Let 'em Holler - A Political Biography of J. Bracken Lee

Problems of city government

21 Problems of City Government Believing that his leadership had placed the city in excellent financial condition, Lee announced his intention in August 1963 to seek reelection. He said that the record proved he had kept his pledge to achieve fiscal reform and a balanced budget for the first time in ten years. He took pride in the fact that the property tax had been reduced by a half-mill, loose purchasing practices tightened, and thousands of dollars saved. Moreover, these accomplishments came without increasing taxes or sacrificing services. "Better bookkeeping has helped," a Tribune article noted, "but in the final analysis the making or breaking of budgets depends on the men elected to office."1 The mayor neglected to mention the Fiscal Procedures Act and its notable effect on city finances. Lee also claimed credit for the capital improvements approved by his constituents and promised that they would be built for "substantially less than the amount authorized." He said that interest would be reduced by "prudent investment of unused bond proceeds," and "good management" had made it possible to finance retirement of the bonds with a net increase of 1.5 mills over the current levy. Some $1,000,000 in sales tax revenue was being set aside each year to finance capital needs not included in the bond program, and he pledged that he would resist any effort to divert these funds to departmental operations or other uses.2 The only other candidate for mayor was Sheldon Brewster, a Salt Lake City businessman and motel owner who had served five terms in the Utah House of Representatives, serving as Speaker twice.3 He was not considered a strong opponent because of low visibility among voters and a bland personality. Lee handily defeated Brewster by a margin, of almost two to one, 295 J. BRACKEN LEE 32,989 to 17,433.4 Clearly, Brewster was an uninspiring and token candidate against the still popular Lee. Ten thousand fewer voters went to the polls than in 1959, suggesting a marked decrease in interest. "If there was any mandate," speculated the Deseret News, "it was for economical and efficient government, with budgets in the black."5 The voters also approved a bond issue for construction of a combination civic auditorium, sports arena, and convention center, to be called the Salt Palace after a historic structure that had burned down. In his second term Lee radiated the same confidence and candor that had earlier attracted national interest. When mayors were invited to the White House to discuss municipal problems and federal assistance Lee was typically forthright in declining the invitation, saying he could not afford it. The tax burden was such that the average person, like himself, lacked the funds for the trip; and he did not believe in asking Salt Lake City to pick up the tab, especially since it had been necessary to refuse salary increases to city officials who were much worse off than he. Vice-president Hubert Humphrey explained in a telegram that the secretary of labor and administrators of other federal agencies would outline ways of obtaining money from the government for urban programs. From this, Lee inferred that the purpose of the conference was to "find more ways of spending the people's money." Proclaiming an interest in a conference to relieve tax­payers of some of their burden, he told Humphrey, "Let me know when the Federal Government has reformed."6 Frederick Nelson of the Philadelphia Bulletin found Lee's approach welcome: But a mayor who doesn't want his city to join Appalachia and couldn't be tempted to go on a junket to Washington on expense account is a refreshing novelty. No wonder he got 55% of the vote when he ran for mayor! No wonder the CIO's COPE describes Brack Lee as "very, very dangerous!"7 URBAN RENEWAL One of the most convincing examples of Lee's disdain for federal spending programs was his consistent opposition to urban 296 PROBLEMS OF CITY GOVERNMENT renewal. The federal government began providing funds for urban renewal projects in 1949. Cities held hearings and then referendums to approve the organizing of local urban renewal agencies. If voters granted approval, the agency worked with the federal government in drawing up plans for renewing selected sections of a city. The major controversy about the program concerned the power of eminent domain, which opponents claimed forced owners of homes to sell. Martin Anderson, a research fellow in urban studies at Harvard and MIT, wrote a scathing review of the program in 1965. He claimed that