Let 'em Holler - A Political Biography of J. Bracken Lee

Mormon church influence

8 Mormon Church Influence In spite of his key role in Lee's election, J. Reuben Clark, Jr., became much less visible in the day-to-day affairs of the gover­norship. The church official who communicated most with Gov­ernor Lee was a lower-echelon figure, Thorpe B. Isaacson, a member of the LDS Presiding Bishopric.1 Isaacson was a natural choice for the role because of his innate interest in politics. He made numerous attempts to exercise influence, beginning with a letter of congratulations upon Lee's election. Writing on church stationery, he predicted that Lee would be one of Utah's great governors. Then, he expressed support for Lee's plan to reform the liquor system and with the loaded phrase, "a number of us have discussed it," implied that the General Authorities supported it too. The evidence does not show that Isaacson was acting on behalf of the church when he wrote to Lee, but he seemed to want Lee to believe that he was.2 Lee remembered it as "the most beautiful letter that you could imagine. I prized it, see. I took it home and showed it to my wife. He was a big Church man. Very flattering!" But two months later, Lee found a letter stuck to the top of one of his desk drawers. It had been written by Isaacson to Maw upon his election to the governorship eight years earlier, and "it was almost identical to the one he sent to me." The discovery natur­ally decreased the value of his own letter, and although Lee became friendly with the politically aware Isaacson, he regarded him with considerably less respect.3 Throughout Lee's two terms, Isaacson's letters continued to be frequent and partisan. Sometimes he spoke in his coveted role as chairman of the Board of Trustees at Utah State Agricultural College. His personal biases against the teaching profession were stronger than Lee's. He opposed teacher salary increases because, 91 J . BRACKEN LEE he said, many were already getting more money than they deserved. He did not object to increases for teachers or profes­sors who were outstanding, but he was opposed to flat, across-the- board raises because they encouraged "misfit individuals in the profession."4 When a bill to increase teacher salaries reached the legisla­ture, Isaacson wrote a letter to State Sen. Elias Day, urging him to defeat it: "I have just sought counsel this morning, and I believe it is the opinion that now would be a very bad time to raise the taxes of our people. . . ."5 Isaacson sent a copy of the letter to Lee with an accompanying explanation that he had "talked to authority here this morning, and certainly House Bill 75 should be defeated. . . ."° On the same day, the self-serving Isaacson sent a similar letter to Sen. Marl Gibson in which the phrase was slightly different: "I have just come from a meeting where I asked for counsel and advice from some who I feel can give good counsel." He was allegedly told that it was time to say "no to these school teachers."7 In the note to Lee, Isaacson added, "I sought counsel this morning, and I again can tell you that it is the feeling here that now would be a bad time to raise this tax levy in order to get more money for school teachers' salaries."8 Although the wording was purposefully obscure, the natural assumption was that the First Presidency or others of the General Authorities gave the counsel. Lee evidently believed that Isaacson was speaking for the church: "I actually don't believe that Thorpe ever did anything without consulting Clark." When Isaacson talked of consulting higher authority or seeking counsel, Lee interpreted it to mean J. Reuben Clark, Jr.0 That explains why Lee could cultivate a relationship with Isaacson even though he did not respect him as highly as he did Clark. At the 1952 annual convention of the Utah Education Asso­ciation, Edgar Fuller, executive secretary of the National Council of Chief State School Officers and a graduate of Brigham Young University, called for Lee's defeat in the November elections. He branded Lee as "the worst enemy of schools among all the governors of the United States."10 Shortly afterward, Fuller 92 MORMON CHURCH INFLUENCE received a letter from the Presiding Bishopric of the church repri­manding him for making a political speech critical of the gov­ernor of the state in a church building-the Assembly Hall on Temple Square. Since he believed that Lee's record was well known throughout the