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Show S5b LTFE OF GEN' . JACKSON. CHAP. its importance merited, and immediate measures taken ~to increase its strength, and prepare it against any future iSis. attack that might be made. Tlus delay of the British commander was evidently designed, that, pending the negotiation, and before it were concluded, an opportunity might be had, either of tlrrowing over reinforcements, or removing colonel Thornton and his troops from a' situation believed to be extremely perilous. Early next morning, general Lambert returned his accept· ance of what had been proposed, with an apology for having failed to reply sooner : he excused the omis· sion, by pleading a press of business, which had occa· sioned tlie communication to be overlooked and ne. glected. Jackson was at no loss to attribute the delay to tl1e correct motive: the apology, however, w.as as perfectly satisfactory to him, as any thing that could have been offered; beyond tl1e object intended to be elrected, he felt unconcerned, and, having secured tl1is, rested perfectly satisfied. It cannot, however, appear otl1erwise than extraordinary, that tl1is neglect should have been ascribed by the British general to accident, or a press of business, when it must have been no doubt of greater importance, at that moment, thap any thing he could possibly have had before him. Arm;st;cc The armistice was this morning concluded, and conclud- agreed to continue uptil two o'clock in the evening. The ~~~. 9. remaining dead and wounded were now temoved from the field, which, for three hundred yards, in front of our line, they had almost literally covered. For the reason already given, our soldiers, within the line of demarkation between the two camps, delivered over to the British, who wer.e not permitted to cross it, the UFE OF GEN. JACKSON. S57 dead for burial, and tl1e wounded on parole, for which CHAP. it WaS stipulated an equal number of American prison- X. ers should be restored. ~ It. has seldom happened that officers were more deceived in their expectations, tl1m1 in the result of this battle, or where they atoned more severely their error : their reasoning had never led them to conclude that militia would maintain their ground, when warmly assailed : no other belief was entertained, than, alarmed at the appearance, and orderly firm approach of veteran troops, they would at once forsake the contest, and in flight seek for safety. At what part of our line they were stationed, was ascertained by information derived through a deserter, on the 6tl1 ; and influenced by a belief of their Wa!lt of nerve, and deficiency in bravery, the main assault was urged at this point. They were indeed militia ; but the enemy could have assailed no part of our entrenchment, where they would have met a warmer reception, or where they would have found greater strength : it was indeed the best defended part of the line. The Kentucky and T ennessee troops, under generals Carroll and Adair, were here, who had already, on former occasions, won a reputation that was too dear to be sacrificed. These divisions, alternately charging their pieces, and mounting the platform, poured forth a constant stream of fire, that was impossible to be withstood, repelled the advancing columns, and drove them from the field, with prodigious slaughter. There is one fact told, to which general credit seems to be attached, and which clearly shows what little fear was entertained of any determined opposition our 1815. |