| OCR Text |
Show RIGHTS-OF-WAY FOR WATER CONTROL AND RELATED PURPOSES 271 No right vests as against the Government under these statutes until the work is completed. The United States Supreme Court held that the statutes create no title, legal or equitable, in the one who simply takes possession of the land. Under the statutes "no right or title to the land, or to a right of way over or through it, or to the use of water from a well thereafter to be dug, vests, as against the government, in the party entering upon possession from the mere fact of such possession unaccompanied by performance of any labor thereon."241 As the pueblo rights of the City of San Diego accrued prior to the passage of the Congressional acts granting rights-of-way over the public domain, rights-of- way acquired under such legislation were held by the California Supreme Court to be subordinate to the already vested rights of the city derived from its succession to the Mexican pueblo.242 (See "The Pueblo Water Right," chapter 11.) Later Acts of Congress.-An act passed in 1890 provided that all patents taken up after its date for lands west of the 100th meridian should contain reservations of rights-of-way thereon for ditches or canals constructed by authority of the United States.243 A number of enactments regarding water and hydroelectric power followed.244 Legislation enacted in 1941 relates to grants of rights-of-way to States or political subdivisions thereof.245 Some other United States Supreme Court interpretations. -According to the United States Supreme Court, the Congressional Acts of 1866 and 1870 were primitive and works for generating and distributing electric power were unknown; hence, they were not in the mind of Congress. These pioneer statutes were limited to ditches, canals, and reservoirs; they did not cover power houses, transmission lines, or necessary subsidiary structures. So, when such modern works came into use, the early statutes were found inadequate. To meet this situation, Congress passed the Act of 1896, which related exclusively to rights-of-way for electric power purposes. The Court considered it plain that the Act of 1896 superseded those of 1866 and 1870 so far as they were applicable to such rights-of-way.246 The Supreme Court held in another decision that the difference of most significance between the acts of 1891 and 1896 related to the nature of 241 Bear Lake & River Waterworks & In. Co. v. Garland, 164 U.S. 1, 18 (1896). See United States v. Rickey Land & Cattle Co., 164 Fed. 496, 499 (N.D. Cal. 1908). 242 San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co., 209 Cal. 105, 131-132, 287 Pac. 475 (1930). 243 26 Stat. 391 (1890), 43 U.S.C. § 945 (1964). 244Of these, see 26 Stat. 1101 (1891), 43 U.S.C. §§ 946-949 (1964); 29 Stat. 120(1896), 43 U.S.C. § 957 (1964); 30 Stat. 404 (1898); 43 U.S.C. § 951 (1964); 31 Stat. 790 (1901), 43 U.S.C. § 959 (1964). The Federal Power Act of 1920 provided that rights-of-way acquired prior to June 10, 1920, were not affected by this act. 41 Stat. 1063, 16U.S.C. § 816(1964). 245 55 Stat. 183.43U.S.C. § 931a (1964). 246 Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 405406 (1917), affirming in part and reversing in part, 209 Fed. 554 (8th Cir. 1913), reversing 208 Fed. 821 (D. Utah 1913). |
