Title |
State of Arizona, complainant v. State of California, Palo Verde Irrigation District, Imperial Irrigation District, Coachella Valley County Water District, Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, City of Los Angeles, California, City of San Diego, California, and County of San Diego, California, defendants : the United States of America and State of Nevada, interveners : State of Utah and State of New Mexico, impleaded defendants : report / Simon H. Rifkind, special master |
Creator |
United States. Supreme Court |
Subject |
Water rights; Water consumption; Rivers |
OCR Text |
Show The record of this action is another chapter in the long history of controversy relating to the Colorado River. Suit was initiated by Arizona on August 13, 1952, by filing a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint against the State of California and seven public agencies of the State.1 On January 19, 1953, the motion, unopposed, was granted. |
Publisher |
[Washington, D.C. : U.S. Supreme Court, 1960] |
Contributors |
Rifkind, Simon H. |
Date |
1960-12-05 |
Type |
Text |
Format |
application/pdf |
Digitization Specifications |
Image files generated by Photoshop CS from PDF files |
Language |
eng |
Rights Management |
Digital Image Copyright 2004, University of Utah. All Rights Reserved. |
Holding Institution |
UNLV Libraries, Special Collection, 4505 Maryland Pkwy., Las Vegas, Nevada 89154 |
Source Physical Dimensions |
ix, 433 p. ; 27 cm |
Call Number |
KFA2847.5.C6 A337 1960 |
ARK |
ark:/87278/s61835d5 |
Setname |
wwdl_azvca |
ID |
1120114 |
Reference URL |
https://collections.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s61835d5 |
Title |
page 181 |
OCR Text |
Show 181 The plain meaning California ascribes to Section 4(a) is, of course, the adoption in the Project Act of the Compact method of system-wide accounting. I cannot accept California's premise, nor if I did would I reach her conclusion. California's premise is faulty in that it characterizes Section 4(a) as an offer and the California Limitation Act as an acceptance, which together constitute a binding contract or compact between the United States and California. This analysis misreads both the Project Act and the Limitation Act. Properly analyzed, Section 4(a) is not an offer but a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the Project Act. Section 4(a) provides: "This Act shall not take effect and ... no work shall be begun ... in connection with the works or structures provided for in this Act . . . unless and until [California enacts the required legislation]." The meaning of the condition is necessarily determined by the congressional intent, just as the interpretation of other provisions of the statute is governed by such intent. Whether the condition has been satisfied is determined by examining the California Limitation Act to see whether it meets the congressional requirement. The wording of the Limitation Act is substantially identical to the limitation provision of Section 4(a). But California did not stop with the enactment of the congressional words. It went further to provide that the statute was intended to satisfy the congressional condition and should be so construed. Specifically Section 2 of the California Limitation Act provides: "By this Act the State of California intends to comply with the conditions respecting limitation on the use of water specified in subdivision 2 of Section 4(a) of the said 'Boulder Canyon Project Act' and this act shall be so construed." |
Format |
application/pdf |
Source |
Original Report: State of Arizona, complainant v. State of California, Palo Verde Irrigation District, Imperial Irrigation District, Coachella Valley County Water District, Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, City of Los Angeles, California, City of San Diego, California, and County of San Diego, California |
Resource Identifier |
193-UUM-COvAZ-SMRP_page 181.jpg |
Setname |
wwdl_azvca |
ID |
1119933 |
Reference URL |
https://collections.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s61835d5/1119933 |