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Show Hinckley Journal of Politics Spring 2000 States in turn began to press for a more intense continued verification system, in order to ensure that Iraq does not recommence its nuclear program. This issue was brought to resolution on May 15 when the Security Council agreed to scale back its nuclear inspections in Iraq after an assessment of Iraq's present nuclear capability could be made (Associated Press 1998, A12). The United States played a primary role in the multilateral decision to reassess Iraqi capability, and negotiated for an open-ended review period in which Iraq could be checked upon. Though the United States often supports a position of force it will be looking forward to a more compromise-based, incentive-driven program of diplomacy. With Iraq's current military forces in decline, the United States will be evaluating the possibility of lifting its own individual sanctions in return for full Iraqi compliance with Security Council Resolution 687 (O'Hanlon 1999b). Security Council Resolution 687 strongly recommends "eliminating [Iraqi] weapons of mass destruction while also accounting for Kuwaiti citizens kidnapped or killed by Iraqi forces," during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. All of these steps were necessary United States foreign policy objectives (O'Hanlon 1999b). Foreign Policy Scenario II: The Nuclear Situation in South Asia I want to make it very, very clear that I am deeply disturbed by the nuclear tests which India has conducted, and I do not believe it contributes to building a safer 21st century. The United States strongly opposes any new nuclear testing. This action by India not only threatens the stability of the region, it directly challenges the international consensus to stop the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. I call on India to announce that it will conduct no further tests, and that it will sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty now and without conditions. I also urge India's neighbors not to follow suit - not to follow down the path of a dangerous arms race. As most of you know, our laws have very stringent provisions. .. .And I intend to implement them fully (Clinton 1998, May 12). Currently, the issue of India's and Pakistan's nuclear testing and possible nuclear arms race is one of the most pressing on the United States foreign policy agenda. During 1998 the situation escalated from a twenty-year standoff to a nuclear dilemma. On May 12, 1998 India conducted three nuclear tests, defying an unwritten two-year long moratorium (Burns 1998a, Al). The United States immediately reacted under the 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, 22 United States Code Section 6301, "a Federal law which [ordered] President Clinton to impose severe penalties on nations conducting nuclear testing," by considering cutting off all U.S. government aid and blocking both International Monetary Fund (IMF) funding and World Bank loans (Weiner 1998a, Al). Currently India receives $40 billion in cumulative aid from United Nations organs and individual states per year and was expecting an additional $3 billion in 1998. As a whole the United States' levying of sanctions could cost India over $4.5 billion in 1998 alone (Weiner 1998a, Al). In addition to the United States' possible levying of sanctions against India, the United States also immediately contacted Pakistan asking that it not retaliate and detonate nuclear bombs of its own. On 13 May, 1998 President Clinton offered India immunity from sanctions on the condition that it would become a signatory to the CTBT (Myers 1998, Al). India refused; however it reaffirmed its overall commitment to disarmament in a letter to the President. It also expressed interest in negotiating the following spring at the 1999 Conference on Disarmament where those issues could be openly debated and brought to resolution (New York Times 1998a, A14). The United States responded by holding true to its promise to levy sanctions and bar investments. However, realizing the path which a nuclear arms race on the Indian subcontinent could take, President Clinton continued to communicate with Pakistan. On 14 May, 1998 United States satellites revealed that Pakistan was preparing for a nuclear test. In response President Clinton sent advisors to Pakistan in order to quell that country's need to test (Weiner 1998b, Al). Moreover on 15 May, President Clinton informed Pakistan that it would be well rewarded if it did not "bend to the pressures of competition" (Kinzer 1998a, A10). In addition, two days later Samuel R. Berger, the U.S. President's National Security Adviser, offered to review the pending delivery of the 28 F-16s to Pakistan that were paid for nearly a decade ago (Bennet 1998, A16). Another foreign policy approach the United States attempted was a bilateral one. On 18 May President Clinton began pressing President Yeltsin to ratify the CTBT, START II and other international disarmament treaties in hopes that such action would influence Pakistan, as a Russian ally, not to test. Sadly, however, Yeltsin's opposition in the Lower House of the Russian Parliament postponed debate on the START II treaty as well as the CTBT until September (Reuters 1998, Al 2). While Clinton was communicating with Yeltsin India detonated a hydrogen bomb, commonly known in military circles as a city buster. This detonation was proof that not only did India have nuclear technology, but also had advanced technology capable of destroying entire large-city populations (Burns 1998a, Al). The United States continued to press the world community for sanctions and other condemnations, but few nations, save Japan and Germany, were responsive. Following multiple phone calls from President Clinton, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan announced that Pakistan, "for the past twenty years has been a responsible state"; however, the sanctions currently placed on India do not make the nuclear threat any less (Kinzer 1998b, A9). He also stated that he thought that Pakistan had waited patiently by while the world attempted to negotiate an end to India's nuclear testing, but under the current conditions no progress had been visibly made (Kinzer 1998b, A9). On 28 May, 1998, 61 |
