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Show I 20 REPORT OF THE ing Indians, was only able to proceed to a point about sixty miles above Fort Pierre, and was therefore p~vented from inflicting any considerable damaga upon or crippling the power of the hostile Indiana'; nor can I learn that the campaign under General Sibley has been productiveof any very favorable re-sults, the probability being that another wpaign will be indispeus~hle. No military posts have been established upon the Upper Missouri. The friendly Indians and the few whites are left without protection, and it is to be feared that mauy thousands of the Indians, who under other circumstan.ces. would have continued faithful to their amicable relations, will be compelled to side with those in hostility, to eseape the consequences of their well-known policy of treating ss enemies all who are not identified with them. The boat conveying the annuity goods was unable to ascend the Missouri be-yond Fort Union,in consequence of the extremely low water, so that the pods designed ?or the Blackfeet agency were necessarily stored at that point, and cannot he distributed before spring. &st of. the goods designed for the In-dians, nnder charge of Agent Latta, were distributed, but with the character. istic perlidy of Indians in hostility, it is believed that a majority of the Indim receiving them were afterwards engaged in an attack upon the boat with the design of murdering the crew and passengers, and capturing tho goods designed for the Blackfeet agency. I t will thus be seen tbat the failure to establish militaryposts upon the Upper Blissouri, together with the severe and almost unexampled drought, have re-sulted in an almost complete loss of the controlling infineneewe have heretofore held upon the Indiana of that country, and that, as a consequence, the impor-tant and most direct route of the emigration setting in upon Idaho, by reason of the newly discovered and immense gold-bearing districts of that Territory, is cut off. I am not without hope that the immense sacrifices of life and treasure which will result from a general war with the numerous and powerful tribes of that country may yet be averted by timely and peaceful negotiation, and am confi-dent tbat at least the pr?portions of the struggle may be very materially re-duced; and to this e d I respectfully recommend to you, and through you to Uongress and the War Department, the importance of establishing, military posts along the Missouri, from the western limits of the State up to and in-cluding Fort Benton, at the earliest practicable moment, and that adequate measures be adopted to enable this department in <heheearslyp ring to effect such negotiations with the tribes in hostility as may be found practicable and consis-tent with a just and honorable peace. SOUTHERN SUPERINTENDENCY. This is by far the most important of our various superintendencies. whether I it be considered with reference to its numbers, wealth, geographical position, or 4 to the present condition of the Indians within its limits, their wants, their future prospects, and the careful consideration required in adopting a policy which shall at the same time prove just, generous, and humane touards those wbo have re- |