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Show American Foreign Policy towards Nuclear Disarmament, 1945-1999 Taylor C. Parkin to the dismay of the world community, Pakistan detonated three nuclear devices in order to answer India's detonations just two weeks before (New York Times 1998b, A20). President Clinton condemned the tests as "contributing to a self-defeating cycle of escalation." He also levied similar sanctions on Pakistan for '"[undermining] the global consensus on nonproliferation"1 (Weiner 1998c, A8). However, the United States' efforts to sanction the two new nuclear states were constrained. President Clinton stated that, '"There's nothing I can do"1 (Weiner 1998c, A8). President Clinton again condemned Pakistan's decision to conduct a second round of nuclear tests on 30 May, 1998. As a consequence of Pakistan's action President Clinton determined that according to the Arms Export Control Act any necessary actions for sanction imposition should be taken (Clinton 1999, 2). Current U.S. foreign policy towards the two nations will continue to be one of strict penalties; however, it will also include room for negotiation. On 1 June 1998 India proposed a "new global treaty limiting nuclear arsenals that would include 'all nuclear weapons states'" (Burns 1998c, Al). Though vehemently opposed to such a treaty in the past the United States is now sincerely considering such a negotiation. The United States in turn pursued a multilateral resolution to the situations, its only remaining foreign policy option. On 30 November, 1998 both Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan and India's Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee spoke to the UN General Assembly regarding their intent to become party to the CTBT This would be a major step toward the accomplishment of United States policy objectives. However, multiple contentions were stipulated by both states. They are looking to become party to the treaty if and only if the United States along with the other five nuclear states also begin to dismantle their armaments. This contingency is supported by the United States; however, it is necessary that all nuclear weapons states also agree to this compromise (Moore 1998, 2). Even if this treaty is viable in the near future the largest concern remains. Stated a White House senior official, '"We're still worried about a missile test by Pakistan and an Indian response. The best that could be hoped for in the short-run was that India and Pakistan would be as careful with their nuclear weapons and policies as Washington and Moscow were during the cold war"1 (Weiner 1998c, A8). Current and Future United States Foreign Policy Strategies There is a growing realization of the futility of war, and a general tendency to avoid military conflict Even so, there is still much to be done to make this an accepted part of our culture. We have to eradicate the pernicious notion that war is a natural phenomenon, that man is biologically programmed for aggression. There is no scientific evidence for this thesis. In this nuclear age we can no longer base our policies on the old Roman dictum. This must be replaced by: Si vis pacem para pacem, if you want peace, prepare for peace. We have to educate ourselves to become conscious of our belonging to the human species; we have to develop a loyalty to humankind. Every educational process is very slow, and we have a long way to go before war is eliminated. But we will never reach the objective unless we make a start A good start to this long-term objective is the short-term objective of eliminating nuclear weapons. Let us therefore devote ourselves to this important task (Rotblat 1996, 8). United States foreign policy regarding disarmament in the future will be one that will follow along the lines of established disarmament beliefs: overall nuclear disarmament through unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral means. The United States will continue to press for the disarmament of itself and all nuclear states, providing that national security can still be maintained while lessening the strong hold of the nuclear era. Recently the United States has been engaged in the development of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (START III), the third in a series of treaties designed to eliminate the nuclear armament of the United States and Russia. This treaty, as proposed, does however, require the entrance of other parties into its agreement. This is important because if the United States continues to disarm without the other nuclear states or possible nuclear states, then the United States will lose its relative power in the international system. This is of paramount importance to the continuance of the United States' place in the international system. The proposed element of START III is the dismantlement of nuclear stockpiles of up to 2,000-2,500 warheads (Milne 1998, A6). This is important because this would decrease the nuclear armaments of the United States nuclear arsenal by 20 percent. The United States is still hesitant to propose a measure this drastic without the cooperation of other nuclear states. Currently, the United States is negotiating with Britain in order to add it to the disarmament required by START III; however due to the relatively small number of British armaments these negotiations are very fragile. Along with Britain the United States is looking to include all other nuclear states in the disarmament process. One of the largest problems facing the United States, as well as all states that are attempting to disarm, is the proliferation of nuclear weapons in rogue states (states not designated as nuclear states), namely in light of the current situation, India and Pakistan. These are nations that are not governed by the NPT or any other treaty; they are only in violation of the moral paradigms put in place by the end of the cold war. There is no leverage against newcomer nuclear powers... .This is why the super powers are still a long way from being able to make any impact on their greatest worry, the danger of further nuclear proliferation. Is not the best way of tackling the threat of rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction to "create a climate of disarmament"? (Power 1998, B10). The U.S. answer to that question is that the climate must be created while maintaining the United States' power. Moreover, the United States has been engaged in the dilemma of how to disarm its current weapons under START 62 |
