||"LET'S CLEAR THE AIR" 17 the Clean Air Act. One of the most interesting efforts by the Department of Commerce is through a group called the National Industrial Pollution Control Council. The principal function of this organization is to issue reports and press releases explaining and defending industry's position. That industry has the right to do such things on its own is self-evident; that it issues them under the imprimatur of the Department of Commerce is indicative of the adversary system at work within the governmental air-pollution-control effort. The Bureau of Mines of the Department of the Interior has the responsibility to serve the mining and fuel industries. It has regularly commissioned and published reports attacking proposed EPA actions as being harmful financially to the mining industry. The President's Office of Science and Technology has been enlisted on the side of the auto industry in opposition to the EPA and opposition to the Clean Air Act of 1970. They issued a long and detailed report calling for Congressional repeal of those provisions of that act which were most distasteful to the auto industry. Presiding over this adversary system, as judge and jury is the Office of Manpower and Budget, which reviews all the proposed actions of EPA, and clears them with other agencies. In case of conflicts, the resolution is finally in their hands. Those who want quick action on environmental matters find this intra-government adversary system a significant stumbling block to that action. Those who fear that prompt action may be hasty and misguided refer to it as the "checks and balances which the founding fathers wisely put into our government." The Economics of Delay My second observation is that delaying the enforcement of pollution control regulations is freauently profitable for industry, so that they will use the legal means at their disposal to delav the enforcement of pollution control regulations upon them. The clearest example of this was probablv the coal industry's response to the enactment bv New Jersev of fuel-sulfur regulations in 1968. These regulations forbade the sale of high-sulfur coal in that state. By challenging the constitutionality of the regulations the coal companies delayed their enforcement for a full year. They probably knew they would lose, but thev also knew that the profit they would realize by being able to sell high-sulfur coal in New Tersey for that additional year was much greater than their legal costs of obtaining this delav. There are numerous cases now in the courts which I believe are of the same type as the New Jersey coal industry suit; the industry expects to lose them, but expects to profit from the delav while the cases are litigated.