| OCR Text |
Show Hinckley Journal of Politics Spring 2000 II. In 1997 protocols were devised between Boris Yeltsin and President Clinton that would lengthen the current disarmament for another five years. Under this all delivery vehicles would be eliminated by 2003 and their respective warheads removed by 2007 (Norris 1999, 78). Though feasible this undertaking is one of unequivocal financial allocation. In order to disarm that many war heads it will cost over $24 billion just to initiate the process. While the United States is completely willing to make such a financial commitment, it is necessary for other states to participate in the disarmament process for these strategies to take place. The United States, due to the current unwillingness of other states to disarm, has begun to upgrade its current nuclear arsenal. It planned to spend $27 billion throughout the 1999 fiscal year on reoutfitting Poseidon submarines with more compact warheads, so delivery is more precise and efficient (Norris 1999, 83). Though this action may seem to violate its policy of disarmament, it is important to remember that the United States' primary objective is to maintain its power while disarming. The United States only continues this program to solidify its own power until a sound disarmament agreement can be reached. In addition to the above disarmament measures START III will also include the withdrawal of 1,000-1,500 strategic warheads from operational systems. Those weapons will then be placed in a reserve category, and then designated as a warhead unit to be destroyed (Norris 1999, 79). This consolidation of weapons systems will soon be followed by more of the same if other countries comply with disarmament measures. All of these nuclear measures are goals of the United States for future disarmament. Unfortunately, due to the complex nature of the variables involved this process can be extremely time consuming. In the United States it is the various constituency groups and the military who slow the process. For example, the START II treaty was held up by Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) for a number of years and "for some START III may have [its own] comatose period" (Arkin 1999, 82). The average time frame for disarmament legislation to pass and be ratified has been so lengthy in the past that the START treaties "no longer promote long-term strategic stability nor provide a sensible day-to-day nuclear posture" (Arkin 1999, 81). Though these disarmament goals are feasible other measures must be evaluated as options for future disarmament. There are three nuclear disarmament foreign policies that the author sees as feasible for the United States in the future. First, the percentage model; second, the proliferation model; and third, the full disarmament model. All of these models are theoretical predictions on my part for the future of disarmament. The percentage model is a reduction theory staged on equal percentage disarmament in all nuclear states. For example, under this model all nuclear states would be party to this agreement and a percentage reduction in their nuclear stockpiles would be agreed upon. This is an equitable solution to the most primary fears of disarmament to all nuclear states: the maintenance of relative power. Under this model relative power would be upheld during the disarming because all nations would be disarming. However, this model is contingent on two points: The first is verification measures. All states party to the treaty must be willing to allow for stringent verification measures. And second, since the states that possess less nuclear weapons would not be able to dismantle fractions of a nuclear warhead, such states would have to dismantle only when a full fraction of the nations with larger nuclear arsenals disarmed. For example, if the United States were required to disarm 20 percent of its arsenal, but India only possessed four nuclear weapons, then the latter would not be required to disarm at all until the next percentage agreement. This model would serve to facilitate the disarmament process while providing relative security to all states. The primary drawback of this method, is that it does not incorporate a system by which to curb other nations who do not currently possess nuclear weapons, from acquiring them. The proliferation model means unfortunately, with the detonation of nuclear weapons in both Pakistan and India, the increased spread of nuclear armaments among nations. Though pessimistic, this view has become more realistic given the possibility of officially non-nuclear states becoming nuclear. The United States has an obligation to its people to further its national security. Its options will continue to be those of diplomacy upon the verification that a state is building nuclear weapons. However if such diplomatic policy options are ineffective then force will be asserted. And lastly if none of those policy options are well received and solvent then a new nuclear arms race will be engaged in. For the United States this system is actually very cost effective. It will no longer have to pay to dismantle any of its warheads and it can pace itself to slowly increase its relative power. But, however effective this system may be, it is the most dangerous policy option the world has. It will be the responsibility of the United States to stop this model through conventional means before it becomes a reality. The full disarmament model is, of course, the most optimistic. This model is the current goal of the United States but it is also the least feasible, at least in the short run. This model assumes that all nuclear states will become party to START III and begin to disarm. Though this model aims toward complete disarmament it is also contingent on strong verification measures, and most importantly continued non-nuclear status for all other states. It would be disastrous for every nuclear state to disarm while a non-nuclear state acquires nuclear weapons. In essence this would be the destruction of every nuclear state's relative capability and would thus leave them as weaker states. This is not an option for the United States. It must strive to keep up its position in the international system. As such it will only continue, while disarming, to encourage and in some cases enforce the non-proliferation policies of other nations. I contend that the most feasible of the models is the percentage model with reservation. Reservation is necessary due to the need for verification measures and the monitoring of 63 |
