Let 'em Holler - A Political Biography of J. Bracken Lee

Economy in Government II

6 Economy in Government II Lee preached economy in 1949 when first elected governor, in 1956 at the end of his tenure, and again in 1960 as mayor of Salt Lake City. He would have argued for economy whatever the international scene offered, but the Korean War provided a con­venient rationale. When he addressed the 1951 legislature he spoke of a "national emergency" and the "possibility of a third world war." He expressed grief over casualties Utah suffered in Korea and argued that Utahns at home must intensify steps already taken to gear the economy to the war effort. He recom­mended the elimination of nonessential services and unnecessary spending as well as the reduction of payrolls and capital improve­ments. In his words, "Every conceivable effort must be made which in any way will accelerate and promote the defense of our country-for the struggle at hand is one of survival."1 Stressing the need to sacrifice, Lee asserted that government, the family, the corner drugstore, and the large corporation all must live within their incomes or face bankruptcy. He claimed that the first two years of his administration had proved that costs could be cut without impairment of services. For instance, the Public Service and Business Regulation Commission was operating more efficiently with nine fewer employees, thus saving the state $37,700. The Liquor Control Commission was return­ing a greater profit, even though liquor sales had declined. He estimated the savings in liquor administration for a two-year period at $400,000, partly due to the abolition of the enforce­ment division. These examples, he said, were typical of almost all departments under his control.2 He strongly recommended that appropriations coincide with anticipated revenue and that taxes be reduced. He proposed to increase exemptions from $600 for an adult to $750, from 67 J . BRACKEN LEE $1,200 for married couples to $1,500, and from $300 for each dependent to $500. Under the existing system a man and wife with two children were allowed an exemption of $1,800, while the same family in California was allowed $4,300. According to Lee, such an example was convincing evidence that Utah's tax system needed reform. In addition, he recommended the simpli­fication of tax forms and procedures to cut red tape and adminis­trative costs. An alternative plan proposed by the State Tax Commission would have eliminated the income tax altogether in favor of a 3 percent (instead of 2 percent) sales tax on all items except groceries and prescription medicine.3 In a request for repeal of the 1947 act creating a state park on the old prison site in Sugar House, he contended that city parks should be the city's responsibility. However, he favored more funds in some selected cases to provide upgrading of state hospital and welfare institutions, a higher salary for the state health commissioner, expansion of the highway patrol, and for the organizing of a civil defense program with local communities assuming the expense and responsibility. He recommended termination of the public employees' retirement system in favor of Social Security.4 With the Korean War as a backdrop the message assumed dramatic importance. The press again supported his proposal, the Tribune labeling it a "rigid economy plan" but one in "keep­ing with the times." The editors applauded the emphasis on sacrifice in a time of national emergency and predicted the sup­port of the public even though the details, especially the sales tax, might be debated.5 The Deseret News said that Lee's strict economy was "not only wise," but in light of the national prob­lem "it is essential, it is mandatory."0 Similar encouragement came from the Telegram. Remembering that Lee had followed economy from the beginning, "sometimes ruthlessly," the Tele­gram nevertheless believed that most Utahns would approve the broad idea, since retrenchment had paid off with a state surplus of some $3,000,000.7 Budget requests in 1949 totaling over $81,000,000 had caused such intense conflict with the governor that state agencies 68 ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT II scaled down their requests for the 1951 biennium, submitting a total budget of $61,900,000. Although this figure was consider­ably lower than the previous biennium, Lee still recommended that the figure be cut by $12,600,000.8 However, lawmakers killed bills designed to satisfy Lee's desire to reform the income tax structure and created a budget figure of $56,400,000.9 Lee, in turn, vetoed all the funds the legislature recommended be spent on higher education, amounting to $13,333,000.10 He also vetoed two bills providing for a refund of gasoline taxes paid by those who used gasoline for off-highway purposes. The Telegram lauded him for "political courage," suggesting that much of the gasoline supposedly purchased for use in tractors and similar vehicles found its way into the gas tanks of trucks and cars.11 By the end of the session Lee was embroiled in controversy because of vetoes so numerous that a special session was sched­uled for June. In spite of heavy pressure to increase salaries of state and local officials