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Show CHAPTER NINETEEN Federal Legislative Jurisdiction THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT exercises exclusive governmental powers in the District of Columbia, and in more than 5,000 other places within the various states. They embrace almost six million acres of land, much of which is public land as defined in this Commission's Organic Act. Nearly one million people live in these areas and, together with millions of seasonal occupants and visitors, have a vital interest in the rules of law which govern them during their periods of residence or visitation on the public lands. As detailed below, the Commission is concerned with this subject and about the lack of legal certainty regarding the rights of the people who inhabit or visit the public lands. The "Jurisdiction Clause" of the Federal Constitution x provides that the Federal Government shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such area, not exceeding 10 miles square, as may become the seat of government, and similar authority over all places acquired by the Federal Government, with the consent of the state involved, for Federal works. A Federal statute enacted in 1841 required states to consent to exclusive Federal legislative jurisdiction over properties acquired by the Federal Government on which it would place improvements.2 Anxious to have Federal installations, such as post offices and arsenals within their boundaries, the state governments responded by enacting general consent statutes which were applicable to all land thereafter acquired by the Federal Government. Through reservations in Statehood Acts and by outright cessions, the Federal Government has also acquired legislative jurisdiction over substantial acreages of public domain land to which the 1841 statute 1 Art. I, § 9. 2 40 U.S.C. §255 (1964). never applied. The Supreme Court held such reservations and cessions to be constitutional, even though they were not covered by the "Jurisdiction Clause." 3 There are in the National Park System, for instance, over 11 million acres of public domain land concerning which some legislative jurisdiction has been reserved in Statehood Acts or ceded by the states. The courts held that the state consent statutes conferred a benefit upon the United States which was presumed to be accepted unless specifically rejected by legislative action, or otherwise. It was held that it was unnecessary for the United States to request exclusive jurisdiction in order to obtain it.4 Federal administrators were reluctant to suggest that the United States not accept exclusive jurisdiction over lands to which the state consent statutes were applicable. And, although most of the state consent statutes were amended over a period of time to provide for the reservation of some measure of jurisdiction, the result was that for a period of almost 100 years the United States obtained more than proprietorial jurisdiction over most of the lands acquired by it. At the same time, paradoxically, state jurisdiction continued to extend to the bulk of lands that had never left Federal ownership. In 1940, the 1841 statute was amended by Congress to eliminate the presumption of Federal acceptance and to make acquisition of exclusive jurisdiction discretionary with Federal administrators.5 The amendment served to retard the acquisition of exclusive jurisdiction by the Federal Government on acquired properties. But it did not entirely eliminate the practice, since some Federal administrators, perhaps from force of habit, failed to take affirmative 3 Fort Leavenworth Railroad Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525 (1885). 4 Ibid. 5 54 Stat. 19. 277 |