nation, Fuller was surprised that the bishopric would be "embarrassed" by his comments. He pointed out that the Assembly Hall had been used before for meetings of a controversial nature and that the Salt Lake Tabernacle had been used only hours after that meeting for a political gather­ing. 11 As a member of the Presiding Bishopric, Isaacson had again used leverage in the name of the church for a political issue and for Lee's protection. Isaacson frequently requested Lee to make key appoint­ments by sending him grandiose letters, such as one request­ing that Lee select a replacement for USAC trustee Matthew Cowley, a deceased apostle. Using his standard request style, Isaacson effusively praised Lee's leadership, claiming that never in the state's history had there been "such an honest government, free from graft or scandal, efficient, better roads, more money for schools," that Lee would always be admired and respected, and that he (Isaacson) was proud of his leadership. Finally, he got to the request; he wanted Cowley replaced with another apostle: "I don't believe anybody would object to such proce­dure, and I know no one would object to the appointment of Apostle LeGrand Richards." Richards, he said, had supported Lee loyally and had been a Republican all his life. I do hope we can have him appointed right away. We need him. He will enjoy it. He will be grateful to you, and I know many others will be grateful. As I spoke to you about it before, I sought the counsel of President McKay, and he con­curred in this appointment.12 Such an obvious approach irritated Lee, and in this case he chose to defy Isaacson. In a terse reply he expressed confidence in Richards but explained that there were numerous other appli­cations for the vacancy: "I do not believe I will be able to appoint Mr. Richards to this particular vacancy but I will certainly keep 93 Above: Governor Lee's inaugural address, 1949, with Secretary of State Heber Bennion, Jr., and Mrs. Bennion in background. Right: Margaret and J. Bracken Lee with their sons, Richard, seated, and James, and daughter Jon in the Governor's Man­sion, 1951. Left: Lee, George Hansen, Repub­lican National Committee member from Utah, and Herbert Hoover at the 1950 state Republican conven-vention. J. Bracken Lee photographs. Above: Left to right, Edith Garner of the Utah State Welfare Commission, Mrs. Dewey, Mrs. Lee, Lee, Thomas E. Dewey, and Dave Wilson, state Republican chairman, at a Salt Lake railroad station during the 1948 campaign. Above: Lee and son Richard on vacation in Colorado, 1950. Right: Lee at the 1950 National Governors' Conference in West Virginia. J. Bracken Lee photographs. J . BRACKEN LEE him in mind for the future."13 More than two years later, Lee did appoint Richards to the USAC board.14 Isaacson had been explicit enough to invoke the name of President McKay, something he had carefully avoided in the past. Perhaps a more subtle approach would have been more effective in dealing with Lee. It was obvious that Lee accepted Isaacson as a messenger from the brethren with reluctance, but he did succumb to Isaacson's wishes about other appointments and named several church authorities to governing boards.15 He was not averse to such appointments, as Maw had been. In fact, Harold Simpson, Lee's press secretary, remembered heavy criticism because university boards were dominated by Mormon appointees. In 1955 he counted an apostle, a member of the Presiding Bishopric, a stake president, and a bishop, all concurrently serving on the Utah State Agricultural College Board of Trustees.10 Ironically, some critics accused Lee of being "anti-Mormon" in his appointments. Lee remembered rumors that "church people" were disturbed because there were not enough Mormons in appointive positions. Through personal research, he discovered that two-thirds of his appointments had gone to Mormons, although he had never asked anyone what his religion was prior to appointment. Lee claimed that he compiled a list of people with their religions and took it to Clark, who disclaimed any interest in such a list and advised, "Don't you hire anybody anywhere unless you trust them."17 The mere compiling of such a list aptly illustrates Lee's desire to please the church. Although Lee maintained that attempts by General Authori­ties to influence his appointments and decisions were rare,18 there is considerable evidence to the contrary. During his tenure Apostles Delbert L. Stapley, Henry D. Moyle, and Joseph F. Merrill; Presiding Bishop Joseph L. Wirthlin; and many bishops and stake presidents wrote to him frequently about appointments and political issues. Although some of the letters were written in an assertive style on church stationery, none of them purported to represent the whole church. Others were careful to draw the line between church and state by writing the letter on personal stationery and expressing personal motives. 