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Show CALIFORNIA 691 began shortly after the adoption of that doctrine, initiated in 1902-1903 in Katzv. Walkinshaw.153 The coordination of rights in interconnected surface and ground water sup- plies has minimized under some circumstances the importance of the distinc- tion between subflow of a stream and percolating water tributary to the stream.154 The supreme court in Hudson v. Dailey, a decision of considerable importance in the establishment of this principle of coordination of rights in stream waters and in "percolating waters feeding the stream and necessary to its continued flow," said, "There is no rational ground for any distinction between such percolating waters and the waters in the gravels immediately beneath and directly supporting the surface flow, and no reason for applying a different rule to the two classes, with respect to such rights, if, indeed, the two classes can be distinguished at all."155 With respect to the methods of acquiring and adjudicating appropriative rights in ground waters, the distinction between underflow and percolating water remains the same as it was prior to the adoption of the correlative doctrine.156 But it is in the determination of claimed interferences that the question of physical interconnection of water supplies is particularly im- portant; and in so doing, the classification of ground water does not determine the matter of liability for injury. So long as the facts of the case show that the extraction of ground water substantially diminishes the flow of the stream to the injury of those who hold rights therein, the question as to whether the ground water at the place of extraction is strictly a part of the stream, or is tributary percolating water on its way to the stream, is immaterial.157 In a case decided after the decision in Katz v. Walkinshaw, rights to use percolating water tributary to a watercourse were correlated with riparian rights in the waters of the stream. Referring to Katz v. Walkinshaw, the court said:158 153Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 134-137, 70 Pac. 663 (1902), 74 Pac. 766 (1903). 154 Apparently there has never been much, if any, question concerning coordination of rights in watercourses and in tributary underground streams flowing in known and definite channels. Definite underground streams have been consistently recognized in California law as subject to the same rules as those applying to surface streams. (See "Definite Underground Streams," supra.) Hence the coordination of rights in the main stream of a watercourse and in its tributary surface streams necessarily extends also to underground tributaries that have the requisite elements of underground watercourses. '"Hudson v. Dailey, 156 Cal. 617, 628, 105 Pac. 748 (1909). 156The statutory procedures for acquiring and adjudicating appropriative rights are limited to waters in definite streams, their underflows, and underground streams. See Cal. Water Code § § 1200 and 2500 (West 1956). The only way in which percolating water could be appropriated is by taking the water and applying it to beneficial use, as discussed at notes 87-88 supra. 151McClintock v. Hudson, 141 Cal. 275, 279-281, 74 Pac. 849 (1903). 158141 Cal. at 281. |