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Show 40 WAR FOR THE COLORADO RIVER that in order to make the project show a decent benefit- cost relationship. But most economists and most of the independent engineers who studied the crsp report understood the fallacy and the unfairness of using revenue from ephemeral indirect benefits to bolster the financial foundations of a project that otherwise would have been in danger of collapse. In what is perhaps over-simplification, the theory of the Bureau was that the sale of power in the area would create a prosperous community and the residents would therefore buy more cigars. The Bureau did not point out, of course, that if those same residents didn't buy their cigars adjacent to the project they would buy them some place else. The Federal Power Commission agreed that some parts of the crsp were feasible and should be built, but it sharply disagreed with the manner in which the Bureau tried to justify the over-all project.49 The Bureau had included as indirect benefits two items with which Mon C. Wallgren, chairman of the Power Commission, found fault in a letter to Com- missioner Straus.50 These two items were: 1 - The project would sell power to utilities and the utilities would sell it to private consumers at a higher price than they purchased it. There would thusly be a profit and this would create what the Bureau elected to term "retailing benefits." By some legerdemain the Bureau figured that the crsp would benefit to the tune of $17,844,000 annually from these "retailing benefits." 2 - By some other bookkeeping magic the Bureau also figured the project power benefits would include $2,327,000 annually as "a proportionate share in the |