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Show Hinckley Journal of Politics Spring 2000 National Defense Strategy vs. Funding Disconnect: I Think I Can, I Think I Can't, I Know I Can't Congressman James V. Hansen (RrUtah) The Problem Throughout this decade there has developed a widening disconnect between what we expect our national defense forces to do, and the resources supplied to accomplish those missions. The effects of this rift are now apparent, and will have profound consequences for American national security in the 21st Century. But, before I start into the esoteric language of national defense with its myriad acronyms and colloquial terms, I must build a groundwork for common understanding. When I was a boy, I learned most of the great lessons of life through parables and stories. One of my favorites was the story of "The Little Engine That Could." Even though faced with great challenges, that courageous little engine, determined to accomplish his essential mission, just persevered until he finally succeeded in pulling his cargo up the mountain. But what if the circumstances had been different? What if the following had happened instead? When the Little Engine Railroad Company built its line to the city over the mountain, unwisely, the company executives established two construction companies to lay the track. One was to construct the right rail and the other, the left. When the contracts were drawn, the right rail contractor was instructed to build its rail by the most direct route up the mountain to the city. The contract governing construction of the left rail did not mention the destination. Rather, to promote maximum economy, this second contract emphasized that the cost was to be capped at a steadily decreasing rate for each mile laid. When the job was completed, the right rail with its trestles and tunnels, was expensive, but took the most direct course. The left rail smoothly ran over the flat plains until it just ended amid abandoned equipment. All the courage and perseverance in the world could not keep the train on that track. So, as the rails diverged, the little engine was heard to say, I think I can, I think I can t, I know I can't! History In 1993, the new Clinton administration was determined to harvest the "peace dividend" that the end of the Cold War promised. John Correll, in his editorial in the October 1999 Air Force Magazine explains the flow of events. The new Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, seeking to build a force considerably smaller than that which had just won the Gulf War, proposed a national military strategy then called "Win-Hold-Win." This strategy proposed a military force just large enough to fight a medium-sized war (Desert Storm), while holding the line on a second aggressor elsewhere in the world (the Korean Peninsula). That force would then be "swung" following victory in the first theater, to the second, to counter-attack and win. This strategy assumed that any second adversary would take many months to first recognize that America was fully engaged, then mobilize its forces to take advantage of U.S. preoccupation. Secretary Aspin was experienced with the details of military policy, having most recently served as Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, but even he was surprised by the chorus of condemnation aimed at Win-Hold-Win. Opposition was widespread and came from all directions: foreign and domestic, Democrat and Republican. Virtually every defense expert was-rightly-unwilling to bet America's future security on the hope that our potential enemies would not be ready to take advantage of a fleeting opportunity. Still, the Secretary had his marching orders from the Clinton White House. His "allowance" for the military was set, and it was not enough to maintain the steady, draw-down glidepath begun by the Bush administration. Mr. Aspin and his staff had a problem. In response, he directed the Pentagon to conduct the now discredited, Bottom-Up Review. The plain goal (if unstated) of this study was to size the force structure to fit the money allotted by the administration, without regard for the new dangers of the post-Cold War world. This arbitrarily-capped defense funding plan can be likened to the left rail in our new tragedy of the Little Engine. Meanwhile, having failed to persuade legitimate military and foreign policy experts that Win-Hold-Win was not really just "Win-Lose-Lose," the Secretary then settled on a strategy to prepare for two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRC). This plan, which called for enough forces to fight two wars at once, while air and sea lift assets would swing to supply both theaters, met with qualified approval. 93 |