to conform to the cost of living, he con­tinued his economy bent, even vetoing bills designed to increase his own salary. Only legislators and court reporters received raises. In the special session Lee decided to be conciliatory and allow legislators to do their work for the most part without obstructive vetoes. Most of the successful bills involved the schools and cost the state more money than if they had been enacted in the regular session.12 Nevertheless, Lee's political image remained positive, as evidenced by a Los Angeles Times article congratulating him for courage in his vetoes and calling the special session a compromise that cost him "none of his public support."13 Lee declared that his vetoes had not destroyed any of the state's services, all of which were "very much alive and improv­ed." 1* But two state senators, Lorenzo Elggren and Edward Watson, disagreed. They issued a bitter attack on the governor for his failure to fund a $550,000 hospital for poliomyelitis and other crippling diseases. Although the act authorizing the hospital was created in 1945 and the building erected for it was virtually completed, Lee had recommended repeal of the legislation on the grounds that the facility was unnecessary. Elggren and 69 J . BRACKEN LEE Watson accused him of "ruthlessly" and "viciously" killing a project that would have helped to alleviate the polio epidemic then in progress. They could not forgive him for trifling with the health of Utah children to save money. They sarcastically asked, "Are parents whose children have died still grateful to you for your economy?"10 Lee reacted to the criticism in a typically forthright, self-righteous manner. In a lecture to the Utah Foundation, a busi­ness- financed governmental research and tax study organization, he complained of their lack of courage in fighting for sound fiscal policies: When bankers are afraid to expose this fraud of inflation, because they might lose some deposits; when you insurance men are afraid to tell people what is happening to their poli­cies for fear of losing some sales; when newspapers write editorials to keep from losing subscriptions, don't come up and try to tell me politicians are cowardly for doing the same thing.16 Instead of accusing him of rigidity in the face of serious criticism, the press continued to respect him for speaking frankly. The Telegram admitted that some would call it "stubbornness rather than courage," but the editors believed it was an example of his unflinching stand on governmental economy "regardless of who got hurt."17 In 1951 Lee spoke equally frankly at the National Governors Conference, threatening to walk out unless the governors took a stand on high taxes, inflation, the Korean War, the national debt, and integrity in government. During a discussion of mental institutions and senility, Lee exploded, accusing the other gov­ernors of worrying about "incidental" problems. "I believe I'm right and every man in this room knows I'm right."18 He made such a splash nationally that local newspapers speculated about a favorite son candidacy at the national Repub­lican convention in 1952. The Tribune rhetorically asked what state official besides Adlai Stevenson had been given so much space in national magazines and was in so much demand as a public speaker. There would be no "iffiness" or "metooism" 70 ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT II in a delegation headed by Lee; "and a definite program, appeal­ing to big and little fellows alike, would be spelled out thus, E-C-O-N-O-M-Y." Lee's campaign slogans were said to be ready-made-Lee to rhyme with "economee" and "honestee" and campaign buttons saying, "Vote for Brack, set spending back," or "We'll go with Brack to give rascals the sack." Lee was considered a potential running mate for Sen. Robert A. Taft because of similar views, and if General Eisenhower were to get the nomination, "our Brack" could be a healing element in the party.19 By the end of May 1952 it was necessary to call another special session, chiefly to upgrade the state retirement system. Other funding matters considered were the completion of indus­trial buildings at the state prison and improving flood control, following the unprecedented floods in Utah that spring. An appropriation of $30,000 was made for the cost of the spe­cial session.20 Lee put intensive effort into tax reduction. He succeeded in reducing the state school equalization levy from 6.3 mills in 1951 to 0 mills in 1952 and reducing the property tax in 1951, mostly through vetoes. Another reason for the decline in prop­erty tax was the increase in sales tax collections. In the 1949-51 biennium the state had collected $30,357,999 in sales tax; two years later collections had jumped to $34,084,265.21 Actually, the special interest groups saved the most on property tax relief, as exemplified by the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad's saving of $127,261.47.22 1953 LEGISLATURE In his address to the 1953 legislature Lee reaffirmed the need for economy, attributing the "substantial surplus" to the increase in tax revenues and "the fight to hold down appropriations." Departments that had economized, he said, had proved that