between 1950 and 1960 the program had demolished 126,000 low-rent homes and built only 28,000 new homes, most in a much higher rent bracket. The result was improved housing for relatively high-income groups only, while low-income groups were pushed into different slums.8 In the early 1960s, planning experts began urging Salt Lake community leaders to become involved in urban renewal and to revitalize the city center by emphasizing its natural assets. They argued that Salt Lake should avoid the trend toward suburban sprawl and urban scatter. More trees should be planted and buildings should be freshened with paint, especially older historic ones. A visitor's and convention center should be constructed downtown to emphasize the area as a place of interest and to attract more visitors by creating an inviting atmosphere.9 Lee's feelings were never in doubt. He brushed off these suggestions, claiming that Salt Lake City's slum problems were very minor.10 Others were not so complacent. The Tribune warned that completion of the westside freeway would "open up part of the seamier side of Salt Lake City to public view." Although the editors believed that Salt Lake had "no long stretches of blighted residential areas," it did have its share of slum housing, "usually hidden on little traveled streets of the city's west side or just east and south of downtown."11 Although Lee realized that property deterioration was a constant problem in any city, he believed that many property owners could repair the buildings themselves if the tax burden 297 J. BRACKEN LEE were not so great. He was convinced that taxes and the size of government would increase with urban renewal: So please forgive me if you find me opposing what may seem to be a good thing such as the advantages pointed out by those who support urban renewal. I am willing to sacrifice what may seem to be good, because I sincerely believe that the price we must pay by enlarging government is far greater than the good achieved!12 When Lee learned in 1962 that President Kennedy had pro­posed a new cabinet-level Department of Urban Affairs, he fired off an anxious telegram to Senator Bennett urging him to oppose it: "It is extremely dangerous to set up these new departments and especially so when they are not truly understood or explain­ed." 13 In 1965 President Johnson, following Kennedy's lead, succeeded in pushing through Congress a new cabinet position called the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Johnson advocated a "creative federalism," a partnership, which Lee rejected, between the federal government and governors and mayors. Johnson encouraged the formation of metropolitan area plans that would receive federal assistance.14 Urban renewal steadily gained momentum in Salt Lake City, and by 1965 all members of the city commission, with the excep­tion of Lee, favored it. In August 1965 it reached the referen­dum stage. The commission decided that if voters approved organization of a renewal agency, they would appoint themselves as the Redevelopment Agency Commission to serve as the con­tracting arm of the city in negotiations involving urban renewal contracts. Lee was relieved at the latter decision, saying, "I don't believe in agencies running things when the top men are not responsible to the voters. I think it is better protection for the people if we name ourselves."15 As propaganda flooded the city, the issue became very heated. Commissioner George Catmull claimed misrepresentation by opponents of the program: "Some people are going door to door saying that a bulldozer will level property if voters approve creation of this agency." Catmull assured doubters that the com­mission would not approve any project unless the majority of 298 PROBLEMS OF CITY GOVERNMENT property owners agreed to it.16 Opposing that view, Sheldon Brewster headed a citizens committee for the protection of prop­erty rights which issued leaflets warning of "the Federal Bull­dozer" and a printed one-page news sheet accusing the city's two dailies of "hiding the facts" in their support of urban renewal. Opponents also distributed handbills saying, "This is your dis­possess notice," which apparently caused some home owners to seek legal aid.17 Complaining of "misinformation" and "deliberate distortion," the Tribune insisted that urban renewal was "not a socialistic attack on private enterprise and private property rights" and that Utah law provided protection against abuse. The editors noted that the use of the power of eminent domain to condemn prop­erty was surrounded with safeguards-much more than in the case of