Let 'em Holler - A Political Biography of J. Bracken Lee

Other election campaigns

18 Other Election Campaigns Encouraged by the results of his independent candidacy for gov­ernor, Lee announced his intention in 1958 to run as an inde­pendent for the United States Senate. His decision was prompted by a conviction that both political parties had repudiated their platforms and that the country had "government by misrepre­sentation under the Republican Party, as well as the Democratic Party." Claiming that both parties stood for the "same policy of big tax, waste and give-away programs," he pledged to reduce the size and cost of government, fight foreign aid, and work for repeal of the income tax: I solemnly promise to vote, as a senator, to restore the independence of the U.S., to reestablish a sound and stable dollar, to maintain peace with honor, to recover the constitu­tional rights of 49 states and of the people, and to eradicate socialism and communism in America.1 The announcement thrust Lee into a race against Republican incumbent Arthur V. Watkins and Salt Lake County Attorney Frank E. Moss, a Democrat. It was not an impossible task, for after twelve years in office Watkins had become vulnerable. He had angered retail service station operators, druggists, and grocers by his opposition to a bill designed to strengthen antitrust laws; he had also angered some eastern and central Utahns by remaining aloof from a controversy over reclamation. Carbon County officials thought he favored water users in Sanpete County, and Sanpete County residents were in turn irritated be­cause he had eliminated them from the Colorado River project.2 Watkins had sown the seeds for his own defeat when he overtly supported Clyde for the governorship in 1956. Many observers interpreted Lee's entrance into the Senate race as a revenge run against Watkins. Lee denied it, insisting that he 225 J . BRACKEN LEE had never been that sort of person.3 Although Moss was con­vinced that revenge was the principal motive because "Lee hated Watkins with a passion," he conceded that there were other con­siderations: "Lee wanted to stay in political life. He enjoyed it and thought it would be great to sit in the United States Senate and make his pronouncements."4 Jennings Phillips asserted that Lee entertained a sincere desire to serve in the Senate but con­ceded that "revenge played a role, because . . . he doesn't forgive very easily. And I don't blame him." According to Phillips, Watkins "coldly calculated" Lee's 1956 defeat.5 Well aware of the potential hazards of an intraparty struggle, Watkins emphasized his achievements and his seniority, noting that he would be next in line for a seat on the Senate Appropria­tions Committee. But Lee remembered that Abe Murdock had served on that committee during his first and only term in the Senate, and Moss argued that Watkins's seniority would mean little in a Democratic Congress.0 In a tactical error both Lee and Watkins appeared frequently in three-way debate with Moss who, because he was younger and more vigorous, became the obvious benefactor.7 Moreover, Lee and Watkins spent most of their campaign time attacking and answering each other, also to the direct benefit of Moss who observed that they "got to slugging one another so much that they sort of left me alone and forgot I was running hard, too."8 On the other hand, Moss directed an inordinate amount of his energies against the former governor, illustrating his fear of the Lee candidacy. For instance, one of his political campaign folders used the Webster definition of a demagogue as its heading -a person who attempts to gain political influence by misrepre­senting the facts. Then, Moss mercilessly attacked Lee as an ex-Republican and "purple people eater" because of the damage he did to education: "Lee never passed up a chance to clobber our school teachers." He also accused Lee of financial mis­management "with his penny-wise and pound foolish schemes" that became a "scandal of national proportions." He criticized Lee for using campaign contributions from sources outside Utah, a serious sin in his view, because Utahns had run their "own 226 OTHER ELECTION CAMPAIGNS affairs for over 100 years" and should continue to do so. Moss claimed that Lee's argument for a national sales tax was a "fraudulent misrepresentation of the facts," appealing to the "uninformed and the selfish." Finally, indulging in some dema-goguery of his own, Moss compared Lee to a well-known dictator: Don't we all remember the little man of Germany with the big moustache-his technique was to tell a big, big lie and the bigger the lie the more people would fall for it. Isn't there a strange similarity to both Lee's and Hitler dema­gogic tactics?9 Supposedly, Watkins was his principal opponent, yet Moss chose to devote two and one-half pages of the circular to Lee and only one-half page to Watkins, who, he noted, had voted against increased old age assistance, reduction of interest rates on federal loans to cities and states, and extending state unemployment benefits to unemployed workers in Utah. Moss appeared little concerned with Watkins, whom he treated almost offhandedly. Rather than "going backwards with Brack" or "standing still with Watkins," he urged voters to choose a man "with the cour­age of his convictions."10 Reflecting on the campaign years later, Moss thought Lee would have made "a very poor United States Senator." Moss, a liberal Democrat, believed Lee would have used the