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Show HINCKLEY JOURNAL OF POLITICS 2002/2003 integrity? Consider that in Singapore, high court judges receive S$700,000 (about US$380,000) per year plus a minimum bonus of three months' salary, besides the perks of a car and a government bungalow at economic rent (Seow 1999, 118). Compare this to the salaries of U.S. justices: Federal District Court Judges receive $150,000/year, while the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is the highest paid at $192,600/year (Walsh 2002, A8). As one lawyer asked, "is this kind of money a salary or an income of permanent bribery" (Glen How, QC, quoted in Seow 1999, 118)? Another valid principle is that "courts in a democracy...should be accessible to all litigants" (Seow 1999, 119). However, this has not been the case in Singapore, ever since Chief Justice Yong imposed a graduated hearing fee scheme as a "fiscal measure" in 1991. "The courts," he said, "will have to be run as efficiently as the best businesses" (Singapore Law .Review 1991, 16), and because court time is a scare resource, it must be allocated efficiently. After one free day, a fee of S$l,500/day is imposed in the high court, increasing to S$3,000 per day after ten days (Seow 1999, 119). This clearly hurts the lower and middle classes' ability to both pursue litigation and defend themselves from it. In short, Singaporean courts are no longer the check on arbitrary power that Lee described them as in 1967. Opposition candidates have been harassed in court, and not only were appeals to the Privy Council abolished, so was the democratic safeguard of trial by jury. Additionally, it's likely that the PAP's discretion over judges' salaries equates bribery. Finally, equal access to the courts has been denied to the lower and middle classes through the graduated fee scheme for time in court. Additionally, there is an inconsistency between the PAP's extravagant salaries for high court justices and the need to charge litigants for court time. Given that both policies exist, it is inexplicable to claim that the courts simply do not have enough resources. If this were the case, resources could simply be reallocated from salaries to operating costs. But because justices continue to be paid so extravagantly while potential litigants are left without access to the courts, ulterior motives are likely at work. It is much easier to believe a scenario where the PAP has engineered the court system to serve its own interests; extravagant salaries and in-kind benefits provided to justices ensure that when PAP interests are on the line, decisions will be made in its favor. Additionally, charging for court access excludes poorer citizens from engaging in the legal process. Considering that minority groups (such as Singapore's Malay population) constitute a disproportionately large number of the lower and middle classes, policies such as this are further tainted because they serve to marginalize these already disempowered groups. Thus, either one of two conclusions can be drawn. First, that the Singaporean government is using a standard (albeit a double standard) of economic efficiency in formulating the court hearing fee policy, and thereby placing justice (as the product of a free and fair judicial system) second to financial considerations. A second possibility is that money is not really a factor, but merely an excuse for the PAP dominated government to further exclude marginalized groups from the political process. In either case, the result is the same: democratic ideals such as justice and fairness are subjugated to the will of the dominant party. Regardless, the court hearing fee scheme is only one part of a broader judicial policy formulated by the PAP to subjugate the court system to its will and use it as a tool to harass and undermine its perceived "enemies," whose only crime is opposing the dominant party (and not necessarily its ideology). THE PAP's DOMINANCE OF PARLIAMENT "If I were in authority in Singapore indefinitely, without having to ask those who are governed whether they like what is being done, then I have not the slightest doubt that I could govern more effectively in their own interests." Lee Kuan Yew, 1962 (Selvan 1990, 247) I noted that the PAP retained complete control of parliament for the thirteen-year period between 1968-1981, when Jeyaretnam was elected. How was this dominance established? Beginning in 1965, citizens' consultative committees were set up in each electoral district, and though they were designed to be independent of party organization, they inevitably became organs of the PAP, "a means of supporting the party and attracting new blood to its ranks.. .they were sounding boards for public opinion, not vehicles for criticism or opposition" (Turnbull 1989, 308). With its monopoly of patronage and power, "the party could co-opt or neutralize potential dissenters" (Turnbull 1989, 307), and it was in this way that the PAP established its political hegemony. Additionally, "the power structure was extremely centralized...characterized by a top-down style" (LePoer 1991, 196), meaning that "power was gained through skill, performance, and demonstrated loyalty to the leaders and their policies" (LePoer 1991, 196). Therefore, once the PAP's political dominance was established, it would not be easily dislodged. The Singaporean government likes to paint a more equitable picture of the distribution of power: in its official publication on Singapore (intended for foreigners and tourists), Singapore Facts and Pictures (1995), the government has a list of all 23 political parties that have been registered since the end of World War II. Lacking, however are any statistics on the number of MPs from each party, any note on the repression of certain parties (like the Barisan Sosialis), or an explanation of other matters that would clarify the actual political situation in Singapore. This refusal to provide relevant political information might result from the PAP's idea that the general public need not involve themselves in politics, because the political elite can do the best job. In support of this idea, some claim that PAP candidates are given IQ and psychological tests intend- 13 |