96 MORMON CHURCH INFLUENCE For instance, when Wirthlin wrote Lee recommending an appointment,19 he did it on personal stationery and made no reference to higher authority. Since Wirthlin was Isaacson's superior in the church hierarchy, this seems especially significant. Lee responded in standard fashion, as if he were writing to any other citizen.20 Delbert L. Stapley wrote on church stationery to recommend Earl Hunsaker, a friend, to become superintendent of the highway patrol.21 Lee was apparently unimpressed, for he wrote a standard letter to Stapley20 and eventually appointed Joseph Dudler, a former Carbon County sheriff under Lee in Price, to the post.23 Henry D. Moyle wrote to Lee on personal stationery recom­mending the appointment of Homer Holmgren to the Utah State Supreme Court and concluding that he was also "politically all right."24 Lee responded in noncommital fashion, assuring Moyle that "the number of applicants for this vacancy is considerable,"25 and Holmgren was not appointed. One of the more obvious attempts to influence came from Franklin J. Murdock, president of the Highland Stake and head of Murdock Travel, the firm most readily identifiable with church travel accommodations. He recommended Judge Leland G. Larsen for the Third Judicial District, saying he had worked closely with him on the stake high council. Murdock promised Lee he would always be "at peace with his conscience" if he did the right thing and said he would watch the appointment with "keen interest."20 It was evidently the wrong approach; Lee failed to comply. J. Leonard Love, a bishop, seemed to have more political clout through his busi­ness and social connections than some General Authorities. He complained to Lee about the dismissal of Judge Rulon Clark from the juvenile court, saying he had known him for twenty-five years and it was impossible to place a value on his services.27 Clark was reinstated, and apparently Love's action on his behalf played a heavy role in the decision. Lee recognized the important difference between persons with high church positions and church leaders who were dele­gated to speak for the church. He was amenable to requests he interpreted as emanating from the church but resented requests 97 J. BRACKEN LEE from persons using their church positions to wield personal influence. Lee believed that President McKay "didn't know anything about politics" and rarely interfered, but he gave great weight to McKay's letters. When members of the Hillside Stake com­plained about the presence of a liquor store in their neighbor­hood, McKay requested that the store be moved to another part of the city. Lee discussed the matter with K. M. Doan, chairman of the liquor commission, who became irritated and, according to Lee, "bowed his neck against the church."28 McKay, however, was tolerant of the delay, and when the store was moved,29 he complimented Lee for acting "wisely and well"30 and expressed pleasure at Lee's contributions in office, especially in solving the "very perplexing liquor problem." McKay believed that Lee had "won the confidence of every clear-thinking person in the state."31 The liquor store issue was the predictable case of the church injecting itself into politics because of a moral issue so clear that intermediaries were unnecessary. Lee had no need to doubt that this was the church itself making the request, with David O. McKay as spokesman, even though many individual church leaders voiced strong feelings.32 In 1953 Lee was forced to deal with the controversial issue of Sunday closing. A bill was introduced in the legislature pro­viding for the closing on Sunday of all places of business except those that dispensed services or provided activities necessary to health and life. Its intent was approved by the Utah Council of Churches and the Salt Lake Ministerial Association, meaning that Protestants as well as Mormons strongly supported it. The bill was passed by the legislature, six to one in the house and nearly two to one in