OCR Text |
Show 62 kingdom from within. For as President Young said: "You might as well tell me that you can make hell into a powder-house as to tell me that you could let an army in here and have peace."3 The Saints had been separated from Babylon, and great strides had been made to purge unrighteousness from them in recent years. To allow troops into the Territory would be to sacrifice the work of years and possibly destroy the gathering which was so essential to their millennial doctrines. One of the most repugnant features of the entire affair, from the Mormon point of view, was the forced reception of federal officers "at the point of a bayonet." Calling these officials "poor, miserable blacklegs, broken-down political hacks, robbers, and whoremongers," Brigham Young declared them to be "not fit for civilized society; so they must dragoon them upon us for officers." Governor Cumming was unfortunately believed to be one of the Jackson County mob. "There is no man," affirmed Apostle George A. Smith, "who feels a greater furor and detestation than I do, of a civil officer, who will not go beyond the reach of a bayonet to perform his duty."5 After consultation with Daniel H. Wells, second counsellor in the church presidency and\Lieutenant General commanding the Nauvoo Legion (Utah militia), and other close advisors, Brigham Young settled on a two-pronged plan that was designed to manage any situation. The primary plan was to stop the army cold in its tracks-bloodiessly if possible, with force if necessary. The secondary plan was a tactical retreat designed to ultimately take the victory by stealth rather than force. This strategy was not considered likely to be used, and emphasis was placed on the primary plan. Since the president had failed to release Young as governor of Utah or to officially notify him of his intent to send troops to Utah, the Mormon leader used the opportunity to treat the soldiers as an unidentified armed mob. As |