Let 'em Holler - A Political Biography of J. Bracken Lee

Mayor of Salt Lake City

19 Mayor of Salt Lake City Following his first losing battles for the governorship and the U.S. Senate, Lee announced his intention to run for mayor of Salt Lake City, a shrewd decision that rejuvenated his political career. Since the race was nonpartisan he was able to cast aside the tainted political image of maverick Republican and inde­pendent. Six candidates filed for the 1959 primary, including the unpopular incumbent, Adiel F. Stewart. In a smashing victory Lee swept 197 of 202 districts with 22,840 votes, or 51 percent of the total. Bruce Jenkins polled 9,354 for a distant second place finish, and Mayor Stewart made an extremely poor showing in third place with 6,749. Not only did Lee manage to defeat Stewart two to one in his own district, but Stewart lost to Lee every other district except for the University of Utah.1 Lee seemed destined for an impressive victory over Jenkins in the run-off election to follow. In an active campaign both candidates agreed that a mayor-council form of government was superior to Salt Lake's five-man commission system. Jenkins promised to work for a change under permissive legislation from the last legislature, but Lee feared that the bill gave the mayor too much power. He argued that ultimate control of government should be held by the people. Jenkins countered that the mayor-council form would separate the appropriating and administering powers, making it superior to the commission system which allowed one body the power to make the budget, appropriate the money, and administer it: "We should have someone who has a hand on the rudder and who is responsible to the people for the operating of govern­ment." Lee promised not to approve any tax increase. Conde­scendingly, he called Jenkins "a fine young man" who belonged to the "taxing and spending school." Exercising unusual candor, 247 J. BRACKEN LEE Jenkins responded that he had voted against the local sales tax as a member of the Utah State Senate but now wondered if he had been mistaken, since that levy was "the key to the capital improvements program."2 Accusing Lee of leaving a "backlog of needed improve­ments" when he left the governor's chair, Jenkins warned that Lee's election would seriously jeopardize capital improvements.3 A citizens' group composed of Democrats, Republicans, and independents agreed with Jenkins and issued a warning letter to their neighbors, advising them to reject Lee because he indicated no interest in the civic building program recommended by a bipartisan citizens' committee. They stressed the need for more fire stations, sewer trunk lines and a sewage treatment plant, a new library, and a civic auditorium. Understandably, they also believed Lee intended to be a "part-time mayor" who would leave office "in search of higher posts."4 In his defense, Lee said he was running on his past record as a "proven administrator" and as an advocate of honest and efficient government.5 He claimed that enough money had been wasted by the city government in the previous twenty years to have completed all the projected capital improvements. He thought the people should have an opportunity to vote on any improvements, but he also felt that some improvements could be financed through simple economy in government.0 He would willingly submit a bond issue for a new civic auditorium, a new sewage treatment plant, and the Redwood Road sewage trunk line, if the people knew the price tag and approved it. In addi­tion he maintained that city workers needed a living wage, the city needed a new library, and fire and police departments needed new facilities. "I believe all this can be done without raising taxes one cent," he asserted, suggesting that there would never be such a wide difference between the philosophies of mayoral candidates as existed in this election. Jenkins rejected that argu­ment, insisting that he too believed that capital improvements could be made on existing revenue: "We need no tax increase to pay for them." He maintained that the city sales tax enacted earlier was intended for capital improvements.7 248 MAYOR OF SALT LAKE CITY Jenkins accused Lee of "playing for bigger stakes than mayor" and using Salt Lake City voters to promote those ambi­tions, specifiically the governorship in 1960 and the U.S. Senate in 1962. Sensing the truth of the charge, Lee hedged, saying that he had never left any office until his term was finished and saw "no reason to change now."8 In campaign literature, Jenkins asked rhetorically, "Can Salt Lake afford Lee as Mayor?"