Senate as a forum for his unorthodox views, making Utah a "laugh­ing stock."11 Moss, critical of Lee's out-of-state backers, received a good deal of outside help himself through campaign visits by Sens. Lyndon Johnson, George Smathers, and Warren Magnuson, as well as Reps. Stewart Udall and John Moss. Nevertheless, the Tribune poll taken early in the campaign showed Lee in front, Watkins second, and Moss a poor third. It was no surprise then that Moss focused on Lee, requesting that he explain his obliga­tions to the For America millionaires who were allegedly "pour­ing money into Utah to buy his Senate seat." After losing the governorship, Lee had become closely allied with a conservative organization called For America. Moss asked, "Will this dis­credited Republican represent us or the interests who put up his 227 J. BRACKEN LEE money? Doesn't it seem a little odd that everyone is corrupt and dishonest but Brack?"12 Watkins echoed Moss's argument, and implied that For America was against the Colorado River proj­ect. He unearthed an old Lee statement in which he referred to reclamations appropriations as "loot" and asked, "Is California money going to be the deciding factor in Utah's senatorial elec­tion?" 13 Although Lee admitted that he was receiving money from California, Texas, "and from all states" from "fine Americans," he denied that any group controlled him. He correctly claimed that neither Watkins nor Moss could deny that they were receiv­ing help from other states, too. The only difference, he said, between his out-of-state money and that of the two political parties was that the latter came from organized minorities who expected special favors. He insisted that the important issue was not where the money originated but what the funds stood for.14 Watkins criticized Lee's income tax philosophy, pointing out that much of Utah's personal income derived from the federal government and that the government payroll was the largest in the state. He predicted that cutting federal spending and reve­nues would make Utah the first casualty in a rigorous economy wave. Watkins insisted that "you don't prune a tree by chopping it down to a stump."15 Income tax remained one of Lee's favorite topics, and he pledged to work toward granting the people a right to vote on repeal if elected. He claimed that half of every dollar spent by the federal government was "wasted or given away or used to buy votes with."16 He thought that $33 billion could be put into the hands of the people if the government was administered efficiently, leaving $40 billion to run the necessary services of government, approximately "$6 billion more than Harry Truman spent in his highest peacetime budget."17 In rebuttal, Watkins warned voters that Lee would "turn the clock back half a cen­tury." He suggested that they avoid the "rabble rousing of extremists of the left and of the right."18 In a cogent analysis of the campaign, journalist DeMar Teuscher observed that the laws of politics dictated that both 228 OTHER ELECTION CAMPAIGNS party candidates ignore the independent and concentrate on each other. Yet, in this case both Watkins and Moss were bringing "their heaviest political guns to bear squarely" on Lee who was showing an amazing strength that few people believed possible when he announced his candidacy. Teuscher thought Lee had succeeded in capturing dissatisfied Republicans as well as cutting into the normally Democratic prolabor vote. As a result, both Watkins and Moss were running scared. Watkins wanted help from the president and vice-president, and Moss planned on former President Truman and Gov. Edmund Muskie of Maine. Unfortunately for Lee, his independent candidacy did not allow for the use of big names.19 In his appearance for Moss, Muskie spoke to the biggest rally of the campaign year, which included several other speakers who made Lee their target, as signs of "Let's Sack Brack" were held high. Rep. John Moss (D-Calif.), a native Utahn, declared that it would be "tragic to saddle the people of the United States with your very interesting former governor-an utterly fantastic person." Moss called Lee's income tax repeal program an "insult to the intelligence of his audience" and "a pie-in-the-sky promise of something for nothing."20 Lee continued to place heavy emphasis on the tax question, challenging the people to check their state tax notices, home and property taxes, and paycheck deductions, and then discover what politicians were doing with the money. He claimed that it was going to "kings, potentates and other rulers for automobiles and new palaces."21 Lee thought it unusual that both parties concentrated their efforts against him as indicated by the presence of top national campaigners. On the one hand, they claimed that Lee was unimportant and would be worthless in the Senate; and on the other hand, they worried that he "would have the power to repeal laws." If he was so unimportant, asked Lee, why did both parties bring in big guns to silence him?22 He observed that the Demo­crats had written a song with the theme of "sack Brack," and the Republicans were "singing the same tune." He concluded that the song was the best publicity he had had in years but 229 J . BRACKEN LEE predicted that the parties would be "left holding the sack."23 Although a third-party candidacy is always tenuous, Watkins and Moss increased Lee's visability, almost bringing to fruition the Lee slogan, "Let's bring Brack back." Lee's right-wing tendencies became