highways, schools, parks, or other public places. The owner did not have to accept the price offered and could go to court to seek fair treatment, even recovering legal expenses if the price set by the court was higher.18 The Tribune further noted that the majority of voters had to approve urban renewal, and if three-fourths of the property owners involved in a specific project objected, they could require that the project be submitted to voters. Public hearings were required on any project, and judicial protection as well as protection by the city commission was assured: It is inconceivable to us, in the face of all these safe­guards, that any urban renewal project could possibly be established in Salt Lake City unless it had very broad public approval and adhered strictly to the law with all its safe­guards. 19 KSL-TV, the Mormon church-owned station and ally of the Deseret News, urged an end to emotionalism, and in an on-the-air editorial claimed that a vote for a renewal agency was not "a vote to lose your home." KSL warned against scare tactics and asked "both sides to discuss the issue calmly and factually."20 Ironic­ally, the most effective campaigning was done by opponents of urban renewal through a guest editorial aired by KSL the follow­ing week. J. McKinnon Smith argued that urban renewal did not 299 J . BRACKEN LEE cure slums: "It only moves them. Slums are not buildings-they are people, and people take their slummy habits and attitudes with them wherever they go." Smith claimed that the commis­sion would have the power to take property against the will of the people: To ask you to vote YES is to ask you to vote your own destruction. Do not be insensible to your God-given, inalien­able right to own property; to be secure in it and to protect it. The astronomical cost of Federal Urban Renewal is suffi­cient reason to vote NO Tuesday; but the cost that is too high-too precious to sacrifice-is your freedom or your free agency to use your property as you wish to do. As President David O. McKay has said, "We must recog­nize that property rights are essential to human liberty." Therefore, I recommend that you vote NO Tuesday.21 A classic example of misinformation and propaganda, the editorial carried emotionalism to the extreme; but even more important, it was a blatant attempt to imply the support of the Mormon church by using loaded terms such as "free agency" and invoking the name of David O. McKay. Clearly, the church was not against urban renewal. If it had been, KSL and the Deseret News would not have argued persuasively in behalf of such a program. Yet, this propaganda struck home to the majority of Salt Lake City voters, as the church was skillfully identified with the opposition. A rather ineffectual attempt at rebuttal was made by John Preston Creer, Salt Lake County commissioner, who suggested that "old folks" had been "duped by the fear of losing their homes." Urban renewal, he said, was not designed to go into residential areas but would instead make the downtown healthy and attractive. "Our city leaders will not sit by and watch any program come in and destroy what has taken a century to build," Creer asserted. Self-consciously, he endeavored to invoke the Mormon heritage with a trite plea to "keep our city as beautiful as the mountains surrounding it."22 The following day, voters indicated which argument had impressed them by soundly defeating urban renewal 29,119 to 4,900. The New York Times called it "painful proof that a 300 PROBLEMS OF CITY GOVERNMENT scare campaign centering around fear of 'the Federal Bulldozer backed by eminent domain' can easily defeat city planners and civic organizations." Proponents had hoped to receive $1.6 mil­lion in federal funds to widen land purchases and relocate home­owners in the downtown district where the $17 million civic audi­torium was to be built. The vote left Salt Lake City the largest city in the nation ineligible to participate in the federal urban renewal program.23 Although a defeat for the city's progressive forces, it was considered an impressive victory for Lee as the only member of the city commission to oppose urban renewal. He reacted with characteristic overstatement: This makes me even happier than any of my own victories when running for office. The voters agree with me that the city can repair any blight that does exist without another Federal agency over which there is no local control.24 A few days later, he referred to urban renewal as a "fraud" that the people had opposed "by a vote of nearly 10 to 1. A few more demonstrations of this kind, I am sure, will open the eyes of our politicians