- an ironic approach in view of Lee's reputation for economy. The handbill stated: "Candidate Lee talks a good game of econ­omy. The record tells another story." Then Jenkins examined Lee's tenure as governor which saw state disbursements rise from $70.1 million to $112.7 million, an increase of 58 percent, when the cost of living rose only 17 percent. He attacked Lee's record in education, noting that in his first year as governor, 82 percent of the men and women trained in teaching in Utah took positions in Utah schools, while in 1954 only 37 percent did so. "This is Lee 'economy': of every 100 teaching graduates of 1954, many trained on Utah tax dollars, 63 went to other states." Jenkins concluded that "Lee's PRICE is too high!"9 Jenkins frequently expressed concern over Lee's law enforce­ment record in Price. When he asked Lee if his enforcement policies in Salt Lake City would be similar to those in Price, Lee proudly defended his policies.10 But Jenkins thought he had trapped Lee with a sensitive issue and kept hammering him with it. Since Mayor Stewart headed public safety, Jenkins suspected that the new mayor would also be charged with law enforcement. Therefore, he considered the rumor that Lee planned to fire Cleon Skousen as police chief a "vital issue." He praised Skousen's three and a half years of accomplishments in improved enforcement and better utilization of manpower. Police morale was higher under Skousen than "in any other period in the city's post war history." Jenkins pledged that he would retain Skousen as chief if elected and called upon Lee to state his position.11 Lee refused to make a commitment to hire or fire anyone before the election. He would do what was best for the city, keeping those who were doing a good job and firing those who were not.12 In Lee's opinion the people were voting for a mayor 249 J . BRACKEN LEE -not a police chief: "If I go into office and find the police department and Chief Skousen are doing a good job, I would want to keep him."13 The week of the election the Deseret News posed several questions to all candidates for municipal office because "voters want to know exactly where candidates stand on important issues." The questions concerned the mayor-council form of gov­ernment, a merit system for city employees, a new library, a civic center, and the tax burden. Jenkins responded fully, but Lee declined to answer the questions individually and instead issued a general statement saying that he intended to administer Salt Lake City in the same way he had administered the state as governor. He spoke in general terms of the tax burden and wasteful spending.14 Jenkins was positive and unequivocal in his answers to each question. He favored the mayor-council form of government; he fully supported the police administration; he favored the $10 million bond issue for capital improvements; he believed in a merit system; he favored the "immediate construction of a new library" but also saw the need for sewage facilities and a civic center; and he believed the tax burden should be adjusted, based on the ability to pay.15 His straightforward manner provided an impressive contrast to Lee's dodging the issues. It would have been tempting to predict that any voter reading the accounts would unhesitatingly prefer Jenkins. Such a prediction would underestimate the polling power of J. Bracken Lee. Lee's more conservative approach and his colorful personal­ity appealed to the voters. He garnered almost 54 percent of the vote, 33,301 to Jenkins's 27,395. When analyzed, the victory looked more impressive, for Lee swept 154 districts to Jenkins's meager 47. Nevertheless, based on the size of his primary vic­tory, Lee admitted that it was not as large a majority as he had hoped.16 This campaign was probably the most lackluster of Lee's career. The issues were relatively few, and toward the end of the campaign it became more difficult for the voters to distinguish the positions of the candidates. Lee's stance evolved from one 250 MAYOR OF SALT LAKE CITY in which economy in government was stressed and capital improvements all but ignored to one that seemed to embrace capital improvements. Lee's ear was to the ground, and it told him that Salt Lake City residents favored capital improvements. Given that, his earlier emphasis on economy may have narrowed the gap in the final election. Still, it was a respectable victory for a durable politician. The Price Chamber of Commerce reacted to the campaign with a resolution protesting the derogatory remarks made about vice in their town. Boyd Marsing, chamber president, said: "Certainly, any family closet holds skeletons that might rattle, if shaken. But Price has no monopoly upon vice, and residents are tiring of being singled out for political expedience." Noting that all religious denominations were represented in the city, Marsing hoped that Utahns would not believe that Price was "undermined by gangsterism and indecency" or "beset by sin and evil."17 Praising the Price community, Lee claimed that because he had disagreed with certain features of the liquor control law the state enforcement agency tried to punish the entire community. But he doubted that he would have advanced politically beyond Price had it not been for his efforts against policies with which he disagreed.18 Quoting Lee, who called it his "most important political vic­tory," U.S. News and World Report characterized him as "Utah's militant conservative" and hailed his impressive comeback at the age of sixty.19 The New York Times complimented the "peppery foe of income tax and big government" for "handily capturing the Mayor's post." The newspaper saw an