the senate.33 In spite of such convincing support, Lee vetoed it, arguing that such legislation must be "beneficial to all the people, with­out prejudice or discrimination to the few." He believed that Seventh Day Adventists, Jewish groups, and others whose views of the Sabbath were markedly different from other Christian denominations, as well as the neighborhood grocer and other merchants who had to depend on Sunday employment, would be 98 MORMON CHURCH INFLUENCE discriminated against. "Social legislation is necessary in some cases," he asserted, "but there is truth in the axiom that you cannot legislate the morals of the people."34 The Deseret News attacked Lee for offending "the great majority of Utah's citizens." The editors said that most states had Sunday closing laws (thirty-one plus the District of Colum­bia) and that Utah, "of all states," must "remain one of the very few places in America where a man has to work on Sunday unnecessarily in order to hold his job." The News concluded that Lee had made a mistake and urged the legislature to override the veto.35 But the legislators were influenced by the governor and the veto was sustained. Lee had offended the Mormon church on what its leaders interpreted as a clear moral issue. The veto marked the first decline in his church support. The following year, in an effort to mend church fences and support his economy drive, Lee tried to transfer Weber, Snow and Dixie junior colleges to the church, which had formerly owned and operated them but had deeded them to the state in the 1930s. Saying that a transfer would take a heavy burden off the state educational system, Lee praised the church's record in education and suggested the change would be beneficial to the colleges themselves. President McKay reluctantly agreed, prom­ising that the church would take them rather than see them close. He said that acceptance of the obligation to operate the colleges (amounting to $1,000,000 per year) was sufficient and valid consideration and price for the transfer but that the church would still pay an amount considered to be fair and equitable. He prom­ised that the colleges would be operated just as they had been in the past, with salaries, sabbaticals, tuition, and so on remain­ing the same to avoid interference with normal operations and individual students. McKay pledged, in answer to critics, that they would not be transformed into "religious seminaries."30 Accused by some people of suggesting the transfer "merely for votes," an angry Lee pointed out that he had vetoed the Sunday closing bill, even though it was desired by the church, and a bill to grant Brigham Young University power of eminent domain.37 He was so disturbed by the charge that he sent a copy 99 J. BRACKEN LEE of a critical letter he had received to President McKay with his own answer enclosed. He wanted to be sure that McKay did not think he was pushing the transfer for political reasons. McKay replied that he too resented the insinuation that Lee had selfish or ulterior motives. Whenever a person makes such an accusation, even by innu­endo, as that made . . . against you, I cannot help but doubt his own integrity. I should put him in the class with the man who said, "There isn't an honest man in the World." Unthinkingly, he makes an admission that he, himself, is dishonest.38 The transfer never took place. Although the bill was approved by the legislature and signed by the governor, it was tied to a referendum ballot, and Utah voters rejected it.39 The result fully illustrates the independence of Utah voters, even when the presi­dent of the church may be involved. Yet, Lee no doubt believed that he had successfully patched a sagging relationship with the church in the wake of his Sunday closing veto. From time to time Lee received communications from a number of General Authorities on other, less important topics. Bishop Wirthlin wrote in praise of a speech Lee delivered in Washington, D.C., while presenting a statue of Brigham Young to the nation. Wirthlin was impressed with Lee's reference to Young standing for individualism rather than collectivism in the presence of the vice-president and Sen. Elbert D. Thomas, a Democrat.40 Lee said that he believed every word he had uttered, even though it "did not sit well with some of the Wash­ington New Dealers."41 Henry D. Moyle expressed his feelings about various bills of reapportionment, none of which he sup­ported, on the grounds that they