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Show 28 LIBERTY AND SLAVERY. with the law of God and rests upon it. Thus, civil society arises, not from a surrender of individual rights, but from a right originally possessed by all; nay, from a solemn duty originally imposed upon all by God himself-a duty which must be performed, whether the individual gives his consent or not. The very law of nature itself requires, as we have seen, not only the punishment of the offender, but also that he be punished according to a preestablished law, and by the decision of an impartial tribunal. And in the enactment of such law, as well as in the administration, the collective wisdom of society, or its agents, moves in obedience to the law of God, and not in pursuance of rightR derived from the individual. §IV. The distinction between rights and liberty. In the foregoing discussion we have, in couformity to the custom of others, used the terms rights and liberty as words of precisely the same import. But, instead of being convertible terms, there seems to be a very clear difference in their signification. If a man be taken, for example, and without canse thrown into prison, this deprives him of his liberty, but not of his right, to go where he pleases. The right still exists; NATURE OF CIVIL LIBEHTY. 20 and his not being allowed to enjoy this right, is precisely what constitutes the oppression in the case supposed. If there were no right still subsisting, then there would be no oppression. lienee, as the right exists, while the liberty is ' extinguished, it is evident they arc distinct from each other. The liberty of a man in such a case, as in all others, would con sist in au opportunity to enjoy his right, or in a state in which it might be enjoyed if he so pleased. This diRtiuction between rights and liberty is all-important to a clear and satisfactory discussion of the doctrine of human ft·ecdom. The great champions of that freedom, from a Locke down to a Hall, firmly and passionately grasping the natural rights of man, and confounding these with his liberty, have looked upon society as the restrainer, and not as the author, of that liberty. On the other hand, the g1·eat advocates of despotic power, f1·om a RobbeR down to a Whewell, seeing that there can be no genuine libcrty~that is, no secure enjoyment of one's rights-in a state of nature. have ascribed, not only our liberty, but all ~ur existing rights also, to the State. But the enor of Locke is a noble and gene· ~:ous sentiment when co,.m pared with the odion• |