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Show the process was used to keep land available for disposition under various grants. Eventually, the process began to be used for land and resource preservation programs. The extensive forest and mineral reservations referred to above were related to congressional action providing for the management of those resources. This was also a method to allocate public domain lands among various Federal agencies for the conduct of their programs. Recent criticism of withdrawal policies has come primarily from economic user groups, such as the timber and mining industries, since many withdrawals curtail economic uses of the public lands to favor recreation or noneconomic values. Also, concern has been expressed by some members of Congress about sound Executive withdrawals on the ground that the actions should be taken by Congress or were in disregard of statutory limitations. In short, the excessive use of Executive withdrawals has become a source of increasing controversy. The Commission has considered this problem in all its dimensions, looking beyond the traditional legal arguments over the respective roles of the legislative and executive branches in this field. We find the problem rooted in shortcomings of both branches. It seems clear that the Executive's liberal use of the withdrawal power stemmed from a necessity to meet public land management needs for which existing public land laws were either inadequate or nonexistent. Congress, on the other hand, did relatively little to remedy the statutory deficiencies which spawned the liberal use of the withdrawal technique, nor did it attempt any restraint through legislation other than on a piecemeal basis. Following enactment of the Pickett Act noted above, in United States v. Midwest Oil Co.,1 a 1915 case challenging the validity of a pre-Pickett Act withdrawal, the Supreme Court interpreted the failure of Congress to object to the practices of the executive branch prior to 1910 as acquiescence equivalent to an implied grant of power to make temporary withdrawals. The court did not then or since then rule whether the act imposed a limitation on the inherent withdrawal power asserted by the Executive. It may be argued that Congress intended to circumscribe all preexisting withdrawal power of the Executive. However, the Attorney General in 1941 held that the Pickett Act limited the President's asserted nonstatutory power only with regard to temporary withdrawals, and that he could continue to make permanent withdrawals without statutory authorization.8 Congress has not acted to modify that interpretation. At present Congress exercises the exclusive power over withdrawals for some single use purposes, such as national parks and wilderness areas. But with the exception of requiring congressional sanction for defense withdrawals in excess of 5,000 acres,9 there is no statutory restriction on the asserted permanent withdrawal authority of the Executive. The only existing supervisory control is through an informal agreement of the Department of the Interior to notify the concerned committees of Congress of proposed withdrawals for nondefense purposes in excess of 5,000 acres. As indicated by the preceding discussion, the use of the withdrawal power as a tool for land planning by the administrative agencies is ambiguous because its limitations are unclear. The continuing, and proper, concern of Congress limits the manner in which this tool is used, but congressional concern is uneven from time to time and place to place. The "Multiple Use" Problem Congressional actions setting aside some public domain lands for parks recognized that these areas could produce more than one kind of value, but had to be protected to assure that the primary value was not lost because of other uses of these areas. Congress has established national parks "to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." 10 To accomplish this objective, most nonrecreational uses are prohibited or sharply limited. Use of wilderness areas established by the 1964 Act1X are restricted in much the same way. A somewhat different concept has been used for wildlife refuges and ranges, and for national recreation areas. These areas are designated for a primary use, but other uses are permitted to the extent that they are compatible with the primary use. On the remaining public lands, the national forests and the Bureau of Land Management public domain, Congress has not defined the primary purpose of use of the lands, but rather has provided the broad "multiple use" authority referred to above with only very general statutory guidelines. However, because of their ambiguity, these acts have failed in some ways to provide adequate guidance. Arguments have also arisen over the application of the term "multiple use" to lands that are set aside for specific purposes, such as the national parks and 7236U. S. 459 (1915). 8 40 Op. Atty. Gen. 73 (1941). M3U.S.C. §§ 155-158 (1964). 10 16U.S.C. § 1 (1964). « 16U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1964). 44 |