more pronounced as the campaign wore on. He declared that the U.S. was supporting Communist policy. For years Communists had predicted that the U.S. would spend itself "into bankruptcy and simply by waiting they would be able to take over."24 He claimed that he would feel neglected if there was not "some sort of smear type advertisement used against" him in the final days. He thought such techniques increased his vote tally and hoped his opponents were desperate enough to resort to it. If they did he was confident that he would be elected.25 When another poll showed Watkins taking the lead with 35 percent of the vote, Lee second with 29 percent, and Moss third with 27 percent, with 9 percent undecided, Watkins trum­peted the figures in his newspaper advertisements.26 Then, taking aim at Lee, he said, "A demagogue always deals in half-truths, glittering generalities, and destructive personal attacks."27 Deseret News political editor DeMar Teuscher called Watkins the slim favorite, while Moss ran the risk of finishing third. Support for that argument came from Washington, when Sen. George Smathers of Florida, chairman of the Senate campaign com­mittee, expressed pessimism at the chances of picking up a Senate seat for the Democrats because Moss was in trouble and Lee was "getting too many of our votes."28 Moss made an effort to appear the coolest head, advocating debate about "vital issues, not personalities and emotional mat­ters," 29 even though he had failed to follow such a course himself. Disturbed by the results of the poll placing him third, Moss com­missioned a new poll, sponsored by the Political Science Depart­ment of the University of Utah and KALL Radio. In the final week of the campaign, this survey showed Moss moving barely ahead of his two opponents.30 Instead of conceding the election to Moss, most political analysts interpreted this to mean that the three-way race was 230 OTHER ELECTION CAMPAIGNS especially volatile. Five days before the election, Teuscher still placed Watkins in the lead, with Lee second and Moss third; but he quoted an aged mountaineer saying, "Whenever you have three critters runnin' in a two-critter race, keep your hands- and your money-in your pockets." Teuscher freely acknowl­edged that "any substantial shift in public sentiment" could change the outcome. An especially interesting facet of this race was the unusually clear choice it offered on issues and person­alities. 31 Four days before the election the Deseret News continued to rate Watkins "a very slight favorite" but thought that the "slash­ing attack" by Lee on both candidates and both parties had "startled the entire country and put some sort of a spotlight upon the state." The News gave Lee a chance to win, even though when he announced his candidacy he was expected to finish last. Moss was said to be "in trouble," although he was waging a strong battle to pull Democrats away from Lee.32 On election eve Moss spoke like a winner, referring jubilantly to the latest polls as "heart warming evidence that all of the efforts of Democrats throughout Utah have not been in vain." He noted that in all the polls he was running first or second with a very thin lead, meaning that "one of the two Republicans is defeated." Reports from the largest counties of the state seemed to indicate that the Democratic tide was even stronger than the polls predicted, and that voters were "switching to the Demo­cratic Party so fast that no method of taking polls could keep up with it."33 Apparently, he was right. On November 4, 1958, Moss was elected, receiving 112,827 (38 percent) to Watkins's 101,471 (34.8 percent) and Lee's 77,013 (26.4 percent).34 Although garnering a smaller percentage than he did in 1956, Lee again demonstrated his impressive drawing power as a candidate. That strength had been evident even in his opening rally in a downtown dance hall when he attracted a larger audi­ence than Vice-president Nixon who addressed a Republican rally later in the same location.35 Since Lee's decision to run was unorthodox in Utah politics, he did as well as could be expected. Yet, the evidence suggests that he started stronger than he 231 J. BRACKEN LEE finished. An immensely popular personality, Lee nevertheless incurred considerable resentment because of his third-party can­didacy; many voters who were initially attracted to him were psychologically unable to remain with him all the way to the ballot box. Lee divided the Republican party, making it appear that had he not been in the race Watkins could have easily defeated Moss. Political scientist Frank Jonas viewed it differently, believing that Lee attracted a large protest vote and that many of those who objected to incumbent Watkins realized that Lee could not win and voted for Moss instead. In other words, Moss would have trounced Watkins whether Lee was in the race or not. Much of Lee's backing in 1958 seemed to come from lower income groups, middle-aged and older citizens, and those who had been laid off by Kennecott Copper, Union Pacific, and Geneva Steel.36 Since the Democratic party normally attracted those people, they would have been expected to support Moss not Watkins. Predictably, Moss agreed with Jonas's analysis: I would have defeated Arthur Watkins anyway if Bracken Lee had not come into the 1958 Senate race. But his pres­ence there enhanced my chances, so I've always considered it a factor in that election. I have never believed that it handed the election to me, but it made it