would give Salt Lake County ultimate control of the legislature. However, he painstakingly identified these as his own personal views, presented in an unoffi­cial capacity, and specifically requested Lee to refrain from pub­licizing them.42 Thorpe Isaacson was not Lee's lone supporter on educational policy. Himself an educator. Apostle Joseph F. Merrill wrote a private letter to Lee on church letterhead, expressing detailed 100 MORMON CHURCH INFLUENCE views and support. Merrill believed that the state institutions of higher learning were already spending more money than was necessary to educate effectively. He praised former University of Utah President George Thomas but criticized President A. Ray Olpin for his ambitious desire to make the school one of the country's outstanding universities. He thought it was econom­ically impossible for Utah to gratify Olpin's ambition. Merrill insisted that there were a far greater number of courses offered in the state universities than were necessary to meet the require­ments of 98 percent of the students. It was, he said, unreasonable to ask economically small Utah to do what Harvard, Chicago, Columbia, and other great universities were doing. He also expressed sympathy for Lee in his conflict with Superintendent of Public Instruction E. Allen Bateman but noted that he was writing a personal letter: "My position does not permit me to indulge in a public discussion of the question."43 While Lee enjoyed church support in 1944, 1948, and again in 1952, he definitely lost it in 1956. He became critical of Eisenhower, who was revered by many Mormons, and much of the support faded. The veto of the Sunday closing law was indeed damaging, and by 1955 his relationship with church authorities was tenuous. In 1956 church support went to Republican George Dewey Clyde for the governorship instead of to Lee, and Clyde was elected. Lee believed that the erosion of support actually began when McKay became president of the church and made Stephen L. Richards his first counselor. That choice meant that Clark would be moved from first to second counselor. Accord­ing to Lee, "When McKay demoted Clark and put in a man named Richards, a life-long Democrat, I noticed a difference. The support started to fade. When I didn't get that support for the Senate, I went to Clark, and asked him what happened. He said he couldn't tell me. He said, T don't have any influence in the Church any more.' "44 J. Reuben Clark, Jr., did have a reciprocal respect for Lee, as evidenced by a letter he wrote to him upon his election as mayor of Salt Lake City. He began by saluting him as "Mr. Mayor," complaining that he must abandon the former address 101 J . BRACKEN LEE of governor. Lee had just sent him a handwritten Christmas letter of appreciation, and apparently Clark was moved by its contents because he expressed deep appreciation for a very great friendship, which included Lee's wife and children for whom Clark had "deep affection." Hoping he could refer to Lee famil­iarly as "Bracken," Clark requested a favor concerning a piece of property on First South Street in Salt Lake City that the church wanted to purchase from the city. Applying some gentle pressure, Clark said he always kept Lee's confidences, "but I did tell the Brethren that you had assured me orally that you would do whatever you might do for us within the law."45 In spite of Lee's statement, "Clark never once asked me for anything," Clark was clearly exacting a price for the help he had offered Lee in past years. Then he closed with more niceties: Again for all of your kindly protestations which I know are honest, of friendship and affection for me, I am most grateful, and mine come to you in return, and I assure you that the friendship which I have for you has never dimmed and I shall hope never to do anything that will make it dim and I receive with great joy your promise that the same situation is true of yourself. God bless you Brother Lee, with every blessing He has that is necessary for you to possess and enjoy in this great respon­sibility which now comes to you.40 Hoping that Clark would continue to "honor" him by address­ing him as "Bracken," Lee claimed that he had too much respect for him to address him as anything but "President Clark." He conscientiously explained that he was doing everything possible to meet Clark's request about the land sale and promised to expedite the matter.47 In this instance, Lee wanted very much to