immediate threat to Governor Clyde as Utah's political leaders were asking, "What next for J. Bracken Lee?" But Utah's Republicans were reportedly uncertain whether Lee wanted to be governor again or whether he preferred a Senate seat to give his conservative For America organization a national forum. Some enemies and supporters thought that Lee could probably defeat Wallace Bennett in a Republican primary if he made some gesture of reconciliation toward the Republican party.20 251 J . BRACKEN LEE Pledging to hold open meetings because the people were "entitled to know what is going on," Lee drew a capacity audi­ence to his swearing-in ceremony. He expressed confidence that he could "get along" with the other commissioners because they wanted to "do the right thing." Then he maladroitly added, "Maybe they have not always done the right thing, but there is good in everyone. I'm sure there is good in them."21 As if realiz­ing his mistake he shifted the focus to himself: "If I do anything wrong I want them to tell me. I want what's the best for the people and this is going to be my policy. I will do my best to live up to it."22 Theoretically, the city commission was designed to sit as a board of directors and jointly run all departments, with the mayor as chairman. In practice, each commissioner and the mayor supervised specific departments; and since each had an equal vote, the mayor exercised no more power over other com­mission members than the strength of his personality would allow. Lee wanted every member to be responsible for the whole city government in spite of his departmental assignment. "You may blame me, as mayor," he offered, "for any department which is not operating right."23 Commissioner Joseph L. Christensen agreed with the mayor that each commisisoner should be inter­ested in every department. At the first commission meeting Lee expressed his philosophy and suggested that public safety be placed under the control of the entire commission; but L. C. Romney strongly disagreed, believing it would be administra­tively inefficient. They then proceeded to assign departments. "If you are interested in knowing which one I prefer, it is the Department of Public Affairs and Finance," said Lee. It was not an unexpected request from one who had made his political reputation on economy in government. Commissioner J. Knowles Piercey moved that the mayor be so assigned, but Commissioner Theodore I. Geurts, who headed finance, fiercely objected, claim­ing seniority. When a vote was taken on Piercey's motion, Romney, Christensen, and Geurts aligned against it, while Piercey and Lee voted for it. With the motion defeated, Geurts moved that Romney be assigned to parks, Christensen to streets, Piercey 252 MAYOR OF SALT LAKE CITY to water, himself to finance, and Lee to public safety. The motion carried, with Lee and Piercey again voting together.24 Although he accepted the decision, a discouraged Lee tried to reassert his authority, saying he was still "chairman of all the departments." He lectured the commissioners about "spending too much money needlessly and wastefully." He wanted a survey taken to determine how many employees were unnecessary and promised to set the example in the police department. In his first suggested budget cut Lee asked the commission to eliminate the $8,400 a year public relations post: "I'm suspicious of a govern­ment that hires a man to tell everyone how good they are." All the commissioners except Geurts, who was still resentful, voted with Lee to release Paul F. Royal from his position.25 The next day Lee received the entire commission's support in revoking controversial salary increases of $100 a month or more previously granted by the commission until a study could be made. Said Lee, "I don't think anyone is going to quit." He noted that a citizens' committee had recommended release of city employees past retirement age. The report showed 76 em­ployees who were 70 or more years of age, receiving a total of $243,212 and 161 employees 65 years old and older receiving $556,944. Pointing out the availability of Social Security and other retirement programs, Lee said, "I can't believe that carry­ing these older persons on the payroll is a good thing." He also questioned the use of new sales tax revenues designed for capital improvements to cover routine department expenditures. Lee was confident that these reforms would help in balancing the 1960 budget.20 Bestowing resounding approval on Lee's first days in office, the Deseret News claimed he was "off and running-and at a very lively pace."27 Continuing his economy theme in an inaugural address at the University of Utah Union Building, Lee projected the end of his term as a time when people might not see beautiful city buildings but they would have a city government with a high level of morality. He criticized the city planning commission for propos­ing buildings for which there were no funds. Sardonically, he 253 J. BRACKEN LEE recommended a planning commission to teach public officials "how to save a little money," adding: It doesn't take any intelligence to spend money. A 10 year old child can