlier democratic systems" (Dahl 1989, 218). In addition to the criteria of polyarchy, Pierre Schmitter's and Terry Lynn Karl's extension of Dahl's pol-yarchic ideal will be used to determine whether Singapore's regime can or cannot be considered democratic. Structurally, the paper focuses first on historical circumstances, with a description of the economic policies and development that established Singapore's place in the international arena. Afterwards, the focus is on the political situation, and how developments in this area have affected democracy in Singapore. The focus is on developments since Singapore's liberation from Japan in 1945, since it was in this political vacuum that the dominant forces shaping modern Singapore arose. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE BIRTH OF THE PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY AND ESTABLISHING A SINGAPOREAN STATE There were two important developments that occurred between 1945, when Britain reclaimed Singapore from the Japanese, and 1965, when Singapore became an independent nation. The first development saw the People's Action Party become the dominant political force in Singapore. The second development was the failed attempt to unite Singapore with its larger neighbor Malaya, in order to decrease its international vulnerability and open up its markets to Singaporean business. On the first issue, Singapore had traditionally been ruled by the Progressive Party, whose colonial politics subordinated Singaporean interests to those of Britain. Beginning in the 1950s, a sudden increase in unionization and the politiciza-tion of the working class (of whom the majority were ethnic Chinese) led to the emergence of credible left-wing parties, which wrested power away from the status quo Progressives. The People's Action Party (PAP), directed by party chief (and future Prime Minister) Lee Kuan Yew, came to dominate Singaporean politics through its moderate, anti-colonial stance and its effective socioeconomic policies. In the 1959 election campaign, the PAP offered a constructive program of economic and social reform, promising to "tackle the problems of education, labor, trade unions, social security, housing, rural development, health and the status of women" (Turnbull 1989, 263). They also pledged to unite Singapore with the Malayan Federation, and these promises resulted in the PAP winning 43 of the 51 assembly seats (Turnbull 1989, 263), for the first time giving Singapore a strong working majority in parliament. This brings up the second major development: the PAP wanted to merge with the Malayan Federation because this would afford Singapore political security while at the same time improving the economy by creating a much larger market. The economic program put forward by Finance Minister Goh Keng Swee "was based upon achieving a common market with the Federation and encouraging industrialization in conjunction with private, and if need be foreign, capital" (Turnbull 1989, 266). Swee noted that "the political reason for the merger has a strong economic basis," because "major changes in our economy are only possible if Singapore and the Federation are integrated as one economy" (Turnbull 1989, 267). A major obstacle to the merger came when radicals within the PAP opposed to the merger split to form the Barisan Sosialis. The new party quickly became a potent political force, as two-thirds of organized labor and forty-three unions immediately pledged their support (Turnbull 1989, 272). To measure public opinion, the government held a referendum on the merger in September 1962. Seventy-one percent of the electorate supported the proposals, while twenty-five percent showed their disapproval by returning blank or spoiled votes (Turnbull 1989, 273). The PAP waited for the 1963 election, thinking that the voters would give the party some mandate for policy. Before this election, the PAP emphasized its effective economic and social policies. Chief among these was the buildup of community centers, which provided recreation facilities, literacy classes, radio/television, along with social services, housing, education and health facilities. The PAP saw these tangible benefits to the population as proof of its viability as a ruling party. However, it also used every legal means (and some extra-legal) to disadvantage the Barisan and guide the election in its favor, such as excluding imprisoned Barisan leaders from running for office by requiring in-person application, freezing the funds of "hostile" unions, and withdrawing the registration of seven Barisan-dominated unions (Turnbull 1989, 277). In the end, however, the 1963 election was a clear victory for the PAP - it won 37 of the 51 seats. This marked the advantages afforded to the PAP from the system of single-member constituency voting districts without proportional representation: the PAP won 73 percent of the seats while receiving less than 47 percent of the total vote (Turnbull 1989, 278). Additionally, half of the Barisan's executive committee was jailed by the Internal Security Council for supporting a communist rebellion in Brunei. After the election, there was nothing to stand in the way of the merger. So in August 1963, Lee declared Singapore free from British rule, and in September the Federation of Malaysia was born. Afterwards, Lee and the PAP rushed into federal politics. Malay leaders were apprehensive, however, believing that Singapore's majority ethnic Chinese politicians were rallying the mainland Chinese to their cause, flaring ethnic tensions. In 1965, faced with the possibility of race riots, federation leaders decided that Singapore could not be a part of Malaysia, and Singapore's forced independence was proclaimed on 9 August 1965. Due to the political and military vulnerability of the small island, Singaporean independence was perceived as a |