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Show SPECIAL STATUTORY ADJUDICATION PROCEDURES 477 materially from a suit to determine particular disputes involving use of water which may have arisen between residents of any community, over which the district courts in the several counties had general jurisdiction. "One is not re- quired to resort to the particular court authorized to conduct a general adjudi- cation proceeding in the several water districts in order to secure redress in an action involving an alleged infringement of a right to the use of water."203 The decree of adjudication became effective when certified copies thereof were filed with the State Engineer and the irrigation division engineer. Such decree was then the warrant of the state water officials for regulating the distribution of water accordingly.204 The decrees were res judicata between those who were parties to or participated in the proceedings in which they were rendered, and they could have been attacked, reviewed, or modified only in the manner provided by law.205 "This court has never recognized the right of parties to a water adjudication to complain of the results after the expiration of the statutory time for review, except on the ground of fraud."206 With respect to those who were not parties to a water adjudication suit, two statutes of limitation concerning the finality and binding force of a decree provided that: (1) The owner or claimant of a water right within the water district whose claimed priority antedated the latest priority fixed by the decree and who filed no claim therefor in the adjudication proceeding and who had no notice of such proceeding served on him (or his predecessor in interest) personally or by registered mail, could have had the decree reopened, for good cause, within 2 years after having been rendered. (2) Any person whose water right was decreed or subject to decree in another water district could bring an action in the court which rendered the decree to determine any claim of in a ditch, it was ineffectual. Rollins v. Fearnley, 45 Colo. 319, 323-324, 101 Pac. 345 (1909). "The district court can go no further than determine the priorities of the several ditches and amount of water awarded thereto." Central Trust Co. v. Culver, 23 Colo. App. 317, 323, 129 Pac. 253 (1912), affirmed, 58 Colo. 334, 145 Pac. 684 (1915). "While the adjudication settled the priority of rights as between the two ditches, it did not, and could not, adjudge the respective rights and claims of water users under either ditch." Caldwell v. States, 89 Colo. 529, 534, 6 Pac. (2d) 1 (1931). The decree was only confirmatory of preexisting rights. It did not create or grant any rights, but served as evidence of rights previously acquired. Cresson Consol. Gold Min. & Mill. Co. v. Whitten, 139 Colo. 273, 338 Pac. (2d) 278, 283 (1959); Cline v. Whitten, 144 Colo. 126, 355 Pac. (2d) 306, 308 (1960). That is, it measured the rights of the claimant at the time it was issued and applied only to appropriations actually made prior to that time. "It does not curtail the right of the landowner to make further appropriations as needed." Nicoloff v. Bloom Land & Cattle Co., 100 Colo. 137, 139-140, 66 Pac. (2d) 333 (1937). M3Genoa v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 533, 349 Pac. (2d) 370, 377 (1960). M4Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 148-9-15 (1963). 30SWith respect to similar former legislation, see Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Arkansas Valley Sugar Beet & Irrigated Land Co., 39 Colo. 332, 337, 341, 90 Pac. 1023 (1907). M6Reagle v. Square S. Land & Cattle Co., 133 Colo. 392, 395, 296 Pac. (2d) 235 (1956). |