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Show 60 METHOD OF DISCOVERY. It was so in the first case, and it was confir~ed. b_Y th nd True it is a very small basis, but still It rs-- e seco . , . enough to make an induction from; you generahze the facts, and you expect to find sourness in apples where· you get hardness and greenness. You found upon that a general law, that all hard and green ~pples .are nd that so far as it o-oes, is a perfect Indnctwn. sour; a , "' b Well havino- got your natural law in this way, when you ~l·e off:red another apple which you find is hard and green, you say, "All hard and green apples a~e sour; this apple is hard and green, therefore tb~s apple is sour." That train of rea~oning. is what logi~.o. cians call a syllogism, and 11as all Its varwus. parts a~a terms -its maior premiss, its minor premiss, and Its ' J • conclusion. And, by the help of further reasoning, which, if drawn out, would have to be exhibited in two or three other syllogisms, you arrive at your final determination, "I will not have that apple." So that, you see, you have, in the first place, established a law by Induction, and upon that you have founde~ a Deduction, and reasoned out the special concluswn of the particular case. Well now, suppose, having got your law, that at some time afterwards, you are discussing the qualities of apples with a friend : you will say to him, "It is a very curious thing,-but I find that all bard and green apples are sour ! " Your friend says to you, " But how do you know that?" You at once reply, "Oh, because 1 have tried it over and over again, and have always found them to be so."' Well, if we were talking sc1ence instead of common sense, we should call that an Experimental Verification .. METHOD OF DISCOVERY. 61 And, if still opposed, you go further, and say, "I have heard from the people in Somersetshire and Devonshire, where a large number of apples are grown, that they have observed the same thing. It is also found to be the case in Normandy, and in North America. In short, I find it to be the universal experience of mankind wherever attention has been directed to the subject." Whereupon, your friend, unless he is a very unreasonable man, agrees with you, and is convinced that you are quite right in the conclusion you have drawn. l-Ie believes, although perhaps he does not know he believes it, that the Inore extensive Verifications are,- that the more frequently experiments have been made, and results of the same kind arrived .at,-that the more varied the conditions under which the same results have been attained, the more certain is the ultimate conclusion, and he disputes the question no further. He sees that the experiment has been tried under all sorts of conditions, as to time, place, and people, with the same result; and he says with you, therefore, that the law you have laid down must be a good one, and he must believe it. In science we do the same thing ;-the philosopher .exercises precisely the same faculties, though in a much more delicate manner. In scientific inquiry it becomes .a matter of duty to expose a supposed law to every possible kind of verification, and to take care, more ·.Over, that this is done intentionally, and not left to a mere accident, as in the case of the apples. And in science, as in common life, our confidence in a .law is in exact proportion to the absence of varia- |