spend all the money you give him. But I say it does take intelligence to spend wisely. And I do not believe that it is fair to our children or grandchildren to pile up debts for them to pay. If we leave it to the planners they will come up with some scheme to bankrupt this nation.28 Claiming that he had inherited more liabilities than assets, Lee told of his visit to a decrepit city building. He had advo­cated that it be either maintained or abandoned, but the em­ployees there were fond of the commissioner responsible for the deplorable conditions: "I guess this just proves that when you smile at the people while you are skinning them, they love it."29 Conceding serious disagreements with the commissioners earlier in the day, Lee insisted that he did not expect them to be "yes men." "I want them to do what they think is right and I am sure that after a time they will be in agreement with me," he unabashedly claimed. He was confident that even if people disagreed with him, they would respect his philosophy of govern­ment. In his typically assertive style, he concluded: "I can't straighten out the whole city government tomorrow morning. But with the help of the commission and of the citizens, in time I can do it."30 The following day, his third in office, he voiced the opinion that the city payroll could be reduced "more than a million dollars a year." Decrying the unfortunate financial con­dition of the city, he claimed that the federal government was "the only one that could be worse." The city had been drifting into this condition for a long time and "almost everything, includ­ing vehicles and equipment of city departments-even city hall, is in bad shape."31 Lee was essentially correct in his assessment of city finances, for later in the month the auditor announced that at Lee's behest budget-trimming in various departments had reduced the 1959 deficit by $400,000, meaning that the city would be in the red only $250,000 instead of the estimated $650,000.32 Since the budget for the calendar year 1960 had been formulated in 254 MAYOR OF SALT LAKE CITY December 1959 by the city commission, Lee had had no say in its contents. Nevertheless, after assuming office in January 1960 he determined that the city would not escape a deficit at the end of the year unless expenditures were curtailed. He believed that the logical procedure was to remove all luxury items first, then trim remaining expenditures "to the bone," and, finally, bring top-bracket salaries closer to those of rank-and-file city employees.33 Basically, his procedure was sound; but some so-called luxury items were debatable, such as the completion of the Parley's Canyon golf course above Mountain Dell Reservoir. Although $215,000 had already been spent in construction, Lee favored refusing the final $35,000 needed to complete it. In voting against the appropriation, he claimed that there were already too many golf courses and that the city had more important priorities. City money should be spent for the "general welfare of the people" rather than for a select group, and the golf course did not meet that criterion.34 In criticism of the mayor, the Tribune astutely asked, Should the city build no more tennis courts because not all people play tennis? Or no more playgrounds because not all families have children? Or no more parks because not every­one likes to picnic?35 The Tribune claimed that the golf courses were actually the only city-owned recreation facilities that paid their own way, having shown a net profit of $40,000 the previous year. The editors concluded that to abandon a project nearly completed and leave "an ugly, useless scar across the canyon floor" was senseless. Fortunately, the rest of the commission agreed, for they defeated Lee's proposal four to one.30 It was an excellent example of the extremes Lee sometimes took to economize. Following his controversial dismissal of Police Chief W. Cleon Skousen in March 1960, the public furor was so intense that Lee suggested a shift of departmental responsibilities as a conciliatory gesture. Again he requested the department he had originally wanted-finance-for which he claimed to be "better qualified." By this time, the commission was convinced that his 255 J . BRACKEN LEE interests lay in finance; besides, there was an urgent need to diffuse controversy in public safety. The commission approved the change unanimously, with Piercey moving to public safety and Geurts to water. Relieved, the Deseret News lauded the move as a "heartening and reasonable response to the public wishes."3' In spite of Lee's efforts, his first year in office saw continuing confusion in Salt Lake City's finances. The mayor foresaw a year-end deficit of approximately $250,000, but the situation became so uncertain by July that the commission named a spe­cial committee to try to determine the true financial picture. Further confusion resulted when the committee reported a finan­cial squeeze at the same time the commission was voting a half-mill tax cut to save the taxpayers $125,000. By August the deficit was estimated at $383,000. Since the Water Department was responsible for most