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Show 354 LIBERTY AND S LAVERY. uunal in which the great question uuclct· consideration has been tried, aud everywhere refuted. By Mr. Justice Nelson, in the Snpt·eme Court of New York,* by Mr. Senator Bishop, in the Court of Errors in the same State, t and by Mr. Justice Story, in the Supreme Court of the United States, it has been so clearly, so powerfully, and so triumphantly dcmolishecl as to leave nothing more to be desired on the subject. And besides, it has been our object not so much to refute arguments against the law in question, or to establish that which has been so long established, t as to show on what slender grounds, and yet with what unbounded confidence, the greatest champions of abolitionism are accustomed to oppose the Constitution, the laws, the judicial decisions, and the uniform practice, of the whole government under which we live. In pursuance of this design, there is another sophism of theirs, which it now devolves upon us to examine. We allude to the argument *XII. Wendell, p. 814. t XIV. Wendell, p. 530; XVI. Pctere, p. 608. l Indeed, if we bad produced all the arguments in favor of the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law, it would have car· ried us far beyond our limits, o.ud swelled this single chapter into a volume. THE FUGITIVE S T,AV E I~AW. 355 that the Fugitive Slave Law is unconstitutional, because it denies the right of trial by jury. Is this still an open question? In the biography of Mr. Justice Story, published by his son, it is said : "The argt1ment that the Act of 1793 was unconstitutional, because it did not provide for a trial by jury accorcli ng to the requisitions of the sixth article in the amendment to the Constitution, having been suggested to my father on his return from Washington, be replied that this question was not argued by counsel nor considered by the court, and that he should still consider it au open one." Mr. Sumner adduces this "distinct statement that the necessity of trial by jury was not before the court;" and adds, "So that, in the estimation of the judge himself, it was still an open question." In the case here referred to-Prigg v. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, reported in · XVI. Peters-it is true that the question of trial by jury was not argued by counsel nor considered by the court. But if the greater includes the less, then this question was embraced in the decision; for, in that case, Prigg had seized the fugitive slave without process, and carried her n.way withont any certificate from |