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Show American Foreign Policy towards Nuclear Disarmament, 1945-1999 Taylor C. Parkin accession of Israel to the NPT. The United States was disappointed at the singling-out of Israel and as such pressed for the Middle East-wide NWFZ. In the end the treaty was extended and all three resolutions were adopted as a package. Holistically, the NPT compromise package, "addressed many of the states' concerns, in particular the enhanced review process and principles and objectives for disarmament" (Foran 1996, 194) Following the extension of the NPT the United States continued to work with the world community in order to reduce nuclear weapons. Early in 1995, the United States voted for United Nations Resolution A/49/699, which proposed a "step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat" (General Assembly 1994, 35). In accordance with U.S. policy the resolution "desired to reduce, progressively and systematically, the threat posed by nuclear weapons." It also sought, in the active clauses of the resolution: to get countries to "cease the production of all fis-sible materials; cease the manufacture and testing of nuclear warheads; and prohibit the test explosion of nuclear weapons" (General Assembly 1994, 36-37). The resolution was passed with strong U.S. support and included a reaffirmation of the United States' favorable current policy towards bilateral agreements. The next stage of United States foreign policy towards disarmament was manifested in START II. "The principal U.S. objective in strategic arms control is to increase stability at significantly lower levels of nuclear weapons" (Conference on Disarmament 1996a, 2). In START II the United States and Russia agreed to reduce nuclear forces by an additional 5,000 warheads, beyond the 9,000 warheads being reduced under START I. In addition to President Clinton signing the treaty, the Senate ratified the START II on 26 January 1998. "President Clinton congratulated the bipartisan efforts that had, 'seized the opportunity presented by the end of the Cold War to take a big step back from the nuclear precipice"1 (Conference on Disarmament 1996b, 3). Upon the ratification START III discussions began. START II represents the most comprehensive nuclear disarmament proposal written as of yet. The United States viewed this proposal as a benchmark in the disarmament process. Foreign Policy Scenario I: Iraqi Nuclear Weapons The major U.S. nuclear weapons related concern is obvious and overwhelming, we must do whatever is in our power to improve physical control and security of [Iraqi] nuclear weapons. . . . Even if all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction eventually are accounted for, and inspections end, we [must] maintain long-term monitoring of nuclear related technologies thereafter (O'Hanlon 1999a, 25). The first foreign policy initiative of precedence for United States foreign policy on disarmament to examine is the dismantlement of the Iraqi nuclear program. Halting the development of nuclear arms by Iraq was of paramount importance to United States security. Any time a non-nuclear state, which is not party to any existing proliferation or disarmament treaties, begins to amass nuclear weapons the United States must evaluate its relative threat. In turn this deterrence only exists if all states are aware of the potential military damage that can be caused by the existence of nuclear weapons. When such a weapon is held outside of the current international theater instability will result. The United States aims to solidify stability, and its place as a global leader in the world, while dismantling its nuclear arsenal at a speed in keeping with these goals. In turn the existence of nuclear weapons in Iraq changes this foreign policy scenario and requires action and intervention. Moreover, until the United Nations has deemed that Iraq's weapons have been dismantled, a more protective security policy should always be pursued. According to the United Nations Special Commission on the destruction of Iraq's Nuclear Weapons, many Iraqi nuclear weapons "have been identified and destroyed" (Porter 1996, 7). However, many weapons and their components are still unaccounted for. Iraqi officials claim that Iraq destroyed the unaccounted weapons during the summer following the Gulf War. The United States, however, is hesitant to believe this account. Rolf Ekeus, Chairman of the Commission, stated that '"[the Commission's] concern is that Iraq has made [additional scuds] indigenously using bits and pieces, spare parts, from the imported stocks'" (Porter 1996, 7). The United States made it clear that it would not approve the Security Council lifting of the current sanctions until the Commission was absolutely sure about Iraq's nuclear program's dismantlement. This situation remained unresolved until May of 1998. On April 17, 1998 a UN report from the chief United Nations arms inspector in Iraq concluded that Iraq was no closer to meeting the requirements set for lifting sanctions than it had been the previous fall (Crossette 1998a, Al). This report, as it had twice in the past, almost drove the United States into military intervention. However, rather than pursue that route the United States chose to hold off until a complete inspection report of approval had been made. Two days after the report was issued the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), the group responsible for the verification of Iraqi compliance, said "it was moving closer to declaring Iraq nuclear [weapons] free" (Crossette 1998b, A4). This statement was taken with much reservation from American nuclear scientists. Many of the scientists believe that nuclear materials may still be hidden in presidential sites, those sites designated in conjunction with the cease-fire, that are off-limits to United Nations inspectors in Iraq. Moreover, if any spare parts exist it would be extremely easy for the Iraqis to reconstruct the bomb given the advanced technology they now possess. However, these reservations were overcome two weeks later on May 9 when the UN, upon recommendation of the IAEA, lifted the sanctions against Iraqi oil exports without United States reservation (Crossette 1998c, A5). The United 60 |
