||16 TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REYNOLDS LECTURE the public point of view those dismissed on loyalty grounds from those whose employment was severed for any number of other reasons. It also broadened the base for dismissal by adding to or altering the standards which had been enumerated in the Executive Order of 1947. One of these modifications literally required speculation, for it stated that loyalty investigators should consider: any facts which furnish reason to believe the individual may be subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure which may cause him to act contrary to the best interests of the national security. In this standard, the movement away from prior performance was complete. Now the question was whether the employee might in the future be subjected to influence which might in the future cause him to act in a disloyal way. The second modification worthy of note was one which continued the standard permitting consideration of sympathetic association with any totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive groups, but eliminated the requirement that such group be so designated by the Attorney General. The reason for this elimination no doubt stems from the fact that the Supreme Court ruled in 1951 that before an organization could be placed on the Attorney General's "blacklist" it was entitled to a fair hearing.19 Eliminating the provision requiring that he designate which groups fell within the ban but retaining the standard of sympathetic association simply meant that security officers were free to determine for themselves what associations could be classified within the description referred to above. Thus words incapable of precise definition were made more susceptible to the vice of subjectivity. The aforementioned extracts from various executive orders relating to the loyalty programs are sufficient to provide insight into the patterns which they established. Few would take issue with their objectives. Serious questions may, however, be raised as to the desirability of instituting mass loyalty investigations and as to the manner in which these programs were executed. The fact that the approach directed by these orders represented an abrupt and radical departure from historic practice has not attracted deserved attention. For 140 years our government found it sufficient to discharge employees on the basis of the acts which they committed. Inquiry into beliefs, opinions, motives, associations was not considered necessary or even desirable. In fact in a more confident age, 1884 to be exact, a civil service rule was issued which expressly stipulated that: no question in any form or application or in any examination shall be so framed as to elicit information concerning the political or religious opinions or affili- 19. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).