easier.37 The Deseret News characterized the results of the election as "split government for Utah" with one Republican senator and one Democratic senator, one Republican congressman and one Democratic congressman. It also marked a "dramatic rebirth" of the Democratic party in Utah, partly ignited by Lee's can­didacy. The News thought it ironic that Watkins and Rep. William A. Dawson, both of whom worked so hard on the Colo­rado River project, "should be retired from Congress even as the cement is poured in the dams they largely fathered."38 Referring to himself as "one political writer who apparently cannot recognize a political 'tide' until the water laps around his neck," Teuscher called the effect of Lee's candidacy on Watkins and Dawson catastrophic. He claimed that Moss's effort to keep Democrats in the party was much more successful than anyone 232 OTHER ELECTION CAMPAIGNS dreamed, probably because of an undercurrent of protest against those in power. Nevertheless, Teuscher thought there were two winners in the Senate race: Moss won the seat, and Lee defeated Watkins. Apparently, Lee hit his peak about ten days too soon, with strong support from Democrats who then turned their backs on Lee because of Moss's solicitation for Democratic support. At the same time, many normally Republican voters stuck with Lee rather than Watkins, and Watkins lost heavily. Democrats who returned to the fold tended to vote a straight ticket, while many Republicans voted "single-shot" for Lee-and no one else, costing Dawson a heavy loss of votes in his congressional race. Watkins and Dawson may have lost anyway, of course, because of the heavy protest vote.39 The opposite view was later expressed by Sen. Wallace F. Bennett who called Lee's decision to enter the race disastrous- "after all the party had done for him." According to Bennett, Lee "split what had obviously been a healthy Republican major­ity for Watkins, and elected Senator Moss," thereby depriving Utah of "senior representation on the Interior Committee" and of Watkins's "resourcefulness . . . [that] would have pushed the Upper-Colorado River Storage Project ahead faster than has been the case."40 Embittered by defeat, Watkins called Lee "the most expen­sive public man in the state" because he cost Utah Watkins's seniority and the completion of the storage project.41 In 1972, fourteen years after his defeat, Watkins claimed that he would still be in the Senate had it not been for Lee: "I might not be alive -but I'd be there!" Making no effort to feign humility, Watkins forthrightly characterized himself as Utah's outstanding Republi­can leader, whose defeat represented an irretrievable loss. He recalled that Lee had once written him a letter in which he asserted that Watkins had done more for him than any other political leader, "yet he ran against me."12 He feared that he had done too much for Lee without receiving an expression of gratitude, such as the appointment of his son to West Point. Watkins said, "The trouble with Brack is that he isn't very edu- 233 J . BRACKEN LEE cated-he has very limited education-and it affects his deci­sion making."43 Lee recalled healthy relations with Watkins during most of his governorship, and he regarded him as a good senator until he "sold his principles out" to the Eisenhower administration: "I'm convinced that he made a deal with Eisenhower to do any­thing Eisenhower asked him to do, provided Eisenhower'd let him name the appointments out of Utah." Lee's relationship with Watkins began to cool after Watkins invited him to listen to a speech he was delivering in the Senate against public housing. During the course of Watkins's one-hour speech, two of the four senators present went to sleep, and a third read a newspaper. As the only spectator present, Lee was disillusioned with Con­gress. A few weeks later, when the issue Watkins spoke against came to a vote, he startled Lee by voting for it: "Can you imagine that?" Lee called Watkins and asked, "Why the hell did you vote for that bill?" His reply disgusted Lee even more: he had traded his vote for the housing bill in order to get support for the Colo­rado River project.44 In spite of his critics, Lee maintained that revenge had no role in his 1958 run for the Senate: If I had no other purpose than revenge, I wouldn't waste one minute! See, I'm not that kind of a fella! I wouldn't do that! What good's revenge to you? That's silly! In fact, it's hard for me to understand how anybody would waste the energy just simply for revenge. I can't understand revenge. I figure that a man'll get what's comin' to him, because I believe in the law of retribution. Nobody's done anything wrong that he isn't going to pay for it. And I think I'll pay for it too. So I've heard that, but I wouldn't even think of wastin' that time and that energy for that silly thing, because I don't think Moss or Watkins, either one, are worth shootin' when it comes to runnin' the government. Far as I'm concerned, you got too many nitwits like them back there. Both failures -all their damn life they were failures, both Moss and Watkins-couldn't make a livin' practicing law, couldn't pay their bills, and end up runnin' the world!45 234 OTHER ELECTION CAMPAIGNS Lee did not regard the Senate as the pinnacle of his political ambition, although he admitted that he would have liked to have gone to the Senate in 1958, adding, "But you couldn't give it to me now! You couldn't pay me ten times what they're gettin' to go back there and go