who have been leading us to destruction."25 Actually, the defeat was closer to 6 to 1, but the voice had been heard, even if it did come in reaction to massive propaganda. Lee had consistently hammered at his theme: "Urban renewal will mean more federal government and more taxes." He seemed unperturbed by the fact that the issue had caused his sharpest disagreement with the business community in twenty-five years. He argued that most of the property that would have been included in the urban renewal package was owned by people wealthy enough to pay for its improvement themselves. Referring to his downtown committee to work on city problems, he claimed, "We are doing a pretty darn good job ourselves. The spirit catches on and if the pace keeps up we will do the job without Washington's help." Warning that urban renewal was part of a step-by-step program in which freedom was being lost by the public's willingness to rely on the federal government, he de- 301 J. BRACKEN LEE clared: "I'm not against rebuilding the community, but I don't want the government to run everything."20 Nevertheless, Lee seemed unconvinced that Salt Lake had any problems serious enough to warrant urban renewal. It was generally recognized, as the Chicago Sun-Times said, that "Salt Lake City, although worn in places, has not acquired real slum corrosion." Lee was characterized as "one of the country's most consistent and personable conservative politicians" who refused to be "diverted by the eagerness of downtown businessmen for federal funds to enhance the city as a convention center." Yet, with President Johnson mounting a massive urban assistance program, Lee's victory was predicted to be a "classic individual­istic exercise comparable to Custer's Last Stand."27 Perhaps that prophecy was fulfilled, for Lee continued to bicker with the city commission and the federal government over programs involving matching funds. He voted against all federal programs and even refused to sign government forms when the rest of the commission approved. He was not only against any federal subsidies, but he was against any programs to raise money to match the funds.28 Without question, Lee's opposition to federal subsidies slowed Salt Lake City's urban progress. Buildings that would have come sooner came later and served as an example of negative leadership. Instead of an assertive, posi­tive force, Lee's voice was the perpetual, single, dissenting one, reminiscent of his regressive stand toward education as governor. FLUORIDATION Lee's fears of socialism surfaced often. While governor, he had warned the Utah Dental Association Convention in 1950 that socialized medicine was the "forerunner of socialism itself." He promised that once medicine was socialized in America, everything would be socialized and democracy would be lost.29 He accused the Truman administration of "using deceit and dis­honor to pedal socialistic programs under sugar-coated names," such as calling socialized medicine "public health insurance." He claimed that socialism "flared and flopped" in America in the 302 PROBLEMS OF CITY GOVERNMENT days of the Plymouth Bay colony. The pilgrim fathers soon dropped a common storehouse project in favor of private enter­prise "because the strong men did not want to do four times the work of the weak and receive no bonus for their efforts."30 When fluoridation became more popular as a means of pre­venting tooth decay, Lee requested an opinion from the attorney general as to whether it would be "constitutional for a govern­mental agency to force the fluoridation of water upon the peo­ple." If the people voted for it and it should be determined constitutional, he acknowledged that he could do nothing to prevent it. But he was disturbed by the prospect and drew an analogy of forcing vitamins or a special diet on people to improve their health.31 In 1955 the attorney general declared it to be constitutional, but Lee remained doubtful, insisting that "mass medication" violated constitutional rights.32 Not all physicians favored the program. Dr. Frederick B. Exner, former secretary of the Association of American Physi­cians and Surgeons, implored Lee to do everything in his power to prevent fluoridation, which he labeled an evil scheme. He told Lee that the association had passed a resolution condemn­ing all compulsory mass medication and warned that "health officials, as a class, are committed to promoting this scheme, come hell or high water, and have completely closed minds on the matter."33 Even though Lee as the state's chief administrator considered fluoridation an invasion of freedom, he was