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Show HINCKLEY JOURNAL OF POLITICS 2002/2003 gave them a stranglehold on power in more stable times" (Turnbull 1989, 305). Lee noticed this tendency as early as 1965, when he remarked that Singapore had too great a concentration of executive power, needed to "liberalize the constitution," and make the "executive authority less inhibitive to the legislature and the judiciary" (Turnbull 1989, 306). This statement is characteristic of the early Lee, before the PAP had sacrificed its commitment to democracy and social equality in the name of economic prosperity. After a healthy economy was established, Lee and the PAP took drastic measures to keep their stranglehold on power, and ensure that their vision for Singapore would not be betrayed. THE SECOND STAGE: THE TRANSITION FROM PAP GUIDANCE TO SOCIAL CONTROL The PAP's spectacular success in the early years of independence instilled an egotistic paternalism in the political leadership, who felt it their duty to retain control of the government and guide Singapore down the proper path. The discussion in this section will look at these developments in four areas: 1) institutional developments in the judicial sphere, 2) PAP control of the political process and the Parliament, 3) government infringement on civil liberties, notably the press, and 4) the government's attempts at social engineering. Many of the actions taken by the PAP in these four areas seem offensive to anyone who possesses strong democratic sensibilities. However, to provide a more rigorous framework for the evaluation of these policies, Robert Dahl has outlined seven conditions that must be met in order for modern procedural representative democracy, or "polyarchy" to exist (Dahl 1989, 221): 1) Elected officials. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials. 2) Free and fair elections. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion in comparatively uncommon. 3) Inclusive suffrage. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials. 4) Right to run for office. Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the government, though age limits may be higher for holding office than for the suffrage. 5) Freedom of expression. Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the socioeconomic order, and the prevailing ideology. 6) Alternative information. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by laws. 7) Associational autonomy. To achieve their various rights, including those listed above, citizens also have a right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups. I will apply these standards to the situation in Singapore throughout this analysis. Dahl considers the institutions of polyarchy as necessary but not sufficient conditions for the "highest feasible attainment of the democratic process," with many gradations of democracy possible (Dahl 1989, 222). However, this essay is necessarily a normative analysis, constituting value judgements that Singapore apologists would rather ignore: "no one claims that Singapore is a Western-style democracy, except in terms of a narrow definition that requires free elections" (Neher 1999, 51). Singaporeans believe that they have a democratic government, "reflecting the procedural components of elections, a functioning parliament, and a modicum of civil liberties" (Neher 1999, 51). Furthermore, apologists claim that Singaporeans don't want a Western-style "polyarchic democracy," because data suggest that most Singaporeans feel they are less capable of handling personal freedom than the political elite (Neher 1999, 48). Nevertheless, because many people both in Singapore and elsewhere are interested in seeing a more democratic regime develop, it's important to understand how the PAP reacts to challenges to its dominance. A good starting point is the 1981 Anson District by-election, because it presented the first serious challenge to PAP dominance, and as a case study, the reactions of the PAP demonstrate its attitudes towards pluralism and democracy. THE 1981 ANSON ELECTION In this election, Workers' Party candidate J.B. Jeyaretnam was elected to parliament with 52 percent of the vote. This shocked the PAP, which had held every seat since the 1968 election. In its eyes, elections were "a means to express passive dissatisfaction, not to elect opposition members" (Turnbull 1989, 319). Said Minister of Culture Rajaratnam, "the role of an opposition is to ensure bad government" (Turnbull 1989, 319). The PAP initially responded to the election with intimidation: editors of the local press were instructed not to cover the activities of opposition parties. The opposition was undaunted, so the PAP took more drastic measures. In 1985, Jeyaretnam was charged with making false declarations of his party's accounts. He was initially acquitted by Senior District Judge Michael Khoo, known as "one of the ablest and most intellectually honest judges to grace the bench" (Seow 1999, 110). As a result of his unwelcome decision, Khoo was immediately transferred to an administrative position in the Attorney General's office as punishment (Seow 1999, 110). Afterwards, Chief Justice Wee allowed the prosecution to appeal, with the caveat that another judge hear the case. The result was predictable: Jeyaretnam was found guilty and convicted. His appeal to Britain's Privy Council (the highest court in Singapore's legal system, and the most impartial) was denied (Seow 1999, 110). However, the court did decrease his prison sentence from three months to one, while adding a compensating fine that was sufficiently high as to disqualify him from sitting in parliament (Seow 1999, 110). 11 |