through what you have to go through." Lee was certain of one thing: if elected, he would not have relin­quished his principles.40 Lee played the typical spoiler role in the 1958 election, but he was much more important than most third-party candidates. He was almost as important to the Utah election as Theodore Roosevelt had been in the three-way race for the presidency in 1912 when he was responsible for the defeat of William Howard Taft. Roosevelt's candidacy elected Woodrow Wilson by divid­ing the Republican vote. He did slightly better than Lee, for he came in second while Taft finished third, an especially embar­rassing defeat for an incumbent president. Although Watkins managed to finish ahead of Lee, Lee clearly controlled the elec­tion. Whether he did it for revenge or ambition, he was certainly angry with Watkins and the whole Republican party. He sin­cerely disagreed with the philosophies and practices of both Moss and Watkins and acted as an effective advocate for his position. In his second independent run Lee demonstrated that his con­stituency was still strong but that it would probably never be strong enough to elect him in a three-way race. 1962 SENATE RACE Although the 1958 defeat did not remove Lee's desire to represent Utah in the Senate, it did convince him of the futility of an independent candidacy. Therefore, in 1962, when he was serving as mayor of Salt Lake City, he announced that he would challenge Senator Bennett in the Republican primary.47 To pre­vent a bitter primary battle some Republican leaders had dis­cussed nominating a third candidate who would represent no serious threat to Bennett but would have enough support in the convention to defeat Lee.48 The plan did not materialize, but it proved that Bennett had no intention of underestimating the Lee 235 J . BRACKEN LEE threat. In a reversal of his 1958 announcement Lee said he had decided to run "because I believe that the Republican Party offers the best opportunity for a conservative like myself to fight most effectively for the principles in which I believe."49 Since Bennett was widely known as a conservative himself, this primary did not offer voters the broad choice of other Lee races. As a result, emphasis was placed on personality differ­ences and the question of party loyalty. In the course of the campaign some suspected that Lee was holding back his usual vigorous criticism so that in the event of a loss he could more easily support Bennett and be considered for the Senate again in 1964 as a regular Republican.50 DeMar Teuscher supported that contention, noting that Republicans were hoping that the race would "stay out of the realm of personal bitterness." Bennett's people feared that if Lee sensed victory, he would stage his usual free-swinging campaign and leave scars on the party reminiscent of 1958.51 Deliberately avoiding personal criticism of Bennett, Lee emphasized many of his familiar campaign themes, asserting, for instance, that "every congressman and every senator who has voted for foreign aid has violated his oath of office."52 Insisting that too many congressmen and senators contributed to the rob­bery of working people "to enrich the rich" all over the world, he suggested the need to stop "this legalized stealing."53 He called it unbelievable that any member of the Senate could "cost the taxpayers $275,000 per year in order to have extra plush headquarters, free telephone service, hidden salary payments to relatives and many non-essential services free of charge." '4 In ref­erence to deficit financing, he claimed that $10 billion per year interest paid on a $300 billion national debt would "pay all the costs of our entire school system in all of the 50 states" as well as provide "a decided increase in teacher salaries,"55 ironic words from the perennial enemy of education. Pundits waited in vain for the campaign to heat up with Lee making serious charges against Bennett. Teuscher astutely observed that Lee's chances of defeating Bennett were slight "unless he staged a slam-bang anti-Bennett campaign. This he 236 OTHER ELECTION CAMPAIGNS has not done. In fact, the usually voluble mayor has been unusu­ally quiet. So Bennett rates the favorite role."50 Lee's cam­paign chairman, Daniel H. Meyer, promptly took exception to Teuscher's claim, insisting that Lee was waging an effective campaign and would win in November. He predicted "a huge groundswell" for Lee because he had outworked Bennett in every county. Private polls indicated a Lee victory in the primary. Meyer said there was no question that "Lee, with his strong Independent and Democratic backing, coupled with all the Republicans who are disappointed with our weak Washington representation, will carry the election."57 In the meantime Bennett played it cool, refusing to make the same mistake Watkins had made in 1958 when he centered his entire campaign on Lee. As a matter of fact, Bennett barely acknowledged Lee's presence. His speeches treated issues, criti­cized Kennedy administration policies, and purposely omitted any mention of Lee's political philosophy. The closest Bennett came to attack was in an ad, "Why I won't attack my opponent in the Primary Election," run three days before the primary. He claimed that dozens of people had implored him to expose his "off-and-on Republican opponent." Even though Lee supporters had pictured him as "a wasteful money shoveler for the Kennedy Administration," Bennett said he would not "retaliate in kind with a caustic attack" on