faced with the Utah State Department of Health which favored it.34 When Lee became mayor, pressure mounted as the Utah State Medical Assoication passed a resolution unanimously endorsing fluoridation for Salt Lake City. Angrily, Lee com­plained that the association had consistently fought socialized medicine, but would now "endorse a Socialist program such as putting fluorine in drinking water." Insisting that the process would only be helpful to a small proportion of the people, he claimed that it was "dangerous and of no help to many others." He asked what right any group had to "force people to take something that they do not want to take." He suggested to physicians that if they objected to dictation by the government 303 J . BRACKEN LEE they should not "use their profession to support dictation to others."35 Lee took to television to fight the program, and his influence prevailed, for the initiative ordinance requesting that fluorine be added to Salt Lake City's water supply was defeated at the polls in 1961 by a vote of 35,881 to 10,330.30 However, the issue continued to plague the mayor. Perhaps the most notable argument in behalf of fluoridation was pre­sented by Dr. Kenneth B. Castleton, dean of the University of Utah College of Medicine. In 1967 he prevailed upon Lee to consider it seriously, arguing that it had been defeated due to misinformation and emotionalism. Castleton said that evidence had become even more impressive that fluoridation was effective, safe, and "one of the most important public health measures of the century." Citing numerous statistics, he alluded to the experi­ence of eight of the nation's largest cities which were fluoridating their public water supply, including New York, Chicago, Phila­delphia, Baltimore, Cleveland, Washington, D.C., St. Louis, and Detroit. "Many studies have been made to test the safety of fluoridation and the evidence is overwhelming that it is a safe and reliable procedure," the physician asserted. Claiming the tendency to emotionalize the issue was widespread, especially among uninformed older people and lower income groups, he said it was advocated by almost all leading scientific organiza­tions in the country. Then he challenged Lee: As Mayor of this city, you have a rare opportunity to render an enormous service. I dare say if you could implement this program, by this one act you would do more for the health of the people than 100 dentists could do in their lifetimes. This is a sobering statement and I hope you will give it due con­sideration. 37 Although undoubtedly impressed by Castleton's erudition and evidence, Lee refused to budge. Citing his wife's five-month hospital stay, he explained that medication normally beneficial to other patients caused a violent reaction in her. Lee also noted that he was unable to take penicillin in spite of its well-known benefits. He concluded that neither Castleton nor any other physician could say with certainty that fluoride would have no ill 304 PROBLEMS OF CITY GOVERNMENT effects upon anyone. He also declared that installation would be expensive-"money which Salt Lake City does not have." He could not understand the logic of putting fluoride into the water supply when most water was used for purposes other than drink­ing. He promised to support a plan to make available free fluori­dated water in bottled form to any citizen who desired it.38 Even though he continued to be inundated with letters and requests for fluoridation, he remained unalterably opposed to it; in a very real sense, it symbolized his conservative political philosophy. SALT PALACE Lee never favored the creation of the Salt Palace, or as it was originally called, the Salt Lake County Civic Auditorium Complex. After voters approved the bond issue to build it and demolition of the buildings on the selected site had begun, he fired a broadside at the project, calling it a high-priced burden on the taxpayers. He discovered that the University of Utah was planning a combined activities center and physical education complex and wondered why it could not serve the needs of the city as well. Predictably, he became the first signer of a petition which, if signed by 19,000 registered voters, would place the issue on the ballot for reconsideration.39 Marvin G. Jensen, county commission chairman, asserted that the project was "beyond the point of no return" and stressed his belief that the Salt Palace would be a very significant pro­ducer of revenue. McCown E. (Ed) Hunt, Civic Auditorium Board chairman, warned that abandonment of the project would cost the taxpayers $3,000,000, not to mention the need