expenditures could be curtailed without the impairment of serv­ices. Although taxes had been reduced since he assumed office, he was still convinced that they were excessive. He urged that 71 J . BRACKEN LEE the income tax be reduced, that returns be simplified, and that the property tax be eliminated.23 The Tribune lauded his program as "economical, yet progres­sive" government; but the Deseret News predicted that citizens would complain of the austerity, especially in education. The News correctly noted that the overall reduction recommended by Lee was about 20 percent but was not evenly distributed among departments. Some budgets he reduced slightly, others drastic­ally, with higher education, as usual, bearing the brunt. Yet, economy in government offered positive benefits, the News asserted, not the least of which was "an aggressive free enterprise economy generally credited with having made this nation the great producer that it is."24 In his budget message Lee recommended that income taxes be reduced by $3,000,000 because of a surplus of $3,124,000 in the General Fund. Since the income tax and property tax were earmarked for the Uniform School Fund, he proposed the trans­fer of $3,000,000 from the General Fund surplus to the Uniform School Fund. The Emergency Relief Fund was supplied by the sales tax and contained a balance of approximately $8,608,900. Since $5,000,000 was to remain in reserve by law and the antici­pated revenue in the coming biennuim for the ERF was $35,000,- 000, he recommended that $23,000,000 be budgeted to pay for the operation of the public welfare department. As a result, the state property tax could be eliminated. If $4,800,000 was trans­ferred annually from sales tax revenues and $3,000,000 from the ERF, the Uniform School Fund would be adequately financed without placing a levy on property.25 Predictably, Lee argued that the figure requested for the next biennium of $72,971,000 in appropriations far exceeded antici­pated state income. As a result, he vetoed funding for projects he thought superfluous, such as $50,000 for an evaluation of rain-making experiments by the University of Utah Department of Meteorology and another $50,000 for purchase of a Pony Express sculpture for the State Capitol grounds.20 The Deseret News called the latter veto an example of "domestic courage." "Knowing how strongly Mrs. J. Bracken Lee has worked on 72 ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT II behalf of the statue project, one suspects that it is just as well that the Governor's mansion, while old, is roomy enough that Mr. Lee can stay out of the First Lady's way for a few days."27 The legislature generally followed Lee's recommendations. The income tax process was streamlined by the addition of a new short form; income tax exemptions were raised from $300 to $600; $1,750,000 from the General Fund surplus was trans­ferred to the Uniform School Fund, and $1,750,000 from sales tax receipts was also transferred to make up for reduced income taxes. An attempt to increase the motor fuel tax from 5 to 6 cents per gallon was vetoed by Lee. Although he vetoed an edu­cational TV station appropriation of $250,000, he signed a bill to appropriate $44,380 to improve and maintain This Is the Place Monument and $79,000 for building at the Utah School for the Deaf and Blind.28 Nevertheless, because of the tax reduc­tion, Utah lost about $13,000,000 during the biennium. Enthusiastic about selling his economic philosophy nation­ally, Lee made a forum of the National Governors Conference in 1953. He said that many people who "worked their hearts out" for a change in Washington had become convinced that the Eisenhower administration would never reverse New Deal poli­cies. Lee disturbed the "pro-Eisenhower glow" at the conference, since most Republican governors supported Ike's go slow policy on tax reduction and an increase on the $275 billion federal debt limit. However, Lee claimed that the attempt to raise the debt ceiling to $290 billion was one of the best examples of what he called the failure of the new administration to reverse the big spending trend of its Democratic predecessors. He said the best way to cut government expenses was to cut taxes so that there would be less money to spend.29 If Lee failed to impress the governors, he managed to win over the press. The political writers who covered the national governors conferences rated him one of the nation's seventeen outstanding governors. They rated him behind such notables as Thomas Dewey of New York, Earl Warren of California, Alfred Driscoll of New Jersey, Allan Shivers of Texas, and Frank Lausche of Ohio, who were called the five best.30 73 J. BRACKEN LEE In 1955 Lee aroused more national recognition and criticism by suggesting a third party as a possible solution to the country's problems. Attacking his speech in Chicago in which he made the suggestion, the Washington Post charged that his "general bungling in the gubernatorial office" made him unworthy to lead a third party and concluded that the speech was an attempt "to divert attention from his own shabby record." The Deseret News agreed that mention of a third party was intemperate but resented the criticism of Lee's record: "The harshest critic of the Governor would be hard put to substantiate a charge of 'general bungling' or a 'shabby record.'" The editors praised him for operating the statehouse more efficiently and openly than any governor of recent memory. They were impressed with his hand­ling of liquor and welfare, his improvement of roads, his resis­tance to tax increases, his "stern pay-as-we-go policy," and the lack of scandal or corruption.31 1955-56 BIENNIUM In his message to the legislature Lee claimed that some expenditures had gone beyond his control, especially in educa­tion. As a result of the transfer of surplus funds to the Uniform School Fund in 1953, the legislature had reduced the property tax by 6.5 mills. Lee did not see such a bright picture for the new biennium, mainly because the surplus had almost all been spent. An increase in the property tax for school purposes seemed a foregone conclusion. Lee expected reserves at the end of the 1953-54 biennium to be $911,000 in the General Fund, $5.7 million in the Emergency Relief Fund, and nothing at all in the Reserve Building Fund, making anticipated surpluses $6.6 mil­lion lower than those of the previous two years.32 A tax increase had not been necessary in 1953 because $13.1 million was transferred from the Emergency Relief Fund to the Uniform School Fund. This so depleted the ERF that nothing could be siphoned off into the Reserve Building Fund, causing most construction programs to be eliminated. Lee called this a mistake; in order to resume construction he recommended that 74 ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT II the first $3 million to $5 million surplus in the ERF-over the $5 million statutory reserve-be diverted to the Reserve Building Fund, with the remaining surplus going to the Uniform School Fund. If general spending could be curbed, more money would be available for the school fund, eventually resulting in a lower­ing of the property tax.33 Again, conflict arose between the governor and the legisla­ture. Lee signed bills designed to close loopholes in individual income taxes, and the lawmakers agreed with his suggestion that money raised from the local uniform levy in excess of the basic minimum school program be transferred to the Uniform School Fund. However, Lee vetoed many revenue bills, three of which were overridden by the legislature: one bill permitted Salt Lake City to levy a 4 mill property tax for water and sewage purposes; one raised the corporation franchise tax rate from 3 percent to 4 percent of net income; and another extended state aid to the emergency school building program with an appropriation of $2.13 million.34 He also vetoed a bill that would have extended the sales tax to cigarettes, beer, and oleomargarine, items already taxed in other ways. Before the lawmaking body completed its work, a discouraged Lee warned that because it had appropriated about $1 million more than the estimated revenue, the state might face a $2 million deficit.35 As a revealing sign of his economic extremism, this prophecy failed to materialize; at the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 1957, Lee's last year in office, there was a working surplus of over $8.35 million in state funds.30 ECONOMY: FOR WHAT? Without question, Lee's eight years were most known for economy, especially in education, and for tax reductions. Yet, when he assumed office Utah's economy was healthy, and state funds included a working surplus. Moreover, the evidence sug­gests that most people approved of the tax system as it had been revised in the 1940s and would have been content to leave it alone. On the other hand, Utah's tendency to political conserva­tism, combined with its Mormon traditions, provided the natural 75 J. BRACKEN LEE support Lee needed for his economy drive. Having been con­tinually admonished by their church leaders to be frugal and avoid debt, Utah's Mormon citizens could enthusiastically, even religiously, support the same admonition from an elected official. But the issue was considerably more complicated than most people realized. Although small property owners felt a kinship to Lee because he saved them small amounts of money, it was really the large property owner, or more particularly, the corporation that received the greatest benefit. For instance, in 1948 the esti­mated property tax paid to the Uniform School Fund in Salt Lake County by Kennecott Copper Company was $897,847; by 1952, when the mill levy had been eliminated, Kennecott paid nothing at all. If that levy had been sustained at 8 mills Kennecott would have paid $1,079,516 in 1952 and by 1957, $1,992,634.37 In 1952 the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad estimated that Lee had saved the company $127,261.47, compared with its 1951 assessment. Over a period of five years this figure ballooned to $763,568.35, without even considering increased assessed valuation. Additional revenue was lost because of Lee's changes in indi­vidual income tax laws: increasing exemptions for dependents from $300 to $600 and new, simplified tax forms. The changes were retroactive to 1952 tax figures, meaning that a tax reduc­tion of $6.5 milion per year was given Utah's taxpayers. The total