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Show 36 LIBERTY AND SLAVE.H.Y. consigning them to a state of servitude. "Such an act," says he, "is wrong, because it is a violation of the inalienable rights of all men." But let us see if his complaint be just or well founded. It is pretended by no one that society has the right to deprive any subject of either life or liberty, without good and sufficient cause or reason. On the contrary, it is on all hands agreed that 1t is only for good and sufficient reasons that society can deprive any portion of its subjects of either life or liberty. Nor can it be denied, on the other side, that a man may be deprived of either, or both, by a preordained law, in case there be a good and sufficient reason for the enactment of such law. For the crime of murder, the law of the land deprives the criminal of life: a fortiori, might it deprive him of liberty. In the infliction of such a penalty, the law seeks, as we have seen, not to deal out so much pain for so much guilt, nor even to deal out pain for guilt at all, but simply to protect the members of society, and Becu>·e the general good. The general good is the sole and sufficient consideration which justifies the state in taking either the life or the liberty of its subjects. Hence, if we would determine in any case NATURE Ol' CIVIL LIBERTY. 37 whether society is justified in depriving any of its members of civil freedom by law, we must first ascertain whether the general good demands the enactment of such a law. If it does, then such a law is just and good-as perfectly juHt and good as any other law which, for the same reason or on the same ground, takes away the life or liberty of its subjects. All this talk about the inalienable rights of men may have a very admirable meaning, if one will only be at the pains to search it out; but is it not evident that, when searched to the bottom, it has just nothing at all to do with the great question of slavery? But more of this hereafter.* This great problem, as we have seen, is to be decided, not by an appeal to the inalienable rights of men, but simply and solely by a reference to the general good. It is to be decided, not by the aid of abstractions alone ; a little good sense and practical •agacity should be allowed to assist in its determination. There are inalienable rights, we admit-inalienable both because the individual cannot transfer them, and because society can never rightfully deprive any man of their enjoyment. But life anrl * Chap. H. i x. 4 |