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Show 478 ADJUDICATION OF WATER RIGHTS IN WATERCOURSES priority at any time within 4 years after the rendering of such decree.207 After the expiration of 2 or 4 years, as the case might have been, from the time of rendering a final decree, the decree became binding and final, except in 207Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § § 148-9-16 and 148-9-17 (1963). For a discussion of these or predecessor provisions, see Rogers v. Nevada Canal Co., 60 Colo. 59, 71-72, 151 Pac. 923 (1915); O'Neil v. Northern Colo. In. Co., 242 U.S. 20, 25-27 (1916), affirming 56 Colo. 545, 550-552, 139 Pac. 536 (1914); Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Arkansa Valley Sugar Beet & Irrigated Ixind Co., 76 Colo. 278, 230 Pac. 615, 617 (1924); Huerfaho Valley Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. Hinderlider, 81 Colo. 468, 256 Pac. 305, 307 (1927). In Quirico v. Hickory Jackson Ditch Co., 126 Colo. 464, 251 Pac. (2d) 937, 940 (1952), the court stated, inter alia: "It could hardly be successfully contended that a decree is valid against those not participating where process has not been served, or notice given as required by statute. Such a decree is not res adjudicata. No more can it, we think, be considered a valid decree to start the running of the period of limitation as to those who do not participate in its benefits or even have knowledge of its rendition. * * * [I]n a situation such as alleged in plaintiff's complaint, the adjudication decree could not become final as to parties without notice who did not participate or accept its benefits or have knowledge of its rendition * * * and, if it was not a final decree as to them, under the very terms of the statute it could not start the beginning of the period of limitation." This apparently was a retreat from the position taken earlier to strictly apply the statutes of limitation. However, in a later case involving the same parties, the court said, "Under conditions generally prevailing in proceedings for the adjudication of priority rights to the use of water, the provisions of the two and four year statutes of limitation have been strictly enforced." Quirico v. Hickory Jackson Ditch Co., 130 Colo. 481, 276 Pac. (2d) 746, 748 (1954). The 1954 court also said: "While no charge of fraud against plaintiff is alleged by defendants, nevertheless in their behalf it is strongly represented that plaintiff and the water officials co-operated in an effort to keep defendants and their predecessor in ignorance of plaintiff's 1934 adjudication decree until after the expiration of the four-year period following its entry. If ever justified under any circumstances, the situation with which defendants apparently were confronted, if credence be given to the allegations of their cross complaint, presents an illustration where the tolling of the statute of limitation might be recognized." 276 Pac. (2d) at 748-749. However, the plaintiff apparently was unable to prove such facts and the court went on to conclude, inter alia: "It may well be that notice in the original adjudication proceeding actually was defective and if subjected to timely objection might have been deemed insufficient, but such is the nature of property rights to the use of water that there must come a time beyond which all such objections are barred. It is important that decrees determining priority rights to use of water have both vitality and finality." 276 Pac. (2d) at 750. In Hallenbeck v. Granby Ditch & Reservoir Co., 160 Colo. 555, 420 Pac. (2d) 419, 424 (1966), the court stated, "Each such decree was open to attack * * * only for the statutory periods prescribed by C.R.S. '53, 147-9-16 and 147-9-17 * * *. Having failed to challenge within the time allowed, Hallenbeck cannot do so now except by asserting and proving abandonment or fraud." According to Comment, "Developments in Colorado Water Law of Appropriation in the Last Ten Years," 35 U. Colo. L. Rev. 493,494 (1962-1963), in 1957 the Colorado Legislature, apparently in response to the Quirico decisions, supra, enacted a statute which provided: "A decree * * * awarding a priority right * * * shall not be set aside or declared invalid because of any irregularity, failure to give proper notice, or other |