reduction over four years was approximately $26,000,000. In his study of Lee's financial policies Floyd Wilcox estimated that $47,000,000, a figure he regarded as conservative, was lost in revenue to the state from all sources during 1951-56.38 In later years Lee conceded the loss of revenue but viewed it from a different perspective: My contention is, and I can prove my point and he (Wilcox) can't prove his, that a corporation doesn't pay one dollar of tax-to anybody! The corporations collect it from the consumer! Remember that! The only thing that makes a corporation be fair with the public is competition. That's the only thing. You can have all the rules and regulations that 76 ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT II you want, but competition is the lifeblood of saving people money.39 In Lee's opinion, taxes control people while competition pro­tects them: "The federal government is taxing the corporations so much now that most of them are getting subsidies. The con­sumer pays every dollar of tax." Therefore, Lee concluded, Wilcox was right when he spoke of lost revenue to government, "but it wasn't the corporations that benefited, it was the people that benefited!"40 What Lee failed to consider is this: if govern­ment is receiving decreased revenue from the corporations, it is also dispensing fewer services to the people. In the meantime, the corporations grow richer at the expense of the consumer and with the encouragement of the government. Lee's economy program must be viewed as a boon to the corporation rather than to the individual taxpayer. Wilcox also concluded that Lee's prime purpose was "to keep the cost of government down even if it meant sacrificing the quality of services which citizens demand of their government." Wilcox was convinced that more building construction during the Lee years would have saved the state money. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, prices of materials and hourly earn­ings in building construction nearly tripled between 1940 and 1958, increasing at a rate of almost 6 percent per year.41 The buildings completed after Lee left office cost the state nearly triple the amount they would have had they been constructed earlier, a fact that Lee afterward realized: "But who's to know that? See, I didn't know the government would actually keep cheapening our money until it became valueless."42 In 1952 DeMar Teuscher, Desert News politicial editor, analyzed Lee's contribution to Utah politics with ambivalence; he was a political paradox who stepped on more toes in a shorter time than any other political figure in the state's history. Lee's administration was marked each year by a surplus in state funds, gained, according to critics, by a "ruthless disregard for the needs of the state agencies." Lee's supporters argued that the surpluses came "as a result of an efficient, sound administration." Teuscher concluded that "Time alone will tell who is right."43 77 J . BRACKEN LEE Later, from a perspective of twenty-two years, Teuscher declared that Lee was "not really a good governor," for he kept such a tight rein on spending that the postwar boom did not even occur in Utah.44 On the other hand, O. N. Malmquist, former Tribune political editor, viewed Lee's economizing favorably: "A tightwad for awhile is a good thing-and then you loosen up." According to Malmquist, when George Clyde followed Lee in office he loosened up and made a creditable record-but only because of Lee's surpluses.45 In Lee's own opinion he accomplished more in his time as mayor of Price, mayor of Salt Lake City, and governor than any other official: All you gotta do is look at the record. What was done while I was in? Take Price. In all the years since I left office they've never had as many improvements in that city as when I was in for 12 years. And you can't name a 12 year period in all the history of Salt Lake City when they've had as much advancement as they had during that period. And of course, up until the time I left office as Governor, they've never had a governor who had as many improvements in a 25 year period as we had in an 8 year period. Now, how much advancement do you need! I don't take credit for all of it, but I think you had good times.40 Lee vetoed an increase in his own salary his first year in office; but in 1953 the legislature tied a salary hike for state employees to a raise for the governor. He felt compelled to allow it to become law, or all state employees would suffer while he was fighting for a principle. That is the only time he voted for his own pay raise-from $7,500 to $10,000 ("$7,500 is not very much for a governor"). Nevertheless, Lee always believed it wrong for an official to raise his own salary, unless the law became effective after the next election. He refused to raise his own salary and refused to use a $2,000 yearly expense account in his twelve years as mayor of Salt Lake City-a savings to the city of $24,000. He believed that an official could not ask people to sacrifice unless he intended to do so himself. "You can't tell a child not to smoke- and then smoke-or tell him not to swear -and then swear."47 78 ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT II Lee was