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Show THE UNITED NATION'S OPERATIONS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: SHORTCOMINGS IN CROATIA AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA Amity N. James wore off, however, it soon became apparent to all parties involved that the UN was not going to be able to solve the problem. After waiting for solutions that never came from the UN, the parties to the conflict in Croatia began to take the initiative on their own behalf. Time and again cease-fires were broken (by both sides), especially once they realized that the UN was going to do little, if anything, to stop them militarily. During 1993 a stalemate frustrated UN negotiators, as both sides refused to cooperate. The year 1993 was, in fact, characterized by stalemate, shaky cease-fire agreements, and subsequent violations of said agreements. The UN was not making headway in Croatia. THE SIXTH UN MISTAKE During the UN's preoccupation with Croatia, the situation in Bosnia flared up. UNPROFOR didn't even have a presence there until mid-1992, and even then it was only to provide aid and relief. In many ways, the situation in Bosnia was far more distressful than that in Croatia. This is true largely due to two factors. These were: Croatian dominance over Serbs in Croatia, and the addition of a third party to the conflict in Bosnia. In Croatia, the Serb population was much smaller than that of the Serb population in Bosnia, leveling out the playing field a little in Bosnia. Also, Serbs in Croatia were forced to flee by the thousands to bordering countries including Bosnia, swelling the Serbian population there even more. The presence of a fairly large Muslim community in Bosnia also added to the chaos. As a result, each party to the conflict in Bosnia was forced to contend with two enemies instead of one. The fact that the tenuous situation in Bosnia was largely ignored and then only offered humanitarian aid is ironic. The area that needed the most help from the UN got the least. This is the sixth shortcoming of the UN's operations in Croatia/Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the beginning UNPROFOR's deployment into Bosnia-Herzegovina had four major goals. One was to aid Sarajevo, unquestionably the hardest hit city in Bosnia. This city was also important because it was home to the Sarajevo airport, a necessity to fly in supplies and aid, as well as a route out of Bosnia for troops and civilians. Another goal of UNPROFOR-Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR-BH) was the escort of humanitarian relief. This goal was much harder to achieve in Bosnia than in Croatia because the Bosnian Serbs were far more aggressive and far less cooperative than their counterparts in Croatia. The UN finally had to call on NATO to implement its humanitarian relief goal. This step was actually fairly sucessful for UNPROFOR-BH because the addition of NATO, along with its air strike authorization, gave the mission a little leverage over the conflicting parties. After continual trouble with Bosnian Serbs, UNPROFOR's mandate was expanded to include the creation of a no-fly zone which was to be monitored and enforced by NATO forces. Also included in the extended mandate in the spring of 1993 was the creation of 'safe zones' in major towns such as Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Gorazde. The last goal at this time was to create weapons exclusions zones, and to try and implement a Muslim-Croat federation. This move was prompted by a major attack on Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serbs. Also a result of this action was the authorization of NATO to back up UNPROFOR-BH with air strikes if necessary. NATO complied and began to issue ultimatums to both parties. At this time NATO demanded that heavy artillery and weapons be pulled back to a certain distance from safe zones, and weapons were to be handed over to UNPROFOR personnel for safekeeping. NATO also declared that failure to comply would result in air strikes. This action helped to create the weapons exclusions zones, and an alliance, albeit a tenuous one, was formed between the Muslims and Croats. At this point, it seemed as though the UN was finally headed in the right direction. THE SEVENTH UN MISTAKE Mistake number seven was right on the heels of these few UN successes. Necessary relief was still blocked by the Bosnian Serbs and not enough supplies were being brought in to ease the suffering of Bosnian civilians. Massive airdrops had to be executed, mainly by the United States. Also, weapons exclusions zones and UN safe areas began to be violated constantly by the Bosnian Serbs. The mistake made by the UN at this point was that NATO (authorized by the UN) continually threatened to conduct air strikes, but never followed through with these threats. By late 1993, the Serbs had heard NATO's threats so many times, always without result that they ceased to see NATO or the UN as a threat. This undermined their credibility and allowed the Serbs to do whatever they wanted. By early 1994, the Serbs had bombed a town, attacked major UN safe zones, and even taken members of the UN peacekeeping force hostage. This extreme behavior still failed to elicit a major air strike from NATO, although it did elicit a few minor strikes on weapons and military sites. This last failure was largely due to the five permanent members of the Security Council. The Security Council hesitated to authorize major air strikes due to the veto power of the five permanent members. The United Kingdom, as well as France, would not authorize air strikes because of the large amount of ground troops each of them had contributed to UNPROFOR. The United Kingdom had around 3,000 peacekeepers on the ground while France had over 4,500 troops committed to UNPROFOR (Higgins 1993, 472). They would not risk the lives of their soldiers to punish the Bosnian Serbs. As a result, the UN failed to force the Bosnian Serbs into compliance. 1994 and 1995 were not very good years for UNPROFOR neither in Croatia nor Bosnia-Herzegovina. By mid-1995 the Croats in Croatia tired of waiting for a resolution from the UN and launched a major attack against the Serbs. The assault was so successful for them that they managed to drive hundreds of thousands of Serbs out of Croatia, winning huge territories in the process. This assault cut right through 46 |