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Show SACRIFICING DEMOCRACY IN THE NAME OF PROSPERITY: THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN POLITICS AND ECONOMICS IN SINGAPOREAN DEVELOPMENT Nick Barker edge" (Dahl 1989, 67) should make these "technical" public policy decisions. Dahl's guardian makes judgements about trade-offs between different values. For example, "high wages versus international competitiveness, savings versus consumption, short-run gains versus long-run gains," etc. (Dahl 1989, 75). The PAP takes this responsibility upon itself when it subjugates political openness to a stable economic environment. What then, is the conflict between the PAP's guardianship and true democracy? The key is that in the case of Singapore, absolute authority is not exactly delegated to the PAP. While elections used to serve as a vote of confidence in the PAP, after decades of political manipulation, the legitimate authority to rule has been alienated from democratic safeguards (Dahl 1989, 76). This is tantamount to a usurpation of governmental authority by a group of totalitarian elites who exercise paternalistic control over the Singaporean people. This trend should be rejected, because just as paternalism in individual decisions stunts individual moral capacity, so too does guardianship in government "stunt the development of the moral capacities of an entire people" (Dahl 1989, 78-9). From Joseph Tamney (1995, 65), "in Singapore democratic formalities, such as elections, do not indicate the existence of a democratic society. The absence of an independent civil society, the Government's refusal to recognize human rights, and the climate of fear are far more accurate clues to the actual conditions." To reiterate, the PAP government has constantly prioritized a stable economic environment over political openness. Given the vital role foreign investment has played in the development of a viable Singaporean state, this should not come as a surprise. It was through great efforts of the early PAP that a favorable investment climate was established, which brought in foreign direct investment and ensured Singapore's political existence by virtue of its economic importance. Indeed, in the years following independence, opposition groups like the Barisan Sosialis did present a tangible threat to Singapore, making it easier to rationalize political repression. However, as of the 1980s, international norms had recognized the permanence of Singapore as a vital economic center, and thus the PAP's undemocratic attitudes seem misguided. So real democracy doesn't exist, but what are the prospects for the future? PM Goh has declared that Singaporeans have "rejected a Western-style liberal democracy and freedoms," that of "putting individual rights over that of society" (Haas 2000, 34). However, Singapore's increasingly affluent citizens are frustrated by the conflict between the state's goals and their quest for a better life, the marvelous progress made by the PAP notwithstanding. "Modern Singaporeans are drawn toward democracy because they are alienated by puppeteer politicians and because they want greater control over their lives" (Tamney 1995, 77). What, then, is the alternative? Possibly, if Singapore's purpose is strictly economic, then this development can continue without government coercion of the populace. "Democratization in itself threatens only the reign of the PAP and not the ruling ideas of the dominant ideology: growth and order. The opposition parties accept the importance of economic development and social order.. .thus democracy no longer threatens the business elite" (Tamney 1995, 82). As long as there are no immediate threats to Singapore's economy, the leaders may eventually accept a larger degree of political rights for the public and the opposition, and in the end they might realize that political participation is not the threat to economic prosperity that they have understood it to be. However, if the political elite fail to realize this, then only a reversal of current trends and a revital-ization of civil society will catalyze the development of true democracy in Singapore. REFERENCES Baker, Donald. 1983. Race, Ethnicity and Power. London: Routeledge & Kegan Paul. Clutterbuck, R. 1984. Conflict and Violence in Singapore and Malaysia: 1945-1983. Singapore: Graham Brash. Dahl, Robert A. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press. Davies, Derek. 1999. "The Press." In Tlie Singapore Puzzle. Ed. Michael Haas. Westport, CT: Praeger: 77-106. Drysdale, lohn. 1984. Singapore: Struggle for Success. Singapore: Times Books International. Economist. 1995. "Confucianism: New Fashion for Old Wisdom." lanuary 21: 38-39. ___. 1998. "Asian Values Revisited: What Would Confucius Say Now?" July 25: 23-28. George, Cherian. 1992. "The Press and the City." Commentary (Singapore), 10 December: 105-112. Haas, Michael. 1999. Tlie Singapore Puzzle. Westport, CT: Praeger. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates. 10 January 1986, col. 718. __. 15 March 1967, cols. 1294-1295. Huff, WG. 1994. Tlie Economic Growtli of Singapore: Trade and Development in tlie Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge Press. Ibrahim, Zuraidah. 1992. "Singapore Eoses if Opposition Keeps on Attracting Only the Mediocre." Sunday Times (Singapore), Review Section, 2 December. J.B. Jeyaretnam v. Law Society of Singapore. 1988. Malayan Law Journal, 425, 434. Eoong, Eee Hsien. 1990. "Media's Role 'to Inform People of Gov't Policies.'" Straits Times (overseas edition), 16Iune: 2. EePoer, Barbara Eeitch, Ed. 1991. Singapore: A Country Study. 2nd Edition. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Eingle, Christopher and Kurt Wickman. 2000. "Political Economy." In Tlie Singapore Puzzle. Ed. Michael Haas. Westport, CT: Praeger: 55-75. 18 |