of the deficit, newly appointed Commis­sioner Conrad B. Harrison agreed to whittle his share from $263,000 to $243,000.JS Still not satisfied, Lee threatened to cut employees' salaries if necessary to balance the budget. He insisted that each department contribute some funds to offset the anticipated deficit. Piercey agreed to contribute $1,800, Romney chipped in $10,000, and Lee managed $5,000, but the financial picture remained grim.39 Lee's insistence on reform and the unhealthy financial climate combined to produce tension-filled commission meetings. For instance, Lee and Harrison clashed over morale among city workers. Harrison suggested improving morale by granting raises to which some members of the police force were entitled. Lee replied that the raises were held up because "the money wasn't there" and the law prevented the spending of unavailable money. Harrison maintained that money was legally available to pay for any deficit. Lee countered that the commission should not obligate the city if it did not have the money, and that, further­more, the commission had a duty to balance the budget. When Harrison claimed that the employees were not responsible for the deficit and therefore should not be punished, Lee angrily suggested that the commissioners were responsible: "Maybe the commissioners should stop their own pay?"10 256 MAYOR OF SALT LAKE CITY The commission unwisely chose to reject Lee's argument. The next day they approved raises for city employees even though they realized such an action would increase the projected deficit. They suggested that any capital improvement funds used to pay off the deficit be reappropriated in the 1961 budget. Lee thought the commission had a moral obligation to reimburse the capital improvements fund. He angrily accused Harrison of spending more money per month to operate his department than any of the other commissioners: "I made a mistake when I voted for you." Incensed, Harrison claimed he was running his department as well or better than Lee was running his and invited him to look over his operation. Composing himself, Lee declined to do so.41 Such verbal jousting was typical of the frequently stormy commission sessions during Lee's tenure. On November 19, 1960, the city auditor warned of a pro­jected deficit of nearly $300,000, but only three days later he cut the figure to $167,899. By November 29 it was down to $133,- 297. On December 14 the commission approved the transfer of $351,246 from the capital improvements fund to meet the antici­pated 1960 deficit. At the same time, a $351,000 item was placed in the 1961 budget to return the money to the capital improvements fund.12 As a result, the city could close the books with a surplus of $259,354, the first time it had been in the black since 1951. Without juggling funds, however, the deficit would have approximated $91,892. The Tribune denounced such "yo-yo financing" as unsound and misleading: No one seems to know from one day to the next just where the city stands financially. Deficits turn miraculously into surpluses. Funds supposedly earmarked for major capi­tal improvements seem to vanish into thin air. Warnings of a deficit are accompanied by a cut in taxes. This financial yo-yo game would be humorous if it didn't illustrate so graphically the ills of our form of city govern­ment. . . . No wonder the taxpayers are confused. No wonder they are concerned about the sanctity of the sales tax money sup­posedly earmarked for capital improvements. No wonder 257 J. BRACKEN LEE they believe that with such slipshod bookkeeping there must be loose and therefore wasteful fiscal controls.43 The Tribune concluded that there was a need for "centralized and responsible control over budgeting and finances. We need to throw away the yo-yo and buy an adding machine."44 Obvi­ously, a budget in the black was not all it seemed to be. These dubious financial procedures dramatically portrayed the need for a strong mayor form of government for Salt Lake City, for in spite of Lee's best efforts at budget balancing he was constantly thwarted by the other members of the commission, each of whom shared an equal vote with the mayor. It was a frustrating experience for Lee, who had exercised considerably more power as governor. The 1961 budget was prepared to meet the estimated amount of revenue with some difficulty. Original requests of $13,465,389 were pared to $12,718,944. That amount plus the $1,800,000 in capital improvements totaled $14,518,944.45 The budget was prepared under the leadership of Fred M. Oliver of Haskins and Sells, a certified public accounting firm that had been employed by the city on an independent contract to head a special budget committee. With expert advice the commission hoped to escape its profligate tendencies. Oliver said the budget was so tight that it would probably force personnel reductions. He saw no funds for any new equipment, with the exception of $218,000 that was to be borrowed from the capital improvements account to pay for a fleet of cars for the Public Safety Department.46 Even with the CPA firm, the city was still indulging in the same dangerous