| OCR Text |
Show Hinckley Journal of Politics Spring 2000 (UNODA 1993b, 65). The next round of negotiations took place in Warsaw, though China was not in attendance. The United States moved forth with the suspension of nuclear technology transfers in order to curtail the creation, without testing, of more nuclear weapons (UNWDC 1992b, 5). The U.S. representatives further negotiated, at the Warsaw Accord in Warsaw on April 3, 1992, with twenty-seven other nations to control the export of dual-use technology (technology that can be used for both peaceful and military uses) (UNWDC 1992b, 5). Shortly thereafter, the United States stopped production of all weapons-grade uranium (UNWDC 1992a, 15). By stopping production the United States halted its ability to construct more nuclear weapons, above and beyond the fissible material already produced. Consequently the United States was now unable to export nuclear data or material in any form, eliminating the possibility of U.S.-fed proliferation. Early the following year the United States again met with Russia in order to advance further reductions. President-Elect Clinton met with President Yeltsin on 3 January, 1993 in order to sign the Treaty for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The treaty entailed a renewed commitment to the obligations of the first limitation treaty, and went further to reduce the number of ICBMs and SLBMs to less than 4,250 within the next seven years (Conference on Disarmament 1993b, 4). In signing the United States again brought nuclear disarmament to the front of its foreign-policy agenda. The United States then moved into a bilateral agreement with Belarus on July 23, 1993. This agreement was used in order to help bring a former Soviet Republic into the democratic world. "President Clinton stressed his 'commitment to democracy and regional stability,1 and 'applauded Belarus for its removal of tactical nuclear weapons'" (Conference on Disarmament 1993c, 3). The United States continued its support to Belarus as it moved forward toward declared non-nuclear status. In doing so the United States furthered both its nuclear superiority and its disarmament agenda. In November, President Clinton announced that the United States, '"would pursue new steps to control the materials for nuclear weapons'" (UNCDA 1993, 9). As a result the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency developed the United States foreign policy agenda regarding nuclear weapons. The main priority of the agenda was to hold a conference in which it would be multilaterally agreed upon, that the production of weapons-grade plutonium and uranium would be prohibited, just as it was currently in the United States. Many nations also voiced their support for the ban on fissionable materials, and agreed to discuss the topic at the next Conference on Disarmament (UNCDA 1993, 9). As a result of that conference a treaty was drafted, signed and entered into force the summer of 1994. The next objective for American foreign policy was the creation of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). The CTBT was significantly debated at the 1994 Conference on Disarmament(CD) in Geneva Switzerland. At the CD John Holum, the director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, pushed ahead for, '"bold steps toward a world made safer through the negotiation at the earliest possible time[,] of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that will strengthen the security of all nations'" (UNODA 1994, 7). He made the United States' agenda plain and simple: "'We seek a comprehensive, not a threshold ban. We seek a complete ban on nuclear explosions. We believe that all five nuclear states should become parties for the treaty to enter into force"1 (UNODA 1994, 7). The United States was looking for an end to the development of nuclear weapons through physical testing. In turn a testing moratorium, in which all nuclear states participated, was instituted throughout 1994. This was a plausible concept until China detonated a nuclear bomb in March of 1994. As a result, the United States again began pursuing negotiations as its main form of compromise for arms control. On March 4, 1994 President Clinton met with President Leonid Makarovych Kravchuk, of Ukraine, in order to foster a stronger relationship between the two countries. As a result of the meeting the two Presidents signed a letter of cooperation, confirming their obligation to "mutual trust and respect. . .and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" (Conference on Disarmament 1994a, 2). In addition to the letter a promise of economic help was given to the Ukraine while it vied its way towards recognition as a non-nuclear state. The United States continued to work with both the multinational world community and on a bilateral level, to reduce the number of armaments present in the world. On 19 May, 1994, James H. Madden, acting United States representative to the Conference on Disarmament and Olexander Slipchenko, permanent representative of Ukraine, submitted a letter to the United Nations, recognizing Vice President Albert Gore's and Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov's Memorandum of Understanding on Missile-Related Exports. "This formal commitment on the part of Ukraine [met] a major proliferation objective of the United States and the twenty-four other members of the Missile Technology Control Regime" (Conference on Disarmament 1994b, 2). In addition to slowing missile exports the letter also helped reaffirm the policy objectives of the United States with regard to START. The next major foreign policy objective for the United States was ensuring the successful extension of the NPT The extension of the NPT was seen as "a necessary step towards the disarmament process," for the United States as well as a multitude of other nations (UNCDA 1995b, 5). The extension Conference held on 11 May 1995 produced three separate resolutions to coincide with the indefinite extension of the NPT. They included a resolution that required a stronger review and evaluation process with a specific time frame for the treaty, a NWFZ in the area of the Middle East, and the 59 |