Lee because he was a "team fighter, not a lone wolf," and had "never deserted the Republican Party." He contended that reliable polls, his "opponent's brash, ground­less claims to the contrary-favor my nomination by long odds." Apparently, he was convinced, as were other thoughtful Utahns, that he was the only conservative who could win.58 Lee lost the primary, pulling a respectable 48,542 votes to Bennett's 71,701.5D The Deseret News suggested that Lee's 40 percent showing proved the strength of the conservative wing of the Republican party. The editors speculated that his "surpris­ingly big vote" against a strong incumbent indicated some success in his effort to reestablish himself as a Republican. They implored him to further show his reformation by supporting the party in the general election.00 Remarking on his comeback 237 J . BRACKEN LEE as a Republican after two straight defeats as an independent, Teuscher observed that Lee had some Republican support but not from key party leaders. Evidently, much of his backing came from "hard-core Lee supporters," the Republican right wing, and Democrats.61 Acting the part of the good loser, Lee pledged he "would do everything possible to re-elect Wallace Bennett to the Senate."62 Not surprisingly, even that decision was greeted with suspicion by some Republican skeptics who wondered whether his support would help or hinder Bennett.03 Suffering some of the same feel­ings of bitterness that had afflicted Watkins in 1958, Bennett later lamented Lee's decision to challenge him, recalling that he "ran out on the party in 1958" but "thought he could be forgiven." Bennett's mood was not one of forgiveness. He felt that Lee had broken the unwritten rule of party politics by chal­lenging an incumbent of the same party. Even though Bennett won by a respectable margin, he was disappointed that 48,000 Republicans had rejected him in favor of Lee, "a turncoat."64 Bennett went on to win his third consecutive term in the Senate, by defeating Rep. David S. King, 166,755 to 151,656. Lee realized the unfavorable odds he faced in a race against Bennett. Bennett was stronger in 1962 than ever before and was, moreover, on exceptionally good terms with the Mormon church. Lee remained convinced that Utah would have benefited from a Bennett defeat: "My opinion of Wallace Bennett is that he never did anything in his life for anybody but Wallace Bennett. I think he's the most selfish man I've ever known."65 A FINAL RUN FOR THE GOVERNORSHIP With Governor Clyde almost certain to step down after eight years in office in 1964, the gubernatorial race became fluid in both parties. By March 1 Calvin Rampton and Ernest Dean had declared for the Democratic nomination, Mitchell Melich and Lamont Toronto for the Republicans; and friends of Lee began circulating petitions for a prospective Lee candidacy.66 His sup­porters felt that he retained enough popularity that if he could once get on the primary ballot he could win. If Utah had a direct 238 OTHER ELECTION CAMPAIGNS primary instead of a convention system, they reasoned, Lee would easily get the nod and would enter the race without hesitation. But the complexities of the convention worried him in light of his controversial career, and so his supporters wrote letters to potential delegates to assess his strength.67 In a move criticized for its tardiness, Governor Clyde for­mally announced that he would not seek reelection only thirty hours prior to the March 31 filing deadline.68 He supposedly made the announcement to remove any doubt as to his intentions in the minds of any possible candidates who may have been postponing their plans until the governor had spoken. Implying a message for Lee, Clyde declared that two four-year terms as governor were a "reasonable limit" and that no man was indis­pensable. 09 The next day, Lee ended speculation by filing his candidacy three hours before the 5 P.M. deadline.70 The final Republican candidate was D. James Cannon, who filed after Lee, to bring the list of candidates to five, in addition to Melich, Toronto, and Kleon Kerr.71 Very early, Lee's old problems with educators surfaced as his biggest roadblock to the nomination. In a speech to delegates he warned that the outcome of the election would be greatly influenced by financial contributions from teachers. He noted that the UEA had organized a campaign fund to support candi­dates of their choice and claimed it was an "example of organ­ized minorities which exert pressures for their own advancement at the expense of the average taxpayer."72 The battle lines were drawn, and Lee was in no mood to placate his former foes. In a huge advertisement directed to Republican delegates Lee traced his record, claiming that "only one man of the five" could lead Utah to "progress and growth." He was proud of his record of economy as governor. He noted that educational expenditures had been raised, with teacher salaries increasing 40 percent. He also called attention to a debt-free Salt Lake City under his leadership as mayor.73 Acknowledging that predictions about the race were not easy, newsman Teuscher went out on a limb and called Cannon and Melich the winners, with Lee, Toronto, and Kerr following in 239 J . BRACKEN LEE that order. Lee's presence in the race made prognostications difficult, since he was regarded as a "political enigma." "Count him out, and he pulls support from enough places you haven't considered to make you look foolish," Teuscher wrote. He specu­lated that