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Show 20 DARWINIAN A. species stand to one another, ..... the limitation of tho range of changes which animals undergo during their growth, ..•. the return to a definite norm of animals which multiply in various ways, .... the order of succession of the different types of animals and plants characteristic of the different geological epochs, .... the localization of some types of animals upon the same points of the surface of the globe during several successive geological periods, .... the parallelism between tho order of succession of animals and plants in geological times, and the gradation among their living representatives, .... the parallelism between the order of succession of animals in geological times and the changes their living representatives undergo during their embryological growtl1, 1 • • • • the combination in many extinct types of characters which in latm· ages appear disconnected in different types, .... the parallelism between the gradation among animals 4hnd the changes they undergo during their growth, . . . . the relations existing between these different series and the geographical distribution of animals, .•.. the connection of all the known features of Nature into one system-" In a· word, the whole relations of animals, etc., to surrounding Nature and to each other, are regarded under the one view as ultimate facts, or in their ultimate aspect, and interpreted theologically; under the other as complex facts, to be analyzed and interpreted 1 .As to this, Darwin remarks that he can only hope to see the law hereafter proved true (p. 449); and p. 338: ".Agassiz insists that ancient animals resemble to a certain extent the embryos of recent animals of the same classes ; or that the geological succession of extinct forms is in some degree parallel to the embryological development of recent forms. I must follow Pictet and Huxley in thinking that the truth of this doctrine is very far from proved. Yet I fully expect to see it hereafter confirmed, at least in regard to subordinate groups, which have branched off from each other within comparatively recent times. For this doctrine of .Agassiz accords well with the theory of natural selection." · THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES. 21 scientifically. . The one naturalist, perhaps too largely assuming the scientifically unexplained to be inexplicable, views the phenomena only in their supposed relation to the Divine mind. The other, naturally expecting many of these phenomena to be resolvable under investigation, views them in their relations to one another, a:ild endeavors to explain them as far as he can (and perhaps farther) through natural causes. But does the one really exclude the other? Does the investigation of physical causes stand opposed to the theological view and the study of the harmonies between mind and Nature ? More than this, is it not most presumable that an intellectual conception reafized in Nature would be realized through natural agencies? Mr. Agassiz answers these questions affirmatively when he declares that'' the task of science is to investigate what has been done, to inquire if possible !~ow it has been done, rather than to ask what is possible for the Deity, since we can know that only ln; what actually exists j" and also when he extends the argument for the intervention in .Nature of a creative mind to its legitimate application in the inorganic world ; which, he remarks, "considered in the same Hght, would not fail also to exhibit unexpected evidence of thought, in the character of the laws regulating the chemical combinations, the action of physical forces, etc., etc." 1 Mr. Agassiz, however, pronounces that " the connection between the facts is only intellectual "~an opinion which the analogy of the inor- 1 Op. cit., p. 131.-0ne or two Bridgewater Treatises, and most: modern works upon natural theology, should have rendered the evi-. deuces of thought in inorganic Nature not "unexpected." 2 |