assist the church. Clark's request was clearly golden; since 1948 Clark and Lee had successfully maintained a "special rela­tionship." Lee managed to make all the necessary arrangements for the sale within one month from the date he had received the letter from Clark.48 Lee was criticized for advertising the property only one week. He claimed that he had done so on advice from the city attorney and a number of other Salt Lake attorneys in whom he had 102 MORMON CHURCH INFLUENCE confidence. He was also criticized for assigning the police depart­ment temporary quarters for almost one year instead of retaining the property while the new building was being constructed. He hurried the sale arrangements to please the church, even though he admitted to some "misgivings about being rushed." There was one consolation: the new court and police buildings could be built out of present funds, without additional taxes.49 Lee cultivated church support while he was Salt Lake's mayor, even though he believed that it was less crucial in gov­erning the city. It was easier, Lee thought, for a non-Mormon to be elected to office in Salt Lake City than to be elected to a state office.50 As mayor he seemed braver at initiating action with Mormon authorities. He discovered that the church was not pro­ceeding with original plans to build a junior college on the property of Forest Dale Golf Course, which the church had earlier purchased from the city. Lee thought that the property should revert to the city at the same price the church paid for it but with reasonable interest. He even suggested to President McKay that if he did not intend to comply, that a clause be inserted into the deed saying that a junior college must be built on the land or it would automatically revert to the city.51 His strong stand was ultimately rewarded. The repurchase was accomplished, Lee winning his point, and the church authorities agreeing to return the land to the city without profit but with a reasonable interest.52 When asked about the importance of the church in his politi­cal career, Lee wryly commented that it was about as important as the Catholic church in Boston or the Baptist church in Texas. He said that an antichurch candidate could not get elected to any office. According to Lee, church officials often prefer non- Mormons to Mormons, and non-Mormon governors have gener­ally treated the church more kindly.53 The latter statement may be an exaggeration, but the evi­dence suggests that church leaders do prefer politicians who clearly recognize the role of the LDS church as Utah's most important interest group. Some Mormon politicians, such as Maw, have had difficulty maintaining an effective working rela- 103 J . BRACKEN LEE tionship because they have been afraid of being perceived as puppets of the church. Lee had no such problem. He not only understood the role of the church in politics, but he recognized the vital need to cultivate the relationship. Lee's experience suggests that church influence in politics is an unquestioned reality, even though its form varies. When the First Presidency exerts pressure on a political leader because of a moral issue, the influence is overt and unmistakable. The brethren clearly represent the institution. Sometimes the First Presidency exerts quiet influence intended to protect the church or promote its growth, such as in land sales and ordinances. Often there are educational, economic, or social issues about which the First Presidency takes no overt stand and about which other church leaders disagree. On these, the First Presidency pur­posely remains silent but allows other church leaders to make private, personal efforts to influence politicians. Some of these personal efforts may be sanctioned by higher church authority or a higher church authority may have even suggested that the letter or phone call be made, but great care is exercised by church authorities to avoid the appearance of intentional influ­ence. The church does not wish to be regarded as such a domi­nant political force in Utah that church and state will be regarded as one. Although there are interesting pieces of evidence, it is impos­sible to prove, for instance, that Thorpe Isaacson exerted pressure on Governor Lee under direct authority from the First Presi­dency. Isaacson undoubtedly requested opinions or "counsel" from other church authorities to carry to the governor. It seems undeniable that he wished to leave the impression that he was speaking for the church. Governor Lee accepted that, and the product was church influence. In this case, Isaacson was inter­preted by Lee to be the emissary of J. Reuben Clark, Jr., and, hence, the institution. Lee took the influence seriously, even though he occasionally chafed under it and sometimes rejected it. His enormous success in Utah politics must be equated with his ability to create that special relationship between church officials and himself. 