consistent in his battle for economy and successful in his effort to attain it. Much of his national recognition resulted from that record. Utah newspapers supported his cause, and economically minded Utahns found it difficult to criticize him even when he exasperated them. Lee set the example by trying to economize himself-on his office expenses, his home, his style of living, his salary. The public knew that he was not living in luxury or getting rich off the public trough while he was insisting that they sacrifice. But the gnawing suspicion remains that most of the public failed to realize that Utah's economy was healthy without sacri­fices and probably would have remained so. Economy may be a good practice, but in this instance it was not dictated by the exigencies of the moment. Besides, Lee's brand of economy proved detrimental to the progress of the state and to state serv­ices, especially education. Economy cost the state time and money and led to an effort to catch up during the administrations of George D. Clyde and Calvin L. Rampton. It engendered unnecessary conflicts in state agencies from which reverberations are still heard. Economy in this case was divisive, holding the state back in crucial ways that could never be justified by appeals to sacrifice or patriotism. 79 J. BRACKEN LEE !J. Bracken Lee's Address to the Legislature, January 12, 1951, complete text as published in Deseret News. 2Ibid. 3Ibid. 4Ibid. r>SaltLake Tribune, January 13, 1951, editorial. ^Deseret News, January 14, 1951. 'Salt Lake Telegram, January 13, 1951. *Senate Journal, 29th Legislature, as quoted in Wilcox, "The Major Finan­cial Policies," p. 28. 9"Education to Leeward," Newsweek, March 12, 1951, p. 45. 10House Journal, 29th Legislature, pp. 1061-68. 41Salt Lake Telegram, March 14, 1951. 12Wilcox, "The Major Financial Policies," p. 34. 13Moley, "Utah's Governor Shows Road to Economy." "Lee to State Sen. Lorenzo E. Elggren, July 28, 1951, Lee Gubernatorial Papers. 15Elggren and State Sen. Edward Watson to Lee, August 28, 1951, ibid. ™SaltLake Telegram, April 23, 1951. "Ibid. ^Deseret News, October 2, 1951. 19Salt Lake Tribune, February 7, 1952, editorial. 20Senate Journal, 29th Legislature, as quoted in Wilcox, "The Major Fi­nancial Policies," pp. 35, 36. 21Utah Foundation, "Utah State Government Financial Summary," Re­search Report no. 51, as quoted in Wilcox, "The Major Financial Policies," p. 37. 22R. K. Bradford, vice-president, Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad, to Lee, November 17, 1952, Lee Letter File, Utah State Archives. 23J. Bracken Lee's Address to the Legislature, January 13, 1953, complete text as published in Deseret News-Telegram, January 13, 1953. 24Salt Lake Tribune, January 14, 1953; Deseret News-Telegram, January 28, 1953. 25House Journal, 30th Legislature, as quoted in Wilcox, "The Major Finan­cial Policies," pp. 42, 43. 26Ibid., p. 45. "Deseret News-Telegram, March 27, 1953. 28House Journal, 30th Legislature, as quoted in Wilcox, "The Major Finan­cial Policies," pp. 45, 46. 2SDeseret News-Telegram, August 3, 1953. 30Deseret News-Telegram, November 9, 1953. slDeseret News-Telegram, February 18, 1955, editorial. 32House Journal, 31st Legislature, as quoted in Wilcox, "The Major Finan­cial Policies," pp. 54-57. 33Ibid. 34Ibid., pp. 57, 58. 35Deseret News, March 17, 1955. 36Former State Treasurer Sharp M. Larsen to Floyd Wilcox, August 13, 1968, as quoted in Wilcox, "The Major Financial Policies," p. 69. Lee said he left a surplus of $21 million and over $50 million in special funds that were 80 ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT II untouched. He recalled that some people thought the surplus was only $17 mil­lion, meaning they did not count the $4 million won in back taxes from a suit against Kennecott Copper. Lee interview. 37Wilcox, "The Major Financial Policies," p. 92. 38Ibid., pp. 91-93. 39Lee interview. 4»Ibid. "Wilcox, "The Major Financial Policies," pp. 90, 91. 42Lee interview. 43M. DeMar Teuscher, "The Political Paradox," Intermountain Industry, March 1952, p. 33. "Telephone interview with M. DeMar Teuscher, Washington, D.C., April 19, 1974. 45Malmquist interview. Significantly, former Democratic National Committeeman Wayne L. Black agreed with Malmquist, claiming that "Every county, state, and city needs a Brack Lee once in a while-this state and city needed Bracken Lee." Yet, Black recognized problems, noting that "Brack was against everything" and made budget decisions with a "broad brush," applying the red pencil freely. In fact, it was a "fetish with him to attempt to be fiscally sound." Black called Demo­cratic Gov. Calvin Rampton the fiscal champion of Utah because he had eco­nomic and financial knowledge that Lee did not have. Thus, Rampton was a "great governor," while Lee was "a very good governor." In Black's opinion, Lee would rank sscond to Rampton in fiscal affairs because Rampton considered each program intimately, individually, and in balance while Lee simply cut across the board. Black interview. 46Lee interview. 47Ibid. An article in the Ogden Standard-Examiner, November 5, 1954, supports Lee's contention that his salary was raised from $7,500 to $10,000, effective January 1954. 81