Goldwater's commanding lead in the race for the Republican nomination for president might help Lee, since they shared similar philosophies. However, he conceded that Lee's record of bolting the party could still cost him heavily in the delegate counts.74 Teuscher was right on target. Lee was unable to muster the necessary convention support, and Melich led the field with 399 votes, followed by Cannon with 376, to qualify as the primary candidates. Lee ran a distant third with 307, followed by Toronto with 216. Kerr withdrew his candidacy before the vote and threw his support to Melich. As Lee had feared, the most important single bloc of votes represented educators who openly adopted a strategy to prevent Lee from qualifying for the primary. The strength of the school block was estimated at anywhere from 100 to 300 votes, most of them favoring Melich, with Cannon a close second. Results indicated that Melich and Cannon ran very close in Salt Lake and Weber counties; on the other hand, Box Elder and Cache were strong for Lee and Weber especially weak for Lee.75 Blaming his defeat on teachers, Lee claimed that they "con­trolled the convention" and that they had issued pamphlets all over the state urging people to work at mass meetings to become delegates "for the purpose of defeating the number one enemy of education, Bracken Lee." Nevertheless, he believed that he could have won if the convention had voted in the morning- "I lost it during the noon hour." Lamont Toronto had gone into the convention as the favorite of the John Birch Society members, who supported him until Lee's convention address. At that point they began to realize that Toronto's chances were limited and that Lee's views coincided with their own. However, during the noon hour someone convinced them that they could nominate both Toronto and Lee, and either way have a candidate they could support.70 240 OTHER ELECTION CAMPAIGNS Lee was correct in assessing the importance of educators at the convention. Recalling his gubernatorial record, they were genuinely frightened by his candidacy and organized carefully to defeat him. It is also reasonable to assume that a very significant proportion of Toronto's support would have gone to Lee had Toronto dropped out. Whether it would have been enough to qualify Lee for the primary can only be conjectured, but Melich and Cannon were much more liberal candidates than either Toronto or Lee. Lee made no effort to camouflage his consistently antieduca-tion philosophy prior to the convention, freely condemning the UEA for excessive spending and then wanting "more money to waste." He cared not how many votes he might lose by such a stand: "At least I will not lose my own self respect," which meant more to him than what "members of the UEA might think."77 He accused educators of "featherbedding" and used M. Lynn Bennion as a prime example. According to Lee, Bennion earned more than $20,000 from the Salt Lake City school system for nine months of work and then received another thousand dollars a month for three months from Utah State University.78 After his convention defeat Lee continued to carp, saying that edu­cators were "not as interested in better schools as they pretend to be." If they were, they would favor merit pay, reduction in overhead, and improvement in educational methods. He lamented their role in his defeat, predicting that they would have more control over state government in the years ahead than ever before.79 This was Lee's final run for statewide office. But later in the year he announced that in 1966 he would run for a U.S. Senate seat from the state of Montana, following the precedent of Robert F. Kennedy of Massachusetts who was elected to the Senate from New York. Lee said he had done some research and discovered that the only requirement was that he be in Montana on election day: "Of course, I'll still be a citizen of Utah, and I won't be able to vote for myself." Claiming to have many friends in Montana, he projected a two-week vacation from the mayor's job to go to Montana and campaign. Asked if there were enough friends 241 J . BRACKEN LEE there to win an election, Lee replied, "We'll see in 1966." He would have been seeking the seat of Lee Metcalf, a Democrat. Engaging in irony, Lee said, "The reason I chose Montana is so that I can run against a Democrat. I wouldn't run against another Republican." Besides, he liked the idea of setting a precedent: "I'll be the first Republican carpetbagger."80 Although most observers interpreted these comments as tongue-in-cheek, one could never be sure about J. Bracken Lee. Montana nervously reacted by pushing a bill through the legis­lature known as the "Lee Bill," making it impossible for a non­resident to run for the U.S. Senate. One could suspect Lee of consciously working for electoral reform, but asked about his intentions later, he actually hedged. Were his comments tongue-in- cheek? "Well, pretty much," he replied. He did it "more to point out how ridiculous" it was for Kennedy to run in New York and Pierre Salinger to run in California when neither was a resi­dent of those states. Was he serious about such a candidacy of his own in Montana? "Not that serious," he said.81 242 OTHER ELECTION CAMPAIGNS ^Salt Lake Tribune and Deseret News, July 7, 1958. See also "The Machines Have Broken Down-Put a MAN on the job!" Political pamphlet circulated by Citizens for Lee. On the back of the pamphlet were instructions on how to vote for Lee; the other two choices were called "Republicrat" and "Demopublican." 