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Show HINCKLEY JOURNAL OF POLITICS 2002/2003 and social movements" (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 79). When the government outlawed the consolidation of the Malay community, it killed a truly grassroots, interest-based movement. In addition, realizing that "dominant political forces are more inclined to negotiate, make concessions, and are generally more accommodating to a minority community when it is lobbying from a position of political strength" (Baker 1983, 41), the principle of governmental accountability is gutted when a group's electoral power is gerrymandered away. A final note on the effectiveness of GRCs in eliminating political opposition: no opposition party has successfully contested the PAP in a GRC district (Rahim 1998, 79; National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 2001, 11). This discussion brings up the case of Jeyaretnam mentioned earlier. Schmitter and Karl outline another principle of democratic elections: "In a democracy, representatives must at least informally agree that those who win greater electoral support or influence over policy will not use their temporary superiority to bar the losers from taking office or exerting influence in the future" (1991, 82). But this is exactly what the PAP did - refusing the legitimacy of Jeyaretnam's victory, and resorting to litigation to keep him out of power. In defense of the PAP's political hegemony, Lee Kuan Yew has argued that strong opposition parties are not essential to democracy and in fact promote disharmony (Neher 1999, 45). Prime Minister Goh considers a two-party system "idealistic," and argues that Singapore should be controlled by one strong party, with "many small parties to keep us on our toes" (Ibrahim 1992, 20). The PAP strives constantly to maintain power, resorting even to economic intimidation: during the 1997 campaign, Goh upgraded the traditional PAP campaign threat of withholding government-funded improvements from opposition constituencies. He went so far as to threaten that those districts that did not vote PAP "might become 'slums'" (Haas 1999,33). Other questionable tactics have been used. As a parliamentary democracy, the Prime Minister can dissolve the government at any time and call for a new election. This provision was manipulated in the 2001 election to give the PAP an advantage in the parliamentary elections. PM Goh called for new elections on 18 October 2001, 10 months before the five-year parliamentary term was up. He announced that the elections would take place on 3 November, leaving only 16 days for preparation. Additionally, Goh allowed only nine official campaign days during this period, conferring a substantial advantage on the incumbent PAP MPs because they needed less preparation time, whereas opposition candidates were caught unawares (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 2001, 6). Partly because of the short preparation time and partly because there just aren't many qualified opposition candidates, the four opposition parties contested only 29 of the 84 parliamentary seats (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 2001, 5). In the end, they won only two. It is indisputable that the PAP's political dominance is not merely the outcome of an impartial democratic process. Rather, the party uses every means at its disposal, regardless of the apparent injustice, to maintain its stranglehold on power. Elections are not fairly conducted (as the experiences of Jeyaretnam and Seow, as well as the 2001 election illustrate) violating Dahl's 2nd criterion. Given the PAP's treatment of opposition candidates, it would be highly dubious to say that Singapore meets Dahl's 4th criterion of the right to run for office. For if the PAP is interfering in campaigns, thereby keeping candidates from running or even being considered, this standard is not actually being met. The 5th criterion of free expression is not being met, because not all citizens are being heard, let alone represented, while people like Jeyaretnam and Seow have been punished for their merely expressing their views. Lastly, developments in the representative sphere have denied Dahl's 7th criterion of association-al autonomy. Another facet of PAP policy that ensures continued dominance is the denial of basic civil liberties. DOMINATION OF THE PRESS AND OTHER CIVIL LIBERTIES "Is this an open, or is this a closed society? Is it a society where men can preach ideas.. .where there is a constant contest for men's hearts and minds on the basis of what is right, of what is just, of what is in the national interest, or is it a closed society [in which] men's minds are fed with a constant drone of sycophantic support for a particular orthodox political philosophy?. . .If your ideas, your views cannot stand the challenge of criticism then they are too fragile and not sturdy enough to last.. .1 am talking of the principle of the open society, open debate; ideas, not intimidation; persuasion not coercion..." Lee Kuan Yew, 1964 (Davies 1999, 80) "I will hit you where it hurts. Then we will see your commitment to a free press." Lee Kuan Yew, 1985 (Davies 1999, 78) in a discussion on targeting the finances of owners and publishers Lee's thoughts on the role of the press have clearly devolved over the years. Most would argue that this has led to a non-democratic press in Singapore: two of Dahl's seven procedural minimum conditions for modern representative democracy deal with the existence of a free press (#5 - freedom of expression, and #6 - alternative information). According to Dahl, a free press consists of citizens having the right to "express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined," and to "seek out alternative sources of information," where these "alternative sources of information exist and are protected by laws" (Dahl 1989, 221). Singapore does not qualify under these criteria. The government began to infringe on the press in 1974, with the Newspapers and Printing Presses Act (NPPA), which increased governmental supervision. The NPPA was given tangible power by a 1977 amendment that "forbade any individual to hold more than 3 percent of a newspaper's ordinary shares" (Davies 1999, 88). The idea is that shares in the 15 |