fiscal juggling it had practiced the previous year. Fortunately, some help was found in the 1961 passage by the Utah legislature of the Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act for Utah Cities. Although Lee shared many of the opinions expressed in the act, it was not his creation. Rather, its passage culminated several years of research under the sponsorship of the Utah Municipal League. Originally introduced in the legislature in 1959, it did not emerge until 1961, following numerous redrafts and arduous committee work. Its purpose was to improve the financial environment and encourage good budgeting and 258 MAYOR OF SALT LAKE CITY fiscal management by tightening up statutory directives in some instances, removing strictures in others, and changing the fiscal year to bring budget-making and payday closer together. The league called it "one of the most significant fiscal advancements at the local government level in the history of our state." Reform was considered long overdue, because fiscal statutes governing Utah cities had not been revised since 1925. Fred M. Oliver and A. M. Fero, legal counsel for the league, wrote the act, which prohibited expenditures in excess of appropriations in the budget as adopted. One of the more important aspects of the act was a provision to accumulate surplus funds to meet emergencies or deficits or for the "orderly development of capital improve­ments." 47 In the opinion of Lee's successor as mayor, E. J. (Jake) Garn, this act was responsible for putting the city in the black- "not Brack." The act prevented people from padding budgets and forced them to spend the allotted amount in each depart­ment. Garn was convinced that with the commission system of five members with equal votes, one member could never be responsible for major decisions or reforms.48 Conrad Harrison, who succeeded Garn as mayor, claimed that the city was put in the black "more in spite of Mayor Lee than because of him." He recalled Lee's voting against employing a fiscal consultant several times and against changing to a fiscal year calendar. Harrison firmly believed that the act "put the city back on its feet financially."49 A significant reform measure, it was the natural extension of the uniform system of accounting conceived by the 1957 legislature for the state tax commission.50 Garn and Harrison notwithstanding, Lee had more influence on the commission than any other member simply through the force of his personality. He made the city's financial condition a smoldering issue and thus prepared the way for acceptance of the Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act. Prior to its institution, he charged the commission with spending money it did not have and insisted that it "should not approve one dime until the budget is reopened, additional money added, and other unappropriated funds earmarked." He was alarmed that a financial report made 259 J . BRACKEN LEE by Haskins and Sells for the Citizens Advisory Committee on City Planning and Capital Improvements showed capital funds overspent by $50,000. Other commission members were embar­rassed by the report, and L. C. Romney argued that it should not be made public until the commission approved it. He claimed that the report did not include additional funds and that there was still money remaining in the capital improvements account. "I'm getting sick and tired of fighting with the commission over this money," retorted Lee, who insisted that he had the right to request any report he desired. He promised that if it were demon­strated that the city was spending money that did not exist, he would "ask for a warrant of arrest."51 Lee suggested taking the $33,000 remaining in the municipal affairs account and transferring it to the department budgets. This account included funds for allocation to the chamber of commerce, the symphony, and other activities not included in regular city expenditures. Lee called it a "give-away fund" and wanted it transferred back into department budgets so that it would not be available when someone came after money. But Romney considered the symphony, the chamber of commerce, and other organizations to be vital city services. Angrily, Lee questioned the value of the symphony, saying, "If you ask me, it's just a few high toned people who want to listen to it." Harrison thought it was as important as baseball and reminded Lee that the city had granted $26,000 in relief to the Salt Lake Bees by reducing the city's share of ticket receipts.52 The financial report was confusing, because it included esti­mates of all future expenditures, such as $371,000 for a down­town fire station that was only in the initial planning stage. The report showed a total of $2,408,903 available in the capital improvements fund in 1961 and $2,459,485 paid out, obligated, or planned. This left an apparent deficit of $50,582, causing Lee's misunderstanding. In fact, the auditor's office reported $780,000 in 1961 capital improvement funds not yet allocated for specific purposes. Auditor Louis Holley listed only items for which actual appropriations had been made against the fund, 260 