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Show Waters that are navigable only in intrastate commerce, or from one point to another point within the same State, are not within the regulatory authority of the United States, but are subject to the regulatory authority of the States ( The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557 ( 1870)). These regulatory powers must, of course, be distinguished from ownership rights. This distinction was made clear by the United States Supreme Court in Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 229 ( 1845), wherein the Court said: To Alabama belong the navigable waters and the soils under them, in controversy in this case, subject to the rights surrendered by the Constitution to the United States; and no compact that might be made between her and the United States could diminish or enlarge these rights. ( See Also, Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367 ( 1842)). The concept of " ownership" of navigable waters has never been defined or clarified with any degree of precision. The Supreme Court of the United States has observed that the state ownership of the water and the underlying soil is closely related to a regulatory power and duty to protect public uses of navigable waters, their beds and shorelands: The State holds the propriety of this soil for the conservation of the public rights of fishing thereon, and may regulate the modes of that enjoyment so as to prevent the destruction of the fishery... This power results from the ownership of the soil, from the legislative jurisdiction of the State over it, and from its duty to preserve those public uses for which the soil is held. ( Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71, 75 ( 1855)). 2. Non- navigable Waters Waters that are non- navigable come within different legal rules. In England, there were no public rights in non- navigable waters, and they were considered to be private waters owned by those who owned the adjacent ( riparian) uplands ( Johnson v. O'Neill, 105 Law Times Rep. 587, 597 ( House of Lords, 1911)). The doctrine of riparian rights, as it developed in England and as it has been adopted by most of the Eastern States in this country, entitles each riparian owner to make a reasonable use of the water so long as the flow of the stream is not materially diminished in volume or unreasonably deteriorated in quality ( Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 18- 25 ( 1894)). In appropriation States, no material distinction is drawn between ownership of navigable and non- navigable waters, since all waters are deemed to be owned by the " public" in general and not susceptible to private ownership while flowing in natural channels; and in some instances public rights of use for recreational purposes have been recognized in non- navigable waters even though the beds are privately owned ( see, e. g., Day v. Armstrong, 362 P. 2d 137, 145 ( Wyo. 1961). The question then arises as to the relationship of state doctrines with respect to the ownership of water to federal ownership interests. These relationships are summarized below. B. Federal Ownership Interests When the United States acquired territory by purchase and cession, it acquired all proprietary rights and regulatory authority over the territory acquired. As a landowner, the United States thus acquired riparian rights along watercourses, because the riparian rights regime of water law was the only one in existence at the time these areas were acquired. When the United States subsequently sold lands along watercourses to private persons, and issued patents thereto, the private patentees naturally claimed riparian water rights. In the West, however, the States had begun to develop appropriation concepts, the basis of which was that the first person to use water for a beneficial use had the prior right to water from the watercourse, without regard to whether he owned any land riparian to the stream. It was natural that conflicts arose between patentees of the Government who claimed riparian rights and those who claimed appropriation rights under state law ( see, e. g., Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 ( 1855); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 ( 1882)). Congress enacted mining and homestead legislation in 1866, 1870, and 1877, with an apparent authorization for water use under appropriation principles of the various States. In 1935, the United States Supreme Court held that these statutes evidenced a congressional intent that water- use in appropriation States be pursuant to water rights acquired in accordance with state law ( California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U. S. 142 ( 1935)). This apparently was not a renunciation or disclaimer by the United States of all riparian water rights which it owned, but merely a declaration that patentees who received conveyances of land from the United States received no riparian water rights as part of the conveyance; and that if they desired water rights, they would have to proceed in accordance with the requirements of the State wherein the land was located. Thus, if the State recognized riparian rights, the patentee would enjoy such rights as measured by state law; and if the State recognized only appropriation water rights, then the patentee would have to make an appropriation in the manner required by the law of the State. But, with respect to lands that remained in federal ownership, some species of riparian rights apparently continued in existence. As noted earlier, the doctrine of riparian rights allows the owner of land adjacent to a natural watercourse to make a reasonable use of the water within the watercourse. The first clear evidence of the continued existence of federal riparian rights surfaced in Winters v. United States, 207 U. S. 564 ( 1908), where the Court held that 82 |