OCR Text |
Show SOB Ltn: OF GEN. JACKSON. CHAP. should be in a state of greater forwardness, Jackson ~ordered the levee to be cut,_ about an hundred yards 1814. below. The river being very high, a broad stream of water passed rapidly through the plain, of the depth of thirty or forty inches, which prevented any approach of tmops on foot. Embrasures were formed, and two pieces of artillery, under the command of lieutenant Spotts, early on the morning of the 24th, were placed in a positiot~ to rake the road leading up the levee. He was under constant apprehensions, lest, in spite of his exertions below, the city might, through some other route, be reached and destroyed ; and those fears were increased to-day, by a report that a strong force had arrived-had debarked at the head of lake Borgne, and compelled an abandonment of the fort at Chef Menteur. This, however, proved to be unfounded: the enemy had not appeared in that direction, nor had the officer, to whom this fort, so much relied on, had been entrusted, forgotten his duty, or forsaken his post. Acting upon the statement that major Lacoste had retired from the fort, and fallen back on bayou St. John, and incensed that orclers, which, from their importance, should have been faithfully executed, had been thus lightly regarded, he hastened to inform him what he had understood, and to forbid his leaving his position. " The battery I have placed under your command must be defended at all hazards. In you, and the v~lour of your 'troops, I repose every confi. dcnce ;-let me not be deceived. With us, el'.ery thing goe;; on well : the enemy has not yet advan~e~. Our troops have covered themselves with glory : 1t IS a noble. example, and worthy to be followed by all. LIFE OF GEN. JACKSON. 509 Maintain your post, nor ever tl1ink of retreating." To CHAP. inspire confidence, and ensure safety, colonel Dyer, .._..I.X,..... ._, and two hundred men, were ordered here, to give 1814_ additional strength, and act as videttes, in advance of the occupied points. General Morgan, who, at tl1e English turn, commanded the fort on the east bank of the river, was instructed to proceed as near the enemy's camp as prudence and safety would permit, and, by destroying tl1e levee, to let in the waters of the Mississippi between them. The execution of this order, and a similar one, previously made, below the line of defence, had entirely insulated the enemy, and prevented his march against either place. On the 26tl1, however, the commanding general, fearing for the situation of Morgan, who, from the British occupying the intermediate ground, was entirely detached from his camp, directed him to abandon his encampment, carry off what cannon might be wanted, and throw the remainder in the river, where they could be again recovered, when the waters receded; to retire to the other side of the river, and, after leaving an adequate force, for the protection of Fort Leon, to take a position on the right bank, nearly opposite to his line, and have it fortified. The necessity of this movement was imposed by tl1e relative disposition of the two armies. The same cause, however, that produced this, made it essential that St. Leon should not be neglected. From every intelligence,. obtained through deserters and prisoners, it was ev1dent that the British fleet would make an ef~ fort to ascend the river, and co-operate with the troops :Jlready landed. That this, or a div<;>rsion in a difler. |