104 MORMON CHURCH INFLUENCE 1Isaacson was later made an assistant to the Quorum of the Twelve Apos­tles (1964) and finally a counselor in the First Presidency (1965). He was the fourth counselor and Joseph Fielding Smith the third counselor, both called due to David O. McKay's failing health. 2Thorpe B. Isaacson to Lee, November 3, 1948, Lee Gubernatorial Papers. 3Lee interview. Maw did not have any recollection of the letter. Maw interview. 4Isaacson to Lee, January 11, 1951, Lee Gubernatorial Papers. 5Isaacson to State Sen. Elias L. Day, February 2, 1951, ibid. "Isaacson to Lee, February 2, 1951, ibid. In a postscript he requested that "if it isn't too much trouble, Bracken," would Lee accompany him to the office of Apostle Joseph F. Merrill sometime to discuss education and the problems of the University of Utah. He assured Lee that it would do his "heart good." 'Isaacson to State Sen. Marl D. Gibson, February 2, 1951, ibid. 8Isaacson to Lee, February 2, 1951, ibid. 9Lee interview. 10Logan Herald-Journal, October 12, 1952. "Edgar Fuller to Presiding Bishopric, October 20, 1952, Lee Gubernatorial Papers. 12Isaacson to Lee, December 23, 1953, ibid. 13Lee to Isaacson, December 29, 1953, ibid. "Appointment Document, February 26, 1956, to July 1, 1957, ibid. 15For instance, Lee named Alma Sonne, assistant to the Twelve, to the Board of Trustees at Utah State almost immediately after Isaacson's request. (Isaacson to Lee, January 20, 1955; Lee to Isaacson, January 25, 1955, ibid.) He had also appointed Matthew Cowley to the same board. (Lee to Quayle Cannon, Jr., secretary of the Utah State Senate, March 11, 1953, ibid.) Lee appointed Richard L. Evans, an apostle, to the University of Utah Board of Regents. (Lee to Cannon, March 16, 1955, ibid.) Additional Lee appointments included: J. Reuben Clark, Jr., as chairman of This Is the Place Monument Commission; Apostle John A. Widtsoe, as member of the Utah Water and Power Board; Apostle Harold B. Lee, as member of the Utah Civil Defense Council; Levi Edgar Young, president of the First Council of Seventy, as board member of the Utah State Historical Society; David L. McKay, son of David O. McKay, as board member of the Utah State Institute of Fine Arts: Albert R. Bowen, son of Apostle Albert E. Bowen, to the University of Utah Board of Regents: Selvoy J. Boyer, former president of the LDS British Mission, as member of the Utah State Tax Commission; O. J. Wilkinson, president of Murray LDS Stake, as member of the Utah State Highway Patrol Civil Service Commission. (See Lee to Raymond Taylor, April 22, 1952, ibid.) 10Harold W. Simpson to Frank Jonas, March 15, 1955, ibid. 17Lee interview. Lee told Ray Taylor that eighteen of his commissioners were Mormons and eleven were not. He hoped this would end the "whispering campaign" that he was anti-Mormon; he expressed his great admiration for the Mormon people and the church. Lee to Taylor. 18Lee interview. 19LDS Presiding Bishop Joseph L. Wirthlin to Lee, February 5, 1953, Lee Gubernatorial Papers. Wirthlin recommended the appointment of D. G. Nelson, Jr., to the Utah State Highway Commission, saying that anything Lee could do would be appreciated by him personally. He also commended Lee for the "fine work" he had done. 20Since Isaacson was a counselor to Wirthlin in the Presiding Bishopric, it could be supposed that Wirthlin would carry more weight with Lee than Isaacson. Obviously, such was not the case. 105 J. BRACKEN LEE 21Delbert L. Stapley to Lee, June 30, 1952, Lee Gubernatorial Papers. 22Lee to Stapley, July 14, 1952, ibid. 23Logan Herald-Journal, November 21, 1952. 24Henry D. Moyle to Lee, November 6, 1953, Lee Gubernatorial Papers. 25Lee to Moyle, November 9, 1953, ibid. 2GFranklin J. Murdock to Lee, July 2, 1956, ibid. 27J. Leonard Love to Lee, June 24, 1949, ibid. 28Lee interview. 