to redevelop the auditorium site.40 Lee's petition effort failed, but a few months later a more serious problem surfaced: there was a $4,000,000 difference between the budget for the auditorium and the bids made on the project. Hunt explained that the board had given the architects the figure of $12,599,825 as the amount available for the build­ing, but they had "miscalculated with respect to design as to what could be done for that amount of money." Controversy 305 J. BRACKEN LEE flared when the lowest bid opened on October 14 was $16,916- 000 or $4,000,000 more than was available. The bid, submitted by Jacobsen Construction Company, included $4,700,000 for electrical and mechanical work but not $4,810,000 for obtain­ing and clearing the site.41 Since Salt Lake City taxpayers were responsible for approxi­mately 44 percent of the taxes to retire the bonds for the project, Lee was distraught; citizens had a right to believe that the archi­tect's estimate was within reason. After renegotiation the county commissioners unanimously agreed to contract with the low bidder for $11,905,000 on the basis of revised plans eliminating the concert hall. But Lee was reluctant about that, too, because the county was assuming that the concert hall's cost was $5,011,000 and that it was a fair valuation. This, he said, was "improper and certainly would leave all of those concerned open to suspicion in view of the terrific amount of money involved." Therefore, Lee recommended that the revised plans be presented for new bids-"the only way, in my opinion that we can avoid creating more suspicion in the minds of the people."42 McCown Hunt opposed such an action, arguing that if rebid the cost would be appreciably higher, due to increased spending on the Vietnam War, higher construction wages, and other fac­tors. Marvin Jensen recalled that the last time the city had insisted on rebidding in the case of the Metropolitan Hall of Justice, the cost to the county was an extra $330,000. Never­theless, the city commission accepted Lee's logic. Although the ground-breaking ceremonies were scheduled for the morning of December 20, 1966, the commission met on December 16, and voted to accept Lee's recommendation, 3 to 1, with George Catmull dissenting and Conrad Harrison, an ex-officio member of the Salt Palace Board, abstaining even though he disagreed with Lee. Then, to force the county commission to accept the recommendation, Lee filed suit in Third District Court asking that construction be delayed.43 The following day Judge Stewart M. Hanson issued a tem­porary injunction delaying the project.44 To avoid conflict of interest on the part of Salt Lake County judges, Sixth District 306 PROBLEMS OF CITY GOVERNMENT Court Judge Ferdinand Erickson of Richfield heard the case and ordered that the county commission call for new bids. He accused the county of putting the cart before the horse in negoti­ating for a lower construction price. Accordingly, the crux of the question lay in a state statute that provided a way to alter a contract. After the commission entered a construction con­tract it could by unanimous vote alter the contract with the consent of the contractor. Although the commissioners had voted unanimously to accept a bid offering subject to change orders, the county did not have a contract when the changes were made.45 Project engineer J. Howard Dunn explained that because the contract was not signed at original bid opening, there was no formal contract, which he regarded as a technicality.40 Following the ruling, a pleased Lee said he had brought the suit because he believed "those in public office should lean over backwards to make sure they are following the law. I felt I was on the right side and the court has justified me."47 Meanwhile, the city commission went on record in support of the project and pledged full cooperation to the end. Howard Dunn believed that Lee "would now lend his full support of the project," but Lee backed off from an unequalified endorsement.48 It was March 1967 before the contract was signed with the new low bidder, Alfred Brown Company of Salt Lake City and Robert E. McKee Company of El Paso, Texas, offering $11,699,- 000. In spite of a significant delay, the contract was over $200,000 lower than the one almost signed with Jacobsen Con­struction Company. It was estimated that two years would be necessary to complete the construction.49 Lee received extensive criticism for his attitude toward the Salt Palace project, and it became an issue in the 1967 mayoralty race. His opponent, D. James Cannon, criticized him for break­ing the contract and