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Show ALL THOUGHT NATURAL· of any kind. It is not even a quality or appearance of a thing or being. It is a mere state or mo_de of the mind; and the mind can no more remembe! 1ts states than men can build houses without maten3;ls. The mental state is a mere relation and in itself 1t may be a relation which is altogether impossible in pra?tic:, or it may be one which is possible ; for the relatl_on t:::> a particular kind of reference to two ?r more thmgs and it depends on the nature of the thmgs ~hemselves whether they can or cann~t haye that relatwn to eacl~ other. The relation of JUmpmg over the moon? or boring through the centre of the ea!th, comes J~lst as readily to the mind as the relatiOn of stepp~ng from one side of the path to the other, o~ of bonng through a sheet of paper wit_h a pin; and 111 as _far as the immediate act of the mmd IS concerned, 1t has just as much of what we c3:ll "powe-r:" in th~ two instances that are first mentwned, as 1t has 111 the other two: and ridiculous as it appears when set down in words a man has mentally as much power to stand on the' sun and kick all the planets in tnrn, or even all at once, as he has to kick even the smallest pebble out of his way. ~11 are equally momen~ary in the thought, and there IS not the smallest fatLgue in thinking of either. In the one case we say that the thought is" un-natural" and in the other that it is "natural;" and there l~rks an ambiguity in these words which mars our understandincr by leadino· us to confound one thing with anothebr,' or to consi0 der two t hm' g~ as on1 y one. A relation may be natural to t~e mmd, o~· 1t may be natural to the subjects ?f wh1ch _the mmd considers it a relation. To the mtnd that tlnnks, every thoua-ht must be natural; because an unnatural thought would be a thoucrht that the n1ind did not think, 0 which is an impossibility. . That the relation shall be natural to the subJects of which we think it a relation, is a very different matter. It does not depend upon us or our thinl<i~g-, but on the subjects themselve-.:; and we cannot thud: V.ALlJJo: OF OBSERVATION. 41 our~elves into t~e knowledf{e of even the simplest subjec~, or the simplest quality of that subject. We can thmk only of that whicl! we know ; and, therefore, though we can apply relatwns to subjects to which they ~ev~r were applied before, and thus find out co_mb~natlons that are new, we cannot by mere thmkmg add one iota to our knowledge of subjects ~f we could do that in any one case, we could do it m all cases ; and we would know the unseen and the future, as wel~ as ~hat which is present before our eyes or sou_nding m our ears. The fact is, that if we could thmk knowledge, all the senses of the body and the body itself, would be superfluities and encum~ bran~es to ~s ; and our whole being, instead of displaymg, as It does, the very perfection of wisdom would be an absurdity. ' But though_the mind cannot quit its unseen citadel, and _go forth 111 quest of the knowledge, it can send out Its messengers ; and it can send them as far as s?und reaches, or heat warms, or light shines. 'I hence the senses are capable of bringincr th~ knowledge of all that_ affects them ; and the o mind can apply all the relatwn_s. Hence the great value of_ oBSERVATioN, and the Ignorance, blundering, and m~sery of those who do not duly practise it. The mmd c3:n comp~re ~ubjects, or judge, as we are in th~ hab1_t of callmg It; but t~e mind always appeals to Its ~Itnflsses, the ~enses, m the case of subjects an~ exJ~tences; and It can have firm and absolute l.,ehe~ no farther than it is borne out by them. It IS f:ere ~ha~ the obstacle lies which keeps so many ot us 111 Ignorance, leads us into error and causes us to b'3 miserable amid all the fascin~tions ?f a world, the mere contemplation of which would. tf we knew bPtter, ?ll us w_ith perpetual delight, and reduce to comrarahve noth111g those little disappointments and c_ares which keep us in a state of annoyance, and. hm,ler us from tasting " the good whi-ch God has gtveu us." We do not distinguish between |