MAYOR OF SALT LAKE CITY complaining that he could not list items merely talked about in his accounts.53 Nevertheless, the Tribune recommended continuing the kind of future planning of expenditures illustrated by the report and hoped that the Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act would clear up any confusion. The act established the auditor as the budget officer, with enlarged responsibilities and authority over budget­ing, planning, and expenditures. Accordingly, the budget officer would submit "a supplementary estimate of all capital projects pending or which each department head believes should be undertaken (a) within the budget year and (b) within the next three succeeding years." The act also permitted accumulation of capital funds from year to year for specific capital improvements, thus eliminating some of the confusion created by juggling money between the general fund and the capital improvements fund. The Tribune suggested that part of the purpose of the act was to "permit taxpayers and investors to form intelligent opin­ions" on the city's financial health.54 In August 1961 the Advisory Committee on City Planning and Capital Improvements completed its two-year project and submitted a report which Lee graciously accepted. They inten­sively studied the capital improvements projects and recom­mended that each of the five be approved: sewage disposal facilities, $7,000,000; joint city-county public safety building, city's share $5,000,000; Redwood Road trunk line sewer, $2,500,000; public library, $2,500,000; and storm sewers, $2,500,000. The total amount was $19,500,000,55 to be sub­mitted to voters in a bond election, which they approved on September 12. Since Lee had been less than enthusiastic from the beginning about capital improvements, the completion of these projects demonstrated that fiscal conservative Lee retained some flexibility and would try to be responsive to the people's wishes. 261 J. BRACKEN LEE ^Deseret News, October 21, 1959. Other candidates were Chandler, 2,722 votes; Preece, 2,395; and Wood, 628. 2Deseret News, October 28, 1959. 3Ibid. 4William Call, Donald Gale, Arthur McKell, Paul Jacobsen, George Kuhn, Lawrence March, A. Krehl Smith, Mrs. Pearl Miller, and Dr. J. D. Williams to Dear Neighbor, November 2, 1959, mimeographed, copy in J. D. Williams's possession. <>Deseret News, October 28, 1959. "Salt Lake Tribune, November 1, 1959. 7Ibid. aProvo Daily Herald, November 1, 1959. 9"Vote JENKINS for Mayor," handbill, copy in J. D. Williams's possession. wProvo Daily Herald, November 1, 1959. "Salt Lake Tribune, October 23, 1959. 12Ibid. "Provo Daily Herald, October 23, 1959. "Deseret News, October 29, 1959. ^Ibid. leDeserel News, November 4, 1959. "Price Sun-Advocate, November 5, 1959. lsSalt Lake Tribune, November 5, 1959. 19"Now It's 'Mr. Mayor' for Ex-Governor Lee of Utah," U.S. News and World Report, November 16, 1959, p. 27. 2"New York Times, November 7, 1959. "Deseret News, January 5, 1960. 22Ibid. 23Salt Lake Tribune, November 5, 1959. 24Deseret News, January 5, 1960. 25Ibid. 2"Salt Lake Tribune, January 6, 1960. "Deseret News, January 6, 1960, editorial. 2&Salt Lake Tribune, January 5, 1960. 29Ibid. 3°Ibid. 31Deseret News, January 7, 1960. 32Deseret News, January 20, 1960. 33Salt Lake Tribune, November 20, 1960. 3iSaltLake Tribune, January 19, 1960. 35Ibid. 3GIbid. "Deseret News, March 23, 1960. 38Salt Lake Tribune, January 22, 1961, editorial. See also Deseret News, October 24, 1960. 39Deseret News, October 24, 1960. 4"Salt Lake Tribune, November 17, 1960. 41Ibid. Harrison regarded Lee as a "character assassin." He believed Lee to be a politician first, public official second," who always based his campaign on ridicule. "He levied his forked tongue at me a number of times, and I felt, 262 MAYOR OF SALT LAKE CITY without provocation." In Harrison's opinion, economy in government was a fetish with Lee. Interview with Conrad B. Harrison, August 4, 1972, Salt Lake City. 42Salt Lake City Corporation, Budget for the Year, 1961, copy in Lee Mayoralty Papers. Under Transfer Funds, $351,246.00 is listed as Appropria­tion to Capital Outlay. It is included in total budget expenditures. 43Salt Lake Tribune, January 22, 1961, editorial. 44Ibid. 45Salt Lake City Corporation, Budget for the Year, 1961. See also Salt Lake Tribune, December 22, 1960. 4"Salt Lake Tribune, December 22, 1960. 47Utah League of Cities and Towns, "Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act for Utah Cities," as enacted by the 34th session and amended by the 39th session (1972) of the Utah State Legislature. See also Salt Lake Tribune, March 23, 1961. 48Interview with E. J. (Jake) Garn, Salt Lake City, August 11, 1972. Garn was then mayor and in charge of the Water Department. Garn was elected to the U.S. Senate as a Republican in 1974 and reelected in 1980. 49Harrison interview. 50"Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act." ^Deseret News, March 28, 1961. "Ibid. ™Salt Lake Tribune, March 31, 1961, editorial. r,4Ibid. See also "Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act." 55Salt Lake Tribune, August 4, 1961. 263