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Show 272 of the World Bank and A.I.D. in further liberalization it should not be difficult to negotiate additional commodity aid, thereby ••• enabling Pakistan to avoid substantial italics added_? draw-down of reserves, even third factor was under the most unfavorable developments.u43 A the expectation that the elimination of licensing and the increased availability of the imported tially reduce prices, "The i terns would subs·tan- elimination of the spread between intemal and C & F prices would far exceed the 10' percent increase in C & F which would result from the pricesp Dr, Gilbert' s views circles but in when the viere surcharge.,,44 highly regarded not only in government circles and it was thus Consortium surcharge imposed was no great surprise (with a few exceptions) 10 percent. He felt did not share AID's view about the extent of overvaluation and the exchange values were moving toward equilibrium. As he put it: the evidence shows that the degree of overvaluation exceeds 10 percent but falls considerably short of 33 per What is more significant, rapid increase in the cent. • • • bonus support, coupled agricultural field rd. thout export external aid, suggest that in increase with the anticipated levels the degree of overvaluation, already far below the is Pakistan moving to continue decrease. of 1958-59, will Under rates. its exchange at present tov.-ard equilibrium devalue would be these circumstances precipitate action to be accurately could rate the unwise even if equilibrium established, 45 The free list liberalization policy announcement being made to the of January never as slightly expanded in The list remainder of the "free" in subsequent periods as previously on this work. was import maintained, in Ayub period. though June 1965 period because of the series been touched upon the 12, 1965 with a few minor adjustments July 1964 free list. prinCiple, throughout the ever, ras it was It was, in the how July 1964 of events which have |
