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Show Hinckley Journal of Politics Spring 2000 tarian institutions (Mueller v. Mien 1983). The District Court and the Court of Appeals both decided that the statute, on its face, is neutral and its application does not have a primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' decisions and stated that this case satisfied all three prongs of the Lemon test. First, the tax deduction has a secular purpose of trying to help the state's citizenry. Second, the primary effect of the law does not advance nor inhibit religion; it is available for all the citizens in the state, and merely falls under the classification of tax deductions. Finally, the tax deduction does not create an excessive entanglement between church and state (Mueller v. Alien 1983, 394404). The state had already decided which textbooks were allowable under the tax deduction. All others were ineligible for the deduction and therefore limit the state reimbursements to only secular textbooks (Mueller v. Allen 1983). Justice William H. Rehnquist for the Court when discussing the intent of the Framers of the Constitution in regard to the establishment clause stated, "the historic purposes of the Clause simply do not encompass the sort of attenuated financial benefit, ultimately controlled by the private choices of individual parents, that eventually flows to parochial schools from the neutrally available tax benefit at issue in this case" (Mueller v. AHen 1983, 400). The tax deductions included a variety of tuition reimbursements, such as for summer school, students who live outside the district, Montessori School tuition, and driver's education. The varied types of reimbursements preclude the tax benefit from being used only by parents who send their children to parochial and other private schools. Justice Rehnquist asserted that this case was different from Lemon and from Wolman v. Walter (1977) because of the private choices of individual parents. In Wolman the Court had partially upheld and partially negated an Ohio program giving various types of governmental funding to private schools, a majority sectarian. The Court held the Constitution allowed parochial schools to be reimbursed for the costs of administering federally mandated tests. The state could also supply diagnostic tests and give textbook loans. However, the loan of instructional materials as well as funding for field trips even though entirely secular, did involve excessive entanglement of church and state (Wolman v. Walter 1977, 238-55). The intent of the tax in Mueller v. Allen (1983) is neutral, and therefore what the parents do after that point is irrelevant. This case set the guidelines for school choice. As long as the intent of the program is religiously neutral, and is a benefit for a large portion of citizens, whether the parents decide to have their children educated publicly, privately in a non-sectarian school, or religiously is irrelevant to the actual law. The second case that directly relates to the school choice movement is that of Witters v. Washington (1986). Larry Witters applied unsuccessfully to the State of Washington Commission for the Blind for vocational rehabilitation assis- tance, pursuant to a Washington statute that was designed to offer vocational rehabilitation to people with disabilities. Witters, who had a progressively degenerative eye condition, was studying at a Christian college with the intent to become a pastor, missionary, or youth advisor. The state Supreme Court had decided that such state aid to Witters, given his aims, was a violation of the federal Constitution's establishment clause. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case (1986, 485-90). The justification given was very similar to the grounds used in Mueller. It is interesting to note that Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the opinion for the Court in Witters, but in the case of Mueller had dissented. In giving the decision, Justice Marshall stated that the intent of the assistance program provided under the Washington statute was neutral, and it was only through the judgment of the petitioner that funds would go to a religious school. Mueller and Witters both create precedents that validate the constitutionality of school-choice programs, by virtue of the fact that the parents, not the government, decide whether a religious program will receive the public money. The purpose of school choice, and the programs in Mueller and Witters, is to increase the quality of education for all students and not to promote or hinder religion. It is also important that the parents are given the funds, and then given the choice as to which school their child would attend. Therefore the parents direct the flow of funds not the state. A third case that affects the question of school choice is Zobrest v. Catalina (1993). The petitioners argued that under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the parallel Arizona statutes, and the free exercise clause, the state was required to pay for a sign language interpreter for James Zobrest, a child who was deaf, at the Catholic high school that he was attending. During elementary school James had attended a public school and the state had paid for an interpreter. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the IDEA should pay for an interpreter even at a parochial school (Zobrest v. Catalina 1993). This decision has ramifications for the future of school choice. In the opinion the Court held that this case satisfied the Lemon test. When addressing the specifics of the three-prong test, the Court (Chief Justice Rehnquist) put the most weight on the issue of the primary effect and intent of the law and stated, "because the IDEA creates no financial incentive for parents to choose a sectarian school, an interpreter's presence there cannot be attributed to state decisionmaking." Here, the child is the "primary beneficiary," and the school receives only an "incidental benefit." In addition, an interpreter, "unlike a teacher or guidance counselor," is going to "neither add to nor subtract from..." the sectarian school's environment, but will merely "accurately interpret whatever material is presented to the class as a whole" (Zobrest v. Catalina 1993, 10-14). This statement identifies two key reasons why one can conclude that school vouchers are not a violation of the Constitution. First, the intent of the government's funding is 77 |
