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Show 364 DARWINIAN A. a different object, such as a spider's web, he would have inferred .both design and non-human workmanship. Of some objects he might be uncertain whether they were of human origin or not, without ever doubting they were designed, while of others this might remain doubtful. Nor is man's recognition of human workmanship, or of any other, dependent upon his comprehending how it was done, or what particular ends it subserves. Such considerations make it clear that "the label of human workmanship" is not the generic stamp from which man infers design. It seems equally clear that "the mental operation required in the one case" is not so radically or materially "different from that performed in the other" as this writer would have us suppose. The judgment respecting a spider's web, or a trap-door spider's dwelling, would be the very same in this regard if it preceded as it occasionally might, . all knowledge of whetl~er the object met with were of human or animal oriO'in. A dam across a stream, and the appearance of the stumps of trees which entered into its formation, would suggest design quite irrespective of and antecedent to the considerable knowledge or experience which would enable the beholder to decide whether this was the work of men or of beavers. Why, then, should the judgment that an~ pa1:t~cular structure is a designed work be thought 1lleg1tlmate when attributed to a higher instead of a lower intelligE: mce than that of man~ It might, indeed, be so if the supposed observer had no conception of a power and intelligence superior to his own. But it would then be more than "irrelevant ; " it would be im- EVOLUTIONARY TELEOLOGY. 365 possible, except on the supposition that the phenomena would of themselves give rise to such an inference. That it is now possible to make the inference, and, indeed, hardly possible not to make it, is sufficient warrant of its relevancy. It may, of course, be rejoined that, if this important factor is given, the inference yields no independent argument of a divine creator; and .it may also be reasonably urged that the difference between things that are made under our observation and comprehension, and things that grow, but have originated beyond our comprehension, is too wide for a sure inference from the one to the other. But the present question involves neither of these. It is simply whether the argument for design from adaptations in Nature is relevant, not whether it is independent or sure. It is conceded that the argument is analogical, and the parallel incomplete. But the gist is in the points that are parallel or similar. Pulleys, valves, and such-like elaborate mechanical adaptations, cannot differ greatly in meaning, wherever met with. The opposing argument is repeated and pressed in another form : "The evidence of design afforded by the marks of adaptation in works of human competence is null and void in the case of creation itself .•.. Nature is full of adaptations; but thl3se are valueless to us as traces of design, unless we know something of the rival adaptations among which an intelligent being might have chosen. To assert that in N a~ure no such rival adaptations existed, and that in every case the useful function in question could be established by no other instrument but one, is simply to reason in a circle, since it is solely from what we find existing that our notions of possibility and impossi- |