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Show 66 THE RIPARIAN DOCTRINE naturally flowing therein.331 It also said that the right of an owner of adjoining land to use water thereon "applies as well to the water of a lake, pond, slough, or any natural body of water, by whatever name it may be called, as to a running stream. In Texas, the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals held that riparian rights do not ordinarily attach to artificial streams in artificial channels; hence they did not attach to water flowing in an artificial drainage system, which in no way took the place of or obtained water directly from any natural stream.333 The California Supreme Court acknowledged the general rule that riparian rights exist only in natural watercourses and in waters naturally flowing in them, as noted above. However, the court held that a watercourse, although originally constructed artificially, may, from the circumstances under which it originated and by long continued use and acquiescence by persons interested therein, become in legal contemplation a natural watercourse. In that event, riparian owners thereon and persons affected thereby become possessed of all the rights to the waters therein that they would have in a natural watercourse. The question of riparian rights arose in connection with an artificial bypass that permitted water to flow from Kings River into the San Joaquin River in California. The court concluded that under the circumstances the owner of lands riparian to the San Joaquin River had all the rights with respect to the waters thereof, after being augmented with the overflow from Kings River through the bypass, that any riparian owner would have with respect to waters of a stream to which his land is naturally riparian.334 Elsewhere, it has been held that in case of a change made by mutual action of riparian owners, their rights and duties respecting the artificial channel may be the same as if it were the natural one.33s "The diversion of a stream by substituting an artificial channel for part of a natural one, by common consent, running in the same general direction, which has existed for a considerable time, may have the characteristics of a watercourse, to which riparian rights would attach."336 331 Chowchilla Farms v. Martin, 219 Cal. 1, 19, 25 Pac. (2d) 435 (1933). See Green v. Carotto, 72 Cal. 267, 269, 13 Pac. 685 (1887). 332 Turner v. James Canal Co., 155 Cal. 82, 87, 99 Pac. 520 (1909). 333Harrell v. Vahlsing, Inc., 248 S.W. (2d) 762, 769-770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952, error refused n.r.e.). 334 Chowchilla Farms Co. v. Martin, 219 Cal. 1, 18-26, 25 Pac. (2d) 435 (1933). 33sJack v. Teagarden, 151 Nebr. 309, 315-316, 37 N.W. (2d) 387 (1949); Harrington v. Demaris, 46 Oreg. Ill, 118-119, 77 Pac. 603, 82 Pac. 14 (1904); Cottel v. Berry, 42 Oreg. 593, 596, 72 Pac. 584 (1903). 336Hornor v. Baxter Springs, 116 Kans. 288, 290, 226 Pac. 779 (1924). Appellate courts of Texas held that an artificial canal that diverted all the water of a creek to all intents and purposes took the place of the creek, so that land adjacent to the canal was considered as riparian land. Santa Rosa Irr. Co. v. Pecos River Irr. Co., 92 S.W. 1014, 1017 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906, error refused); McKenzie v. Beason, 140 S.W. 246, 247 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911). |