costing the city $200,000 in waiting.50 Cannon was on weak ground. The cost factor was of very little signficance, since the eventual bid was $200,000 lower than the original. Lee was opposed on principle to the entire complex, regarding it as expensive and unnecessary. But the cost and the bidding represented a question of equity and legality. His suc- 307 J . BRACKEN LEE cessful efforts to delay construction through the courts until the city could be certain of a fair valuation was not only justified, it was exemplary public service. In fact, Lee became the con­science of city and county government in this case. The courts supported him in the end, ample evidence of the correctness of his stand. Consistency was the ultimate theme of Lee's mayoralty, as he fought for economy and against federal assistance. Ironically, in his approach to each of the problems considered above his weaknesses were as evident as his strengths; in fact, they were sometimes interchangeable. For instance, his strict adherence to principle was offensive when he blindly fought urban renewal; yet, it signified the idealistic statesman with the courage of his convictions when he protested the construction of the Salt Palace or defended his stand on fluoridation. He need not have been right as long as he could generate respect from the people, some­times even those who opposed him. Inevitably, he thrived on fighting the lone battle. 308 PROBLEMS OF CITY GOVERNMENT 1Salt Lake Tribune, August 4, 1963. 2Ibid. 3Deseret News, July 13, 1963. 4Deseret News, November 6, 1963. Tbid., editorial. "Frederick Nelson, " 'Dangerous' Mayor," Philadelphia Bulletin, April 27 1965. "Ibid. 8Martin Anderson, "Exploding the Myths of Urban Renewal," Reader's Digest, April 1965, p. 3. 9A1 Zelver, "The Visitor in Downtown Salt Lake City," paper submitted to the mayor on June 4, 1962, by Zelver who lived in Menlo Park, Calif., Lee Mayoralty Papers. 10Lee to Mrs. Cardella D. Stanger, Salt Lake City, March 13, 1961, ibid. "Salt Lake Tribune, September 14, 1964, editorial. 12Lee to Stanger. 13Lee to Sen. Wallace F. Bennett, February 7, 1962, telegram, Lee Mayor­alty Papers. "Message from the President of the United States Relative to the Prob­lems and Future of the Central City and Its Suburbs, March 2, 1965, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (1965), House Document no. 99; a copy of this document is in Lee's Mayoralty Papers. "Deseret News, August 4, 1965. "Ibid. "New York Times, August 22, 1965. "Salt Lake Tribune, August 1, 1965, editorial. 19Ibid. 20KSL-TV, Channel 5, editorial on urban renewal aired week of August 2, 1965, Salt Lake City, transcription, Lee Mayoralty Papers. 21J. McKinnon Smith, guest editorial on KSL-TV aired week of August 9, 1965, transcription, ibid. 22John Preston Creer, guest editorial on KSL-TV aired week of August 16, 1965, transcription, ibid. 23New York Times, August 22, 1965. 24Ibid. 25Lee to H. Belmont Houghton, Barre, Vt., August 30, 1965, Lee Mayor­alty Papers. 26Charles Bartlett, "Salt Lake City-A Last Stand," Chicago Sun-Times, September 17, 1965. "Ibid. 28Lee to Mrs. H. Pistorious, Salt Lake City, January 19, 1967, Lee Mayor­alty Papers. Lee explained: "I have even refused to sign any of these govern­ment forms as Mayor of Salt Lake City and as a result, the Salt Lake City Commission has authorized Commissioner Barker to do the signing. I do not know if this is legal or not, but I suppose it is since the City Attorney has advised the commission it is." 2SDeseret News, May 15, 1950. 30Deseret News, October 15, 1951. 31Lee to Mrs. M. M. Wright, Salt Lake City, March 23, 1955, Lee Guber­natorial Papers. 32Lee to Dr. A. R. Gould, San Francisco, Calif., June 22, 1955, ibid. 309 J. BRACKEN LEE 33Dr. Frederick B. Exner to Lee, February 12, 1956, ibid. 34Lee to Exner, March 5, 1956, ibid. 35Lee to Dr. Harold Bowman, executive secretary, Utah State Medical Assn., April 12, 1960, Lee Mayoralty Papers. 36Lee to Mrs. Robert J. Readey, Kirkwood, Mo., November 16, 1961, ibid. 37Dr. Kenneth B. Castleton to Lee, September 14, 1967, ibid. 38Lee to Castleton, September 29, 1967, ibid. 39Deseret News, July 28, 1966. 4°Ibid. 41Deseret News, October 19, 1966. 42Lee to Salt Lake City Commission, December 15, 1966, Lee Mayoralty Papers. 43Deseret News, December 16, 1966. 44Salt Lake Tribune, December 17, 1966. 4r^Salt Lake Tribune, December 21, 1966. 46Intermountain Contractor, December 30, 1966. "Salt Lake Tribune, December 21, 1966. 4SIntermountain Contractor, December 30, 1966. i9Salt Lake Tribune, March 1, 1967. 50Interview with D. James Cannon, Salt Lake City, August 4, 1972. 310