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Show THE UNITED NATION'S OPERATIONS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: SHORTCOMINGS IN CROATIA AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA Amity N. James seven actions contributed to the eventual failure of the UN's peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslavia and created one of the worst peacekeeping disasters in the United Nation's history. While it is easy to see what could have been done better in hindsight, it is not always so easy to see clearly while in the midst of a crisis. This is why it is so important to come up with corrections for the UN's actions in the former Yugoslavia. This paper will discuss possible solutions to the UN's errors in order to determine what might be helpful in future operations. The most obvious correction is taking immediate action in a crisis. As will be shown, the United Nations failed to do this in the Yugoslav crisis, a mistake that cost a great deal. Another solution is to modify structural arrangements of the UN's internal organization. Systems of UN peacekeeping funding currently in place are lacking and therefore reduce the effectiveness of the missions. Changes in the payment system could help future operations to be more effective. Finally, a simple, yet helpful, solution to preventing future conflicts is to obtain a fundamental understanding of the cause of the Yugoslav conflict and what went wrong in the UN operation there. By doing this, we can gain invaluable knowledge that may prevent conflict from breaking out in other unstable regions. BACKGROUND The crisis in the former Yugoslavia began in 1990 when the ruling communist party collapsed amidst growing ethnic tensions and economic hardships. When the communist party collapsed, multi-party elections were held resulting in a Croat majority in the republican legislature. In turn, the Croat Nationalist party majority elected their leader, Franco Tudjman, as President of Croatia. Shortly thereafter, Serb populations in Croatia created their own parliament and declared themselves to be autonomous. Similar events occurred all over the former Yugoslavia. With the nation of Slovenia leading the way, many former Yugoslav republics began to declare independence. This provoked the Yugoslav National Army into action. The first goal of the Yugoslav army was to keep Yugoslavia united. Failing that, their second objective was to try and keep Serbian communities in the separate republics attached to the majority Serbian population in Serbia. The first signs of serious conflict occurred in Croatia when the Yugoslav National Army attempted to protect the seriously outnumbered Serbian minority there. Shortly after the first troubles appeared in Croatia, the country was engulfed in an all out civil war. SEVEN MISTAKES MADE BY THE UN DURING THE CRISIS While there were many flaws to the UN's operations in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the following seven critical errors were the main causes of the UN's failures in the former Yugoslavia. THE FIRST UN MISTAKE The international community, in the form of the UN, sat by at the beginning of the crisis and did nothing. This was the first critical mistake made. One main reason for inaction was that the international community in general and the European community in particular, were more concerned with the turmoil created by the end of the Cold War at the time. The early signs of trouble in Yugoslavia were either overshadowed by the shakeup caused by the end of the Cold War, or not taken seriously by those who did notice the rumblings there. Many observers simply believed that the noise coming out of Yugoslavia was merely the result of the Communist Party's loss of power and that nothing serious would come of it. Also a factor in the overlooked tension of Yugoslavia was the West's (especially the United States') involvement in the Persian Gulf War. The United States was involved in the Gulf War until mid-1991, and the war there was dominating international interest and headlines. Also contributing to inaction at this time was the fact that many European populations have ties to many of the ethnic groups in the Balkans. With such ties present, many European countries were prejudiced in favor of one ethnic group or another, resulting in conflicting opinions within the UN as to the appropriate course of action. This circumstance made it next to impossible for the UN to react immediately, even had the international community been inclined to do so (Durch and Schear 1996, 200-230). This incapacity to act allowed the imminent crisis to erupt into a violent civil war. In fact, William J. Durch and James A. Schear go so far as to claim that "As a result, pressures that might have been dissipated by concerted international action early on were allowed to build to explosive levels" (1996, 199). None of the major powers wanted the responsibility of handling the Yugoslav crisis, especially the United States. The United States had enough to deal with in handling the Persian Gulf War and did not want to engage in a protracted, violent struggle. Other European nations didn't relish the idea of being involved either, but they felt more obligated to deal with it because of their proximity to the conflict. Thus, the rest of the international community was more than happy to oblige when the European Community finally insisted on handling this conflict. THE SECOND UN MISTAKE Allowing the EC to take charge of the situation was the second big mistake made by the UN. The UN relied on Article 33, as well as Chapter 8, of the United Nations Charter to excuse itself from early intervention. These state that disputes can and should be handled locally or even regionally before being brought before the Security Council. Under the Charter, the UN acted legitimately in this crisis, but the end 44 |