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Show Hinckley Journal of Politics Spring 2000 keeping with the agreements made in the partial test-ban treaty (United Nations 1988h, 5). Since the treaty's entry into force over 138 parties have become signatories. Along with nations becoming party to the treaty, four review conferences have been held. At each of these the United States has continued to reaffirm the goals of the treaty as well as reaffirm its leadership in the world. Shortly following the implementation of the NPT, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Sub-soil Thereof, commonly known as the sea-bed treaty, was drafted and signed (United Nations 1988i, 7). It entered into force in 1972 and since has received over 82 countries as signatories. The United States has led two review conferences on the treaty, both reaffirming the mission and goals of the treaty's principles (United Nations 1988c, 7). This treaty limited testing to underground only, and in doing so brought the world one step closer to a comprehensive test ban treaty. This treaty was also the final multilateral treaty passed during the Cold War. All other treaties were either bilateral or regional in nature. The United States began its bilateral communication with the USSR in 1963 with the inception of the Memorandum of Understanding. It created for use "in times of emergency," a direct communications link between Washington, DC and Moscow, known as the "hot-line" in order to ensure the safety of the populations in case of a false alarm (United Nations 1988e, 15). The creation of the "hotline" was viewed by many as the first major step toward United States and Soviet cooperative relations in the nuclear era. Since the hot-line was established two additions have been made. First, in 1971 the Agreement on Measures to Improve the USA-USSR Direct Communication Link was adopted. It allowed for communication via satellite in order to quicken the response time of the leaders of the two nations. Secondly, in 1984 the hot-line was upgraded to include a facsimile line in order to facilitate the transmission of not only text, but maps and graphs as well (United Nations 1988a, 15). In 1968 the first stage of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT 1) began. As a result of the first three years of discussion the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) was ratified in 1972. The treaty limited the amount of land-based launch sites to two per country with no more than 100 warheads per site (United Nations 1988f, 17). This agreement was a landmark step in foreign policy negotiation, because it inherently considered that both countries had reached a point of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), and as such each understood that they must limit the amount of warheads targeted at each other in order to guarantee stability. The interim stage of SALT I created the Interim Agreement which limited the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This in turn, would extend the provisions of SALT I, and eliminate the need for shorter-range missiles (United Nations 1988d, 18). The final agreement in the SALT I treaty period was the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War signed in 1973. It extended the treaty to refrain from the "threat or use of force not only against each other, but also against the allies of the other party. . . in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security" (United Nations 1988b, 18). The extension of this idea was important because it reduced the risk of a proactive nuclear strike to a bare minimum. The next step taken by the United States to facilitate nuclear disarmament was the initiation of the steps outlined in the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests, commonly known as the threshold test-ban treaty. This treaty was signed 3 July 1974. It limited nuclear testing to less than 150 kilotons (United Nations 1988g, 19). This was an important step because blasts of under 150 kilo-tons are extremely hard to engineer unless larger blasts have been detonated before. Also, blasts of this size are often used for peaceful purposes only, i.e. mining and nuclear reactors for electric power. This limit also made it much easier to verify nuclear testing over the 150 kiloton limit, which in turn made it virtually impossible for a non-nuclear state to become nuclear without another state noticing. At the close of SALT I, SALT II was instigated. In 1979 the talks produced the Treaty on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. This treaty set a ceiling on the amount of strategic delivery devices each nation could possess at 2,400 (United Nations 1988k, 22). It also set limits on the amount of Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) each missile could have. This added to the equality of the two nations and thus, the continuance of balance of power stability. Though both nations have striven to keep the conditions of this treaty it has still not been ratified by the United States Senate. The final treaty negotiated under the auspices of the Cold War was the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly known as the INF treaty. This treaty eliminates all nuclear weapons that are not either ICBMs or Short Range missiles (missiles termed as "Short Range" are only accurate when fired from less than 500 kilometers away). It also calls for a triad verification process which is comprised of: (1) on-site inspections; (2) inspection by challenge (i.e. if a signatory country had reason to believe that another signatory nation was breaking the treaty, it would challenge that country and conduct an on-site inspection); and (3) national technical means such as satellite (United Nations 1988k, 22). This type of verification system has been termed C3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence). This form is used especially by the United States in order to detect false alarms, first strikes, and other nuclear phenomena (United Nations 1992b, 10). It also functions as the fastest means of communication between nuclear states in order to ensure that a false alarm will not instigate nuclear war. The compromise on these forms of verification helps to illustrate 57 |