2Frank Jonas, "The 1958 Election in Utah," Western Political Quarterly 12 (1959):347. 3Deseret News, November 7, 1958. 4Moss to author. 5Phillips interview. "Jonas, "The 1958 Election." 7Ibid., p. 348. 8Moss to author. 9Frank E. Moss Campaign Brochure, sponsored by Utah Unity Council, 1958. The cover of this 4-page brochure stated: "Webster's Dictionary says: A Demagogue is a speaker who seeks to make capital of social discontent and gain political influence. A demagogue does this by misrepresenting the facts." "Ibid. "Moss to author. "Deseret News, October 15, 1958. 13Arthur V. Watkins ad, "Should Utah Give Away One of Its Two Seats in the U.S. Senate?" Deseret News, October 16, 1958. "Deseret News, October 18, 1958. ^Deseret News, October 11, 1958. 16Ibid. "Deseret News, October 13, 1958. 18Arthur V. Watkins ad, "What Is It Worth to Utah?" Deseret News, October 15, 1958. 19DeMar Teuscher, "Speaking of Politics," Deseret News, October 15, 1958. 20Deseret News, October 16, 1958. "Desert News, October 23, 1958. 22J. Bracken Lee ad, "Parties Close Ranks, Unite against Lee," Deseret News, October 16, 1958. 23Deseret News, October 17, 1958. 24Deseret News, October 30, 1958. 25Deseret News, October 28, 1958. 2GArthur V. Watkins ad, "All Utah Wins With Watkins," Deseret News, October 20, 1958. 27Arthur V. Watkins ad, "Watkins Practices Economy While His Opponents Talk about It!" Deseret News, October 22, 1958. 28Teuscher, "Speaking of Politics," Deseret News, October 23, 1958. 2SDeseret News, October 24, 1958. 30Jonas, "The 1958 Election," p. 349. 31Teuscher, "Speaking of Politics," Deseret News, October 30, 1958. 32Deseret News, October 31, 1958. 33Deseret News, November 3, 1958. 34Deseret News, November 5, 1958. 35Jonas, "The 1958 Election," p. 354. 36Ibid., pp. 352, 353. 243 J. BRACKEN LEE 37Moss to author. 38Deseret News, November 5, 1958, editorial. 39Teuscher, Deseret News, November 6, 1958. 40Bennett to author. 41Watkins interview. 42Ibid. 43Ibid. 44Lee interview. Lee also had "a big fight with Watkins in 1954 over whether Rep. Douglas Stringfellow, who had lied about his war record for years, should be kept on the Republican ticket. Watkins wanted him on the ticket, while Lee argued that the "fella's a self-admitted liar, and I just don't think you should keep him on." Watkins argued that Mayor Curley of Boston had been in jail and was still elected to office afterward. Lee said, "You need a better argument than 'the Democrats do it.' " At that moment the telephone rang; it was Ezra Taft Benson who allegedly told Watkins that the president wanted Stringfellow off the ticket. According to Lee, when Watkins hung up he said, "He's off the ticket." Benson recalled the telephone conversation with Watkins and admitted that he preferred that Stringfellow be dropped. Eisenhower thought so, too, but he had not instructed Benson to order him off the ticket. Benson said he made the call of his own volition. Benson interview. 45Lee interview. 46Ibid. "Deseret News, July 9, 1962. 48Frank Jonas, "The 1962 Election in Utah," Western Political Quarterly 16 (1963):461. i9Deseret News, July 9, 1962. 50Jonas, "The 1962 Election." "Teuscher, "Speaking of Politics," Deseret News, August 1, 1962. ^Deseret News, August 8, 1962. ^Deseret News, September 3, 1962. ^Deseret News, September 8, 1962. 55Deseret News, September 7, 1962. 56Teuscher, "Speaking of Politics," Deseret News, August 29, 1962. "Deseret News, September 5, 1962. ^Deseret News, September 8, 1962. 59Deseret News, September 12, 1962. ""Deseret News, September 12, 1962, editorial. "Teuscher, "Speaking of Politics," Deseret News, September 12, 1962. "2Deseret News, October 16, 1962. "3Deseret News, October 17, 1962. "Bennett to author. G5Lee interview. ""Deseret News, March 1, 1964. •"Teuscher, "Speaking of Politics," Deseret News, March 5, 1964. Under Utah law a convention ballot is required whenever more than one candidate seeks the party nomination for any office. If one candidate gets 80 percent or more of the delegate votes he becomes the nominee without a primary election. If not, the two highest vote-getters go on the primary ballot. "^Deseret News, March 30, 1964. 244 OTHER ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 69Clyde's delay in making his announcement suggested that he feared a Lee candidacy and thought Lee might not run if he (Clyde) decided to seek a third term. His comments about a "reasonable limit" for a governor were also directed at Lee. '"Deseret News, March 31, 1964. 71Deseret News, April 1, 1964. 72Deseret News, June 4, 1964. 73"Republican Delegates, Utah Is Now at the Crossroads of Crisis!" Ad, Deseret News, June 12, 1964. 74Teuscher, "Speaking of Politics," Deseret News, June 11, 1964. ™Salt Lake Tribune, June 14, 1964. 76Lee interview. Although members of the Birch Society often identified with Lee's brand of conservatism, he was never a member of the society. He said: "I do not believe that you can fight a dictatorship-and that's all Com­munism is-by setting up another dictatorship. Now the whole theory behind the John Birch Society as I understand it is the only way to whip Communism is adopt their tactics. . . . I'm not a very good joiner anyway, to tell you the truth. I'm too much of an individual." 77Lee to J. F. Faux, June 22, 1964, Lee Mayoralty Papers. 78Lee to Mrs. Roger Bailey, June 19, 1964, ibid. 79Lee to Max Powell, June 30, 1964, ibid. S0Deseret News, December 17, 1964. 81Lee interview. 245