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Show SPRING WATERS 627 diverting from streams, and that the owner of the lands upon which the seepage or spring waters first arose should have the prior right thereto if capable of being used upon his lands. Spring source of natural watercourse. -It was said in some of the early decisions that water from a spring which forms a natural watercourse is subject to appropriation, since such a spring is part and parcel of the stream.342 Such a watercourse is established where there is a substantial flow from the spring in a defined stream running in a definite direction for a certain distance, even though the water then disappears into the ground; and the fact that beneficial use could be and is being made should be considered in determining the appropriability of the water.343 It was also held in the early decisions that a watercourse originating from a spring was subject to the riparian doctrine.344 The fact that water originates on another's land was held not to defeat the rights of the lower landowner; and that such a vested riparian right, actually exercised, could not be divested by a subsequent statute345 giving the prior right to spring waters to the land- owner.346 In considering the foregoing cases, it is important to note that the riparian doctrine in Washington was modified in the 1920's by requiring the riparian owner to show with reasonable certainty, as against the claim of an appropriator, that either at present or within the near future, he will use the water for beneficial purposes.347 During the same period, the Washington Supreme Court stated that "The common-law rule of riparian rights has been stripped of some of its rigors,"348 and that "For years past, the trend of our decisions and the tenor of our legislation have been to restrict and narrow the common law of riparian rights * * *.')349 **2Geddis v. Parrish, 1 Wash. 587, 21 Pac. 314 (1889);Miller v. Wheeler, 54 Wash. 429, 103 Pac. 641 (1909);/n re Ahtanum Creek, 139 Wash. 84, 245 Pac. 758 (1926). ^Allison v. Linn, 139 Wash. 474, 477-478, 247 Pac. 731 (1926). The court also said, "While the formal notice of appropriation, posted by appellant's predecessors in interest at the place of diversion, may not have been authorized by law, and may not have, in itself, created a legal appropriation, yet it did give notice of claimed rights, and that fact, taken with the fact of actual appropriation, would be amply sufficient to establish appellant's rights as appropriator." See Pays v. Roseburg, 123 Wash. 82, 211 Pac. 750 (1923). 344 See, e.g., Geddis v. Parrish, 1 Wash. 587, 21 Pac. 314 (1889). 345Wash. Laws 1889-90, § 15, p. 710, repealed, Laws 1917, ch. 117, § 47, p. 468. 346Nielson v. Sponer, 46 Wash. 14, 89 Pac. 155 (1907); Miller v. Wheeler, 54 Wash. 429, 103 Pac. 641 (1909); Hollett v. Davis, 54 Wash. 326, 103 Pac. 423 (1909). 341Brown v. Chase, 125 Wash. 542, 553, 217 Pac 23 (1923); State v. American Fruit Growers, Inc., 135 Wash. 156, 161, 237 Pac. 498 (1925). See chapter 10 at notes 227 and 526. See also chapter 10 at note 527 regarding 1967 Washington legislation pertaining to the nonuse of riparian rights. 348/n reAlpowa Creek, 129 Wash. 9, 13, 224 Pac. 29 (1924). 349Proctor v. Sim, 134 Wash. 606, 616, 236 Pac. 114 (1925). |