29Lee to David O. McKay, October 13, 1949, Lee Gubernatorial Papers. Lee claimed that several prominent Mormons were frequenting liquor stores and that Doan had obtained cards on a stake president and a bishop and members of the bishopric of the area who had allegedly been buying liquor on the west side of the city. Lee concluded that it was "embarrassing as hell," because Doan accused these people of being too cowardly to buy liquor from a nearby store so their neighbors could witness it. Lee interview. 30McKay to Lee, October 31, 1949, Lee Gubernatorial Papers. 31McKay to Lee, December 7, 1949, ibid. McKay said that Lee's integrity was unquestioned and commended him on his instruction that no liquor be served at Christmas parties in the Utah State Capitol. Lee agreed that the use of liquor at such gatherings not only degraded the capitol but the officeholder as well. Lee to McKay, December 8, 1949, ibid. 32Lee was commended by members of the bishopric of the Mountain View Ward, speaking "as members and property owners." They were grateful to Lee for support in their desire to maintain high standards for their community and family life. (Paul Newmeyer, Homer Holmgren, and Ralph E. Smith to Lee, May 20, 1950, ibid.) C. H. Parker, president of the Hillside LDS Stake, followed suit, saying he had made it known to the people that Lee had supported them in moving the store. The people, he said, appreciated his integrity and would support him because of adherence to principle. (Parker to Lee, May 21, 1950, ibid.) Lee also received several other letters relating to various phases of liquor sales from church leaders. For instance, the Sharon LDS Stake presidency wrote concerning their unhappiness with the liquor commission's granting of a permit for a liquor agency in Orem. (Stake presidency to Lee, April 11, 1949, ibid.) The presidency of the North Davis LDS Stake protested efforts to liberalize the liquor law and the locker practice in private clubs by permitting the dispensing of liquor over the bar at such clubs. (Stake presidency to Lee, February 21, 1949, ibid.) 33Deseret News, February 17, 1953. ^Deseret News, February 16, 1953. 35Deseret News, February 17, 1953, editorial. 3CDavid O. Mckay, Stephen L. Richards, and J. Reuben Clark, Jr., First Presidency, to Lee, May 21, 1954, Lee Gubernatorial Papers. "Lee to Clyde S. Johnson, attorney, Vernal, Utah, November 4, 1954, ibid. 38McKay to Lee, November 9, 1954, ibid. 39State of Utah, Secretary of State, "Abstract of Elections," November 2, 1954, Election File, ibid; Deseret News, November 2, 1954. 40Wirthlin to Lee, June 2, 1950, Lee Gubernatorial Papers. "Lee to Wirthlin, June 6, 1950, ibid. 42Henry D. Moyle to Lee, May 25, 1954, ibid. Letter was on Council of the Twelve letterhead. "Joseph F. Merrill to Lee, June 6, 1951, ibid. 44Lee interview. 106 MORMON CHURCH INFLUENCE Jennings Phillips, Lee's campaign manager in 1956, said that Clark told him, "I've been told to keep my hands out of politics, and as much as I admire the governor-and I'm going to vote for him-I'll do anything for him in private that I can as a citizen, but I cannot interfere in any way. I've been told that I must keep out of this political race." Interview with Jennings Phillips, August 14, 1972, Salt Lake City. 45J. Reuben Clark Jr., to Lee, January 5, 1960, Lee Mayoralty Papers, Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City. 4CIbid. 47Lee to Clark, January 15, 1960, ibid. 48Taylor H. Merrill, Zion's Securities Corp. (LDS church holding com­pany), to Salt Lake City Commissioners, December 14, 1960, ibid. 49Lee to John H. Henderson, February 15, 1960, ibid. 50Lee interview. 51Lee to McKay, April 20, 1966, Lee Mayoralty Papers. 52Homer Holmgren, city attorney for Salt Lake City, to Salt Lake City Commission, June 9, 1967, ibid. 53Lee interview. Lee believed that N. Eldon Tanner of the First Presidency, a Democrat, was the most influential general authority in Utah politics in the early 1970s, giving Democratic candidates an edge. Ezra Taft Benson, Lee maintained, was influential, but the average Latter-day Saint would pay more careful attention to Tanner than to Benson in political matters. If Lee was correct in his assessment, it would probably have been because of Tanner's position in the First Presidency rather than the political party involved. As an example of Tanner's influence, Lee suggested that Democrat Calvin L. Rampton was the "church candidate" in 1972 and that Tanner gave an unmistakable message to Republican opponent Nicholas Strike by presenting Rampton with an award at Brigham Young University before the election. 107