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Show priority dates. Procedures also were recommended for clarifying inaccurate and inadequately defined rights. Measures such as these to more accurately define claims to rights of water use were taken as a first step in establishing the user fee or concession tax system in Ecuador, described in Chapter I. In that case, however, a new filing had to be made for all rights whether already recorded or not. The next step was to impose a tax on the rights as claimed. The problems of imposing fees on the rights to water use in eastern states that adhere to a riparian doctrine of water rights would be quite different than those for appropriation states. The first and most significant action required of these states probably would be the establishment of state ownership of the water and the institution of an administrative rights or permit system. The creation of a permit system in Florida in 1972 represents an eastern states trend toward increased regulation of both surface and groundwater resources. Thus, the prospects for imposing user fees on rights to use water, which, of course, depend upon records will be enhanced. Since the beneficiaries of municipal water service are easy to identify and those persons not willing to pay for the service can be excluded, this use lends itself to the application of pricing policies. Side stepping the issue of deficiencies in current pricing policies of municipalities, e. g., average cost instead of marginal cost pricing, one might conclude that this would offer the least complications to the state in establishing user fees. The municipality and its existing water rate structure presents an immediately available collection system for a state imposed surcharge. Water rates are by no means uniform across the nation or within a state, and rates could be raised substantially in many cities and still be relatively low. In light of this, a state surcharge could be designed as a " rate leveler," i. e., to be assessed on a graduated scale which would charge low rate payers more than high rate payers. In spite of the possible advantages, the fact that municipal water departments are faced with inflated costs of operation and that city dwellers, wielding substantial voting power, may feel they are paying more than their share of state water development costs through a new state surcharge could make such a course of action difficult. Instituting fees on navigation uses of water, subsidized by the federal government for almost two centuries, would require a drastic break with tradition. Recently, however, the policy of free use has been questioned, and a number of fee systems are possible including license fees, fuel taxes, and segment tolls. The prospects for the institution of state fees on this use do not appear to be good in light of the dominant federal powers granted by the Constitution. Legal questions pertaining to state rights with respect to navigation would have to be answered to determine if a system of state user fees is possible. Since occupants of flood prone areas face quantifiable financial risks in connection with property values as affected by flood hazards, the introduction of a system of user charges for flood protection is possible. Compulsory flood insurance is an example of the use of pricing schemes in this area. Effluent charges have been studied and recommended for controlling waste disposal in water courses. Because of long standing state authority and activity in water administration, states would seem to stand in a good position to impose state user charges not only for control, but for financing construction costs. Although institutional problems and problems of gaining public acceptance loom large with respect to imposing a new system of state user charges on outdoor recreation, fish and wildlife, hydroelectric power and irrigation use, the legal hurdles do not appear insurmountable. States already collect fees and sell licenses for outdoor recreation and fish and wildlife uses. Mechanically, the imposition of a surcharge for water use per se on top of existing fees would seem to be relatively simple. State charges on power produced from hydro plants appear to be fairly straight forward, too. Because of the multitudinous and diverse institutional arrangements and inadequate metering under which irrigation water is distributed a comprehensive system for collecting fees from irrigation uses would be difficult to design. However, organized irrigation companies and districts afford a readily available mechanism for imposing charges on a substantial number of rights holders and users. In the case of irrigated uses, in western states there would be a question to settle on the legality of imposing state fees on irrigation supplies provided by federal reclamation projects. Since reclamation law recognizes state systems of water rights the problem may be minimal. CONCLUSIONS Because rather drastic changes from traditional ways of paying or not paying for water uses are entailed in instituting a system of state fees on water uses, the short run prospects of implementing a broad system of fees are poor. Implementing legislation would require the support of the public, all of whom are users of water in one way or another. Recognition that water development benefits bestowed upon a few are being paid by the public in general has not been of sufficient concern to policy makers to date to provide impetus for change. Social goals and political pressures for abundant low cost water are partly responsible. With mounting pressures for additional water and fewer tax funds to pay for it, the long run prospects of implementing water use fees are better. It seems reasonable for states to move toward a greater role in financing water development, and user charges in one form or another constitute one approach to additional funds for states. The imposition of user fees, if